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This dissertation examined the impacts of multiple collaborative planning and 
implementation processes on ecosystem management of the Everglades wetlands of 
South Florida. In particular, the research focused on collaboration’s role in (1) reducing 
phosphorus pollution in runoff from the Everglades Agricultural Area in the historic 
northern Everglades and (2) improving the water flow regime in Shark Slough of the 
southern Everglades. Restoration of the greater Everglades watershed is the largest such 
initiative in the world, and it may also be the most collaborative, with scores of these 
processes used at various scales since the mid-1960s. 
Ecosystem management is the most advanced approach to environmental 
governance, and its three tenets of integrative, adaptive, and ecologically protective 
governance provide a framework for evaluating environmental planning processes. 
Proponents of collaborative processes believe they are exceptionally suited to promoting 
the tenets of ecosystem management. Critics of collaboration, however, are concerned 
with the potential for cooptation of environmental interests, among other issues.  
Using qualitative case study methodology, the research found that collaborative 
processes improved ecosystem management, but not to the degree expected by 
collaboration proponents. Collaborative processes were integrative of values, 
information, activities, and political support across the ecosystem, yet integration had 
biases and limits as a result of groups’ strategic behaviors and processes’ emphasis on 
reaching agreement rather than fully exploring the issues. Cooptation of environmental 
interests was not a significant problem. Collaborative processes promoted adaptation and 
social learning in specific cases, but at a macro level helped to maintain the status quo of 
 xii
the dominant water management agencies and technocratic paradigms. Process outcomes 
were protective of ecological health in that they made steady, incremental progress 
towards ecological restoration. Progress had significant setbacks however, because 
collaboratively developed policies were subject to capture by economic interests. Despite 
the collaborative improvements in ecosystem management, ecological health remains a 





1.1 Everglades Governance: Progress Towards Sustainability? 
In 1994, after five years of contentious lawsuits and mediated negotiations, the 
Florida Legislature signed into law the Everglades Forever Act, launching the world’s 
largest project of constructed wetlands to treat phosphorus laden runoff entering the 
Everglades from the Everglades Agricultural Area to the north.1 Florida Lieutenant 
Governor Buddy MacKay remarked, “This is the biggest test yet of the idea of 
sustainable development…. Can we solve this without having one side or the other totally 
defeated?”2  
Environmentalists and scientists were skeptical of the state’s commitment to 
achieving the very low level of phosphorus, less than 10 parts per billion (ppb), needed 
for the Everglades to retain its characteristic “river of grass” and productive food chain 
that fed large colonies of wading birds.3 Indeed the technical plan could only guarantee a 
level of 50 ppb phosphorus after project construction, with further research necessary to 
attain the final goal. Florida International University researcher Ron Jones told the 
Washington Post in 1994, “They’ll get to 50 ppb and announce the water clean…I know 
I’m being cynical. But that’s what I think.”4  
Less than a decade later in 2003, with substantial progress towards constructing 
the 40,000 acres of treatment wetlands and reaching the interim goal of 50 ppb, but under 
looming deadlines for the state to declare a final phosphorus standard (presumably 10 
ppb), the Florida Legislature amended the Everglades Forever Act to create loopholes to 
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allow for water not meeting the state standard. The St. Petersburg Times reported, “Years 
of painstaking agreements, forged in courts and in legislative arenas, were changed in a 
matter of minutes.”5 The momentum, however, had been quietly building for several 
years. During this time, the South Florida Water Management District (District) 
conducted studies and prepared its Long Term Plan for Achieving Water Quality Goals in 
the Everglades Protection Area (Long Term Plan), which the District’s Governing Board 
approved several months before the legislative action. William Hoeveler, the federal 
judge overseeing the 1992 consent decree that settled the U.S. Department of Justice 
lawsuit that led to the Everglades Forever Act declared the Amendment “clearly 
defective.”6 Hoeveler said of the sitting Florida governor, “I think [Jeb] Bush is a good 
man and he means well…But I’m afraid he fell into the hands of those who don’t like the 
Everglades,” i.e., the powerful sugar industry, the main contributor of excess phosphorus 
to the Everglades.7 The sugar industry protested and Hoeveler was promptly removed 
from the case. A year after the Amendment, United States Sugar Corporation (U.S. Sugar 
Corp.), one of the largest sugar producers in the area, declared, “The partnership is 
working. Everglades restoration is on time and on budget. Only continuing criticism, 
threats of litigation and political undermining of the process by extremist groups stand in 
the way of achieving this goal.”8  
The sugar industry was appearing to prevail, yet events took another turn when in 
2008 newly elected Governor Charlie Crist made the surprising announcement that the 
District was negotiating to purchase U.S. Sugar Corp. for $1.75 billion, including its 
187,000 acres of farmland in the Everglades Agricultural Area.9 Rather than purchase 
U.S. Sugar Corp. to reduce its phosphorus impacts, however, the state and District eyed 
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the company’s farmland for construction of water storage reservoirs.10 This move was the 
latest step in the District’s campaign to find new sources of water for development, 
including for the growing Lower East Coast population that was expected to increase by 
62 percent between 1995 and 2025 to 7.3 million persons.11 The need for these reservoirs 
became apparent when a major water storage project, deep aquifer storage and recovery, 
under the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) became unfeasible. The 
District had initially viewed CERP, a multi-purpose collection of water management 
projects across South Florida, as the primary vehicle for meeting future water demand.12 
The state and District touted the reservoirs as environmental restoration, since improved 
water storage capacity would also reduce damaging freshwater discharges to Atlantic and 
Gulf coast estuaries, and environmental groups were excited by the potential of using the 
land purchase to restore historic overland flow from Lake Okeechobee to the remaining 
Everglades.13 
Indeed, one major ecological objective of the Comprehensive Everglades 
Restoration Plan, and the main reason for federal involvement in the plan’s formulation 
and implementation, was to improve the natural water flow regime across the remaining 
Everglades. In addition to phosphorus reduction, ecological restoration needs for the 
Everglades include removing constructed barriers to wide, shallow flow (sheet flow), 
increasing flow volume, and improving natural flow timing and variability. Yet CERP, 
which was authorized in 2000, did not promise to significantly increase flow to the 
Everglades, and projects to improve sheet flow were not scheduled for completion until 
decades later. Moreover, the foundational projects in the Shark Slough area upon which 
restored Everglades flow depends have not been implemented, even though they were 
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authorized two decades ago in 1989. Among the culprits for delay were stakeholder 
conflicts, inconsistent funding, and bureaucratic procedural requirements.14 The second 
National Research Council biennial report on the entire effort to restore Everglades flow 
criticized, “it appears that planning rather than doing, reporting rather than constructing, 
and administering rather than restoring are consuming [managers’] talents and time.”15 
Like the weather of South Florida with its hurricane-induced floods and fire-
provoking droughts, Everglades progress towards sustainability was paradoxical, 
simultaneously bringing environmental improvements amid economic development 
coups, restoration project starts and stalls, governance innovation that maintained the 
status quo, and great hope and cynicism uttered in the same breath. Was the Everglades 
ecosystem making progress towards sustainability, such as in terms of MacKay’s vision 
of effectively balancing competing needs for the good of the whole? Did governance 
leaders make good choices about the types of decision making processes and institutional 
arrangements used in order to maximize progress towards sustainability in the short and 
long runs? What can we learn from the most ambitious attempt at ecosystem restoration 
in the world? As the brief story of Everglades governance attests, evaluating a region’s 
efforts to preserve ecological health while meeting other societal needs is not a simple 
matter. Correspondingly, it is a challenge to evaluate any single initiative or type of 
initiative intended to improve environmental governance. It is, however, critical that 
researchers develop the means to empirically evaluate the choices governance leaders 
make in order to provide guidance for effective action. As the Everglades case illustrates, 
there is ample room for improvement, yet it is important that leaders discern what to 
continue, what to fix, and what to abandon in the quest for sustainability. 
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1.2 Role of Collaboration in Improving Ecosystem Management 
The most highly developed and accepted set of principles for regional governance 
in support of social-ecological sustainability is ecosystem management, and these 
principles can serve as a framework for evaluating entire governance systems, single 
initiatives, or types of initiatives.16 Ecosystem management is a systems approach to 
environmental governance that advocates decision making and institutional integration 
and adaptation, within governance and between governance and the social-ecological 
system (ecosystem), for the long-term goal of protecting ecological health.17 Ecosystem 
management can thus be explained through its integrative, adaptive, and protective tenets. 
Ecosystem management takes a holistic perspective of the ecosystem and addresses 
specific threats to social-ecological health (such as excess phosphorus and the disruption 
of natural flow in the Everglades). Ecosystem management is expected to lead to 
immediate ecological improvement as well as capacity building for future ecological 
benefits. 
Key among the types of decision making and institutional innovations intended to 
enable ecosystem management is collaboration.18 Collaborative processes bring diverse 
interests together to discuss and solve common problems, ranging from alternative 
dispute resolution processes, multi-stakeholder planning and advisory committees, 
grassroots ecosystem partnerships, and large-scale intergovernmental coordinating 
bodies. Collaborative processes differ from the traditional decision making approaches of 
the political, bureaucratic, and judicial governance systems. Incorporating collaborative 
processes into governance thus changes the manner and goals of communication and 
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decision making thereby resulting in a cascade of changes in knowledge, values, and 
actions that affect ecosystem management.  
Most ecosystem management initiatives include collaboration, and not 
surprisingly Everglades governance has made extensive use of collaborative processes, 
perhaps more than any other region in the world.19 Since the early 1970s there have been 
ten ecosystem level collaborative processes, beginning with the Governor’s Conference 
on Water Management in South Florida that sought a holistic, consensus-based view of 
the region’s “water crisis.”20 Current ongoing ecosystem level collaborative processes are 
the federally based South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Working Group, 
the District’s Water Resources Advisory Commission, and the federal-state multi-agency 
partnership to implement CERP. Since the late 1960s, governance of the phosphorus and 
Shark Slough flow disruption threats has involved sixteen and seventeen ad hoc 
collaborative processes, respectively.  
Because collaborative processes are prominent in Everglades governance, other 
ecosystem management initiatives, and ecosystem management theory, it is crucial that 
they be evaluated in terms of their ability to improve ecosystem management, especially 
ecological outcomes, in the short and long runs. Ecosystem management theory has relied 
on collaboration proponents’ perspectives of collaborative process impacts, probably 
because of a common reliance on systems thinking (ecology and complex, adaptive 
systems theory), but in actuality, the theories and research of collaborative processes have 
been inconclusive and not fully examined empirically. At the level of governance 
performance, i.e., ecosystem management, proponents state that collaborative processes 
incorporate environmental values, resolve conflicts, enhance decision making and 
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institutional legitimacy, build social networks, and improve understanding of ecosystems. 
Critics counter that collaborative processes can negatively impact the environmental 
bottom line, i.e., ecological health, because they are likely to facilitate tokenism, 
manipulation, and cooptation of environmental interests.  
Past research of collaboration has focused on evaluating the immediate, direct 
impacts of individual collaborative processes, rather than tracing systemic and 
cumulative impacts. Moreover, researchers have avoided comparing collaborative 
process impacts to those that would have likely been achieved through the use of 
traditional processes alone. Without addressing indirect, higher order impacts and making 
comparisons to alternative processes, the main theoretical debates, which have substantial 
implications for the performance of ecosystem management, remain unresolved. 
Furthermore, the environmental implications of collaboration impacts are unclear without 
explicitly relating them to ecosystem management theory. The evaluative lens of 
ecosystem management can also suggest additional types of impacts of importance, such 
as those related to the regional scale. The regional scale, for instance, has unique sets of 
stakeholders and institutions that become involved with, and are affected by, 
collaboration. 
 
1.3 Research Question and Design 
The goal of this dissertation is to tease out the progress and setbacks of 
Everglades governance in order to empirically address the question of whether or not 
collaborative decision making processes improved ecosystem management.21 The 
dissertation addresses the core debates concerning the impacts of collaborative processes 
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within the conceptual framework of the integrative, adaptive, and protective tenets of 
ecosystem management. The dissertation takes a holistic perspective of governance, 
observing patterns of behaviors that are characteristic of collaborative processes, as well 
as those of political, bureaucratic, and judicial processes, and their interactions, as 
environmental problems move through the policy cycle over several decades. The holistic 
perspective allows observation of the range of impacts expected and comparison with the 
likely impacts from alternative decision making approaches. Rather than viewing 
collaboration as being in competition with political, bureaucratic, and judicial processes, 
this dissertation considers the view that collaborative processes play a unique role that 
may improve governance performance. The dissertation findings will guide when and 
how to use collaborative processes for ecosystem management. And, more broadly, this 
dissertation advances ecosystem management theory by improving understanding of the 
political, institutional, and social aspects.  
To answer the research question, the dissertation focuses qualitative case study 
analysis on governance of the Everglades phosphorus and Shark Slough flow regime 
threats. The phosphorus threat dates back to the 1960s when construction of the Central 
and Southern Florida (C&SF) Project by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers created the 
Everglades Agricultural Area in the northern Everglades, encouraging rapid expansion of 
sugarcane production and other agriculture in the area. The C&SF Project also intensified 
disruption in natural flow that had been occurring since the early 1900s.22 Most 
significantly, the C&SF Project converted the central Everglades into large, shallow 
reservoirs and cut off the eastern Everglades by a long north-south levee, leaving 
Everglades National Park as the only portion of the Everglades managed purely for its 
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natural values. The historic flow way of Shark Slough in the southeastern Everglades was 
severed and drained. The two cases represent different types of environmental issues 
(water quality and water flow), geographic areas (northern and southern Everglades), and 
stakeholder groups. However, the fact that both cases are situated within the larger South 
Florida ecosystem improves the understanding of each case due to cross-case interactions 
and allows comparison between cases sharing the same context. 
 
1.4 Summary of Cross-Case Findings 
The dissertation reports the cross-case findings concerning the impacts of 
collaboration on ecosystem management of the Everglades. The findings explain the role 
of collaborative processes within the strong and diverse governance context found in the 
Everglades ecosystem. The dissertation found that collaborative processes did not 
significantly curtail the use of traditional processes and their impacts on governance. 
Collaborative processes were largely additive tools to overcome the shortcomings of 
traditional governance, especially as viewed from the perspective of the bureaucratic 
system (i.e., the administrative branch of government). On the whole, collaboration 
improved all three tenets of ecosystem management (adaptive, integrative, and protective 
governance), but not to the degree suggested by collaboration proponents and with 
accompanying negative impacts. The Everglades indicated a more complex story. 
Collaboration was particularly integrative of values, information, activities, and 
political support across the ecosystem, yet integration had biases and limits. 
Collaborative processes sought consensus among diverse governmental and stakeholder 
groups. Toward this end, collaborative processes promoted all values, including 
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ecological health, without addressing the fact that difficult choices would have to be 
made in order to achieve ecological restoration. Collaborative processes instead assumed 
that technology and funding would become available to meet all needs, and that policies 
would work as planned. The consensus approach resulted in problem solving integration 
only to the degree needed to resolve disputes. The resulting compromise and multi-
purpose projects promised environmental benefits, but they also had unexpected negative 
environmental impacts or were subject to capture by powerful governmental and 
economic interests.  
The political capacity building impacts of collaboration resulted in less criticism 
of economically dominated policies, but this effect was minor as environmental groups 
continued to strongly advocate their interests through a variety of means, including 
litigation. Collaboration improved social and intellectual capacity for ecosystem 
management, primarily by increasing face-to-face interactions, decision making 
transparency, and educational communications, but it likewise distracted observers away 
from the most critical, closed-meeting decision making and gave a veneer of better 
ecosystem management than actually existed. The ecosystem level collaborative 
processes and their political capacity building, however, allowed ecosystem management 
to survive during political and economic changes, and to hold governance accountable to 
environmental goals regardless of the competing forces (such as population growth).  
Collaboration paradoxically enabled adaptive governance that maintained the 
status quo. Collaboration was a planning and consensus building tool used by the 
governance elite to adapt to and overcome barriers to action caused by conflict and 
uncertainty. Toward the end of the study period, governance leaders used collaborative 
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processes proactively for high profile issues with planning flexibility. As a result, 
collaborative processes created opportunities for policy advancement sooner than would 
have occurred with the traditional processes alone. Governance leaders also used 
collaboration to facilitate development and acceptance of new elite-supported initiatives, 
as well as to maintain the dominant decision making authorities and methods (such as the 
technocratic, or “scientific,” approach).23 As a result of the strategic use of collaboration, 
the practice also ignored or delayed the resolution of particularly controversial issues. 
The net result was incremental progress of mainstream policies, many of which had 
environmental benefits, and steady strengthening of existing bureaucratic status.  
Collaborative processes facilitated governance learning about the ecosystem and 
governance self-reflection, but they did not encourage a radical re-visioning of the 
ecosystem in order to achieve ecological sustainability. The most important learning that 
occurred was the slow diffusion of integrated information among diverse groups and the 
accumulated wisdom of governance leaders with substantial collaborative experience. 
The strengthening of social capital discussed above also provided increased opportunity 
for interactions between actors, and hence governance adaptation. 
The net result of the integrative, adaptive, and other changes for ecologically 
protective governance was that collaborative processes on the whole allowed governance 
to be more responsive to all needs – environmental, economic, and governmental – rather 
than becoming mired in conflict. Environmental progress remained slow, however, since 
policy gains through collaboration were incremental, technology and funding faltered, 
and conflict resurfaced. Economic and community groups specific to the phosphorus and 
Shark Slough cases (i.e., agriculture and residential development) made sacrifices but 
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were successful in protecting their viability. The most powerful economic interest at the 
ecosystem level, the growing South Florida population, was able to plan for its needs. Yet 
even this interest group’s plans were subject to delay, at which point the collaborative 
capacity building for ecosystem management resulted in policy to shift more of the 
burden for finding new water to the communities, rather than rely on the Everglades. The 
evolution in policy towards greater environmental protection was also made possible by 
the continued strong advocacy of environmental interest groups, for which cooptation and 
manipulation by economic interests resulting from collaboration was not a significant 
problem. Despite the collaborative improvements in ecosystem management, however, 
ecological health remained a distant and uncertain prospect for the Everglades. 
 
1.5 Overview of the Dissertation 
The next chapter, Chapter 2: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework, 
elaborates on the dissertation’s research question and the supportive conceptual 
frameworks of ecosystem management theory and collaboration theory. The research 
question and conceptual frameworks suggest qualitative case study analysis, for which 
the design, case selection, and methods are presented in Chapter 3: Methodology. 
Chapters 4 through 6 provide background information and chronologies of Everglades 
governance events at the ecosystem level and for the phosphorus and Shark Slough 
threats. The next three chapters, Chapters 7 through 9, identify the impacts of 
collaboration for each of the three tenets of ecosystem management: integrative, adaptive, 
and protective aspects, respectively. The last chapter, Chapter 10: Conclusions and 
Recommendations, synthesizes the dissertation’s findings and presents recommendations 
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for practice and additional research. Appendices A, B, and C provide more information 
about each collaborative process used for the phosphorus and Shark Slough threats and at 
the ecosystem level. A list of acronyms and abbreviations is provided on pages ix and x. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Governance leaders, such as in the Everglades ecosystem, are increasingly using 
collaborative processes for environmental decision making and policy implementation, 
and many scholars and practitioners believe such processes shift governance towards the 
ecosystem management approach. That is, they expect collaborative processes to enhance 
governance integration and adaptation corresponding to ecosystem conditions in order to 
improve social-ecological protection. Fitting the theoretical expectations of collaborative 
process impacts to the tenets of ecosystem management, however, highlights knowledge 
gaps and debates. Research tailored to addressing the gaps and debates is needed, and 
such is the goal of this dissertation. The dissertation asks: does the use of collaborative 
processes improve ecosystem management? 
This chapter motivates the dissertation’s research question and design with 
development of a conceptual framework that merges theories of ecosystem management 
and collaboration. Ecosystem management theory is the most advanced and accepted set 
of principles for effective environmental governance at the regional scale and thus 
provides criteria for evaluating governance processes and institutions.1 Collaboration 
theory defines collaborative processes and identifies their many kinds of impacts. 
Following separate discussions of ecosystem management and collaboration, this chapter 
summarizes the literature with regard to how collaborative processes either help or hinder 
ecosystem management. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the knowledge gaps 
and debates and the research design needed to address them. 
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2.1 Ecosystem Management 
Ecosystem management is a complex, adaptive systems approach to 
environmental governance with a normative bias towards protecting the natural 
environment and biodiversity.2 Ecosystem management is used to protect natural systems 
of importance, such as the Everglades, by taking a holistic view of regional ecological 
systems. Society may desire to protect whole natural systems because of their landscape 
characteristics, as matrices supporting their parts, or to provide ecological services such 
as natural water storage and water quality treatment. Ecosystem management also aims to 
improve problem solving of narrowly defined problems by viewing environmental 
problems and solutions as occurring within complex, adaptive social-ecological systems 
(i.e., ecosystems). A complex, adaptive systems approach to problem solving can 
improve the likelihood of solution success and develop strategies to effectively respond 
to, and even foster, the inevitable system dynamics and surprises. The complex, adaptive 
systems approach promises improvements over traditional governance that is largely 
based upon a reductionist/mechanistic worldview, an inaccurate characterization of 
environment and society.3 Given that ecosystem management is only an approach, and 
that traditional governance is well established and has experiential wisdom, ecosystem 
management in practice can enhance rather than supplant traditional governance. 
With the focus on definable social-ecological systems, ecosystem management in 
practice consists of nested governance systems oriented around the ecosystems of 
importance (such as the Everglades and larger South Florida watershed) and problem 
solving to address specific ecosystem needs or threats (such as pollution).4 Theorists have 
developed three necessary and sufficient ecosystem management tenets based on the 
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characteristics of desirable and resilient (i.e., sustainable) social-ecological systems, the 
theory of problem solving within complex, adaptive systems, and the constraints imposed 
by current institutions and cultural norms.5 The three tenets are conceptually interactive, 
logically leading to and placing constraints on each other. Together they should foster a 
healthy, co-evolving social-ecological system. Each of the tenets has also received 
individual attention outside the context of ecosystem management as means to deal with 
complex adaptive systems more generally.6 
First, ecosystem management is integrative across the ecosystem and across 
governance scales in order to systemically solve problems and meet diverse needs (as 
required by the protective tenet below). Integration is important given that there are 
strong interactions (by definition of an ecosystem) and intense competition for limited 
resources.7 Ecosystem management thus promotes integrative institutions and decision 
making processes that gather and analyze diverse ecosystem information, jointly solve 
problems, reconcile competing interests, and coordinate activities across the full range of 
governmental, public interest, and private actors. Traditional governance, on the other 
hand, consists of political, bureaucratic, and judicial institutions and decision making 
processes designed to foster specialization, disjoint territories (usually not corresponding 
to ecosystem boundaries), competition, and isolated problem solving and interpretation of 
rules.8 Researchers have observed traditional systems’ attempts at ecosystem 
management and found serious flaws. Yaffee’s study of management of the Pacific 
Northwest forests and their endangered spotted owl noted that traditional governance was 
fragmented across jurisdictions.9 Similarly, Ernst’s study of Chesapeake Bay watershed 
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management noted competition among jurisdictions and a lack of coordination among 
environmental groups.10  
Second, ecosystem management is adaptive to adjust to (and thus allow) 
ecosystem dynamics that are important for resilience, to keep pace with rapidly changing 
conditions, information, and values, and to speed the transition towards more sustainable 
beliefs and practices. Ecosystem management thus requires institutions to actively, rather 
than passively, view actions as experiments, monitor the social-ecological system, 
evaluate trends and impacts, and modify activities, and even institutions, values, and 
worldviews accordingly (i.e., single-, double-, and triple-loop learning).11 The adaptive 
tenet emphasizes that decision making is ongoing and not only a front-end activity. 
Ecosystem management can further improve adaptability by fostering governance system 
self-organization, creativity, and innovation diffusion through flexible networks, 
diversity, and redundancy. And, just as integration occurs at different ecosystem scales, 
adaptation occurs at different temporal scales. Ecosystem management differs from the 
traditional institutions and decision making processes known for providing only limited 
opportunities for policy advancement, bureaucratic inertia and ever-tightening control, 
judicial gridlock and setbacks, lack of sufficient knowledge, and avoidance of creative 
and bold decisions that have short-term political and organizational risk but substantial 
long-term social-ecological benefits.12 Moreover, the lack of integration in traditional 
governance (discussed for the second tenet) inhibits the level of self-organization, 
creativity, and innovation diffusion. The Yaffee and Ernst studies, for example, found 
that traditional governance lacked problem-solving orientation and sufficient knowledge, 
and limited opportunities for policy advancement, respectively.13 
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Third, ecosystem management is protective of the natural environment and 
societal needs for economic development and social equity in accordance with 
sustainability theory’s “three E’s.”14 In terms of the natural environment, ecologists 
recommend that ecosystem management protect or restore ecological health (consisting 
of native species, representative native ecosystem types, and evolutionary and ecological 
processes) in coexistence with human activities.15 Protection of ecological health is the 
main aspect considered by this dissertation. The protective tenet follows from the 
integrative and adaptive tenets as well as places additional requirements on governance. 
Governance to maintain ecological health differs from traditional governance that has led 
to substantial ecological degradation and loss of resilience by privileging resource 
extraction, attempting to tightly control narrowly defined outputs, and ignoring 
environmental problems and externalities.16 The Yaffee and Ernst studies concurred, 
finding that traditional governance did not take a long-term view and economic interests 
dominated policy making, respectively.17  
Traditional governance must undergo significant institutional and decision 
making process modifications in order to achieve ecosystem management. Theorists and 
governance leaders have proposed and conducted many types of initiatives to improve 
governance performance in terms of one or more tenets of ecosystem management. One 
of the most widely recommended and used types of initiatives is collaboration.18  
 
2.2 Collaborative Processes 
Collaboration theory is rich and includes the definition of collaboration, 
typologies of collaborative processes, factors of success, and identification of diverse 
 21
types of impacts. Collaboration theory also addresses conceptual and methodological 
issues of evaluating collaborative processes. Each of these topics is important to 
theoretically and empirically relate the use of collaborative processes to outcomes for 
ecosystem management. 
 
2.2.1 Definition of Collaboration, Process Typologies, and Factors of Success 
In the United States, collaboration is often viewed as an antidote to the 
fragmentation, exclusion, contention, and inertia of “traditional” governance that impede 
effective problem solving and policy implementation.19 The U.S. Constitution disperses 
decision making authority among the political, bureaucratic, and judicial systems 
(roughly aligned with the legislative, executive, and judicial branches), as well as among 
powers split at different governance scales (e.g., federalism), interest group liberalism 
(i.e., pluralism), and bureaucratic specialization.20 Interest groups and agencies have 
traditionally accessed policy making (or policy blocking) through the political activities 
of lobbying and interagency communications, advisory councils, quasi-public 
associations, media campaigns, and ballot initiatives, as well as bureaucratic consultation 
and public participation, and the courts.21 As discussed above, these governance 
characteristics have impeded ecosystem management.  
Alternatively, collaborative processes bring representatives of diverse 
governmental and stakeholder groups together for flexible, face-to-face communication 
for information sharing, coordination, problem solving, consensus building, and conflict 
resolution. In practice, such processes manifest as alternative dispute resolution 
(specifically negotiation and mediation), multi-stakeholder technical panels or advisory 
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groups, interagency coordination groups, community-based partnerships, or some 
combination of these approaches. Collaborative process outputs include legally binding 
agreements, but most processes affect policies indirectly through process interactions, 
jointly developed information, and recommendations. 
Collaborative processes adhere to the ideal of communicative rationality whereby 
discussion and negotiation among the various perspectives improves understanding and 
decision quality. In comparison, the political system is based upon interactive political 
bargaining, i.e., pluralist politics in which organizations compete in a “political free 
market.”22 The bureaucratic system adds a dimension of administrative instrumental 
rationality that privileges technical analysis in the service of agency or jurisdictional 
mandates, and the authority of hierarchical institutions.23 The judicial system is a forum 
for inter-organizational dispute resolution and it employs highly formalized procedures 
for hearing arguments and issuing rulings based on legal rationality. Legal rationality 
emphasizes adherence to laws, institutions, and rulings to ensure standards, fairness, and 
consistency. Communicative rationality is communal and flexible, whereas traditional 
governance is competitive and controlling.  
The practice of collaboration is diverse. Individual processes vary in the extent to 
which they orient to the problem, engage stakeholders, and facilitate understanding and 
consensus.24 Collaborative processes also differ along political and legal dimensions, 
such as how much status or legitimacy they have, the resources available, and the 
authority to implement joint decisions and publicize work products. In reflecting on 
Everglades governance, for example, Robert Jones, director of the Florida Conflict 
Resolution Consortium, stated, “The Everglades mediation highlights how each different 
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decision making context, found in the most complex environmental disputes, define the 
possibilities and the players (both decision makers and experts) and present constraints 
and challenges for solutions to emerge within that context.”25 Further complicating 
evaluation, all of these aspects can change over times as processes and their contexts 
evolve.26 Collaborative process variability affects the range of possible impacts and limits 
the ability of empirical research to generalize findings from a single collaborative 
process.27 
Scholars have long recognized the potential for adverse effects of poorly 
conducted collaborative processes, and they have identified process evaluation criteria, 
called factors of success, related to improved communicative rationality.28 Proponents 
believe that better outcomes result from processes that have a greater degree of joint 
problem solving and consensus building among divergent, highly interdependent 
interests.29 Scholars have also noted the importance of contextual factors affecting 
success, including external political support, prior social and institutional networks 
focused on the issues of concern, and the timing of recommendations.30 Many of the 
current debates concerning the benefits of collaboration center around how high a 
standard processes must meet in order to yield benefits, whether the standard is 
practicable, and to what degree communicative rationality can or should replace the 
competitive and controlling rationalities of traditional governance. These debates can 
only be resolved through empirical research attuned to the complex relationships between 
collaborative processes and their governance and social-ecological contexts. 
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2.2.2 Collaborative Process Impacts 
Collaborative process evaluation theory is well developed, and scholars have 
identified a wide range of potential collaborative process impacts, all of which have 
implications for ecosystem management. Collaborative process impacts include direct 
effects, such as agreements and improved relationships between process participants, and 
indirect, higher order effects, such as implemented policies and changes in group 
behaviors. The claims of collaborative process impacts derive from a mix of theory, 
empirical studies, and experiential wisdom. Scholars have found empirical support for 
most of the direct effects, positive and negative. Scholars have only recently begun to 
conduct empirical studies of the indirect, higher order effects, which are more difficult to 
observe, since many factors contribute to systemic change.31 The literature concerning 
collaborative process impacts falls into two main camps, proponents and critics, and each 
camp represents different disciplines and emphases.  
Collaborative process proponents tend to focus on improvements in problem 
solving in the short and long runs, with the latter characterized as capacity building and 
environmental outcomes. This literature is primarily grounded in the planning, policy, 
and negotiation/dispute resolution disciplines, and much of it is inspired by complex, 
adaptive systems theory (through the work of Innes and Booher).32 Mandarano’s 
framework for evaluating the environmental impacts of collaboration sums up the types 
of impacts considered by proponents.33 Mandarano combined Gray’s criteria for 
characteristics of collaborative processes, Innes and Booher’s criteria for social outcomes 
(social, intellectual, and political capital; policy innovation; and institutional change), and 
Koontz and Thomas’ environmental output and outcome criteria, along with evaluation of 
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output quality.34 Social capital describes improved working relationships, trust, and 
norms of reciprocity; intellectual capital is shared understanding; and political capital 
represents the ability for parties to honor agreements.35 Environmental outputs pertain to 
policy changes, and outcome criteria include observable environmental changes (or, as a 
proxy, perceptions of environmental change).36 Output quality includes recommendation 
aspects such as justification for decisions, detailed plans, and use of scientific 
information.37 
Representing the critical perspective of political scientists and political 
geographers, Walker and Hurley charged, “[a] lack of political awareness…describes 
much of the [collaborative natural resource management] literature.”38 Indeed, 
proponents have considered social outcomes to explain improvements in problem 
solving, such as the generation of political capital to better implement agreements, rather 
than changes in relative group power, i.e., political restructuring.39 Indicators of political 
restructuring resulting from collaborative processes include changes in opportunities for 
decision making involvement and voice, new beliefs and behaviors of groups and their 
relation to power, creation of political or institutional tools used to advantage particular 
groups, and marginalization of certain groups, perspectives, or approaches. Critics are 
also concerned about the losses in benefits when collaborative processes replace 
traditional processes, such as the reduction in problem solving capacity or 
implementation success. 
In summary, for the purposes of this dissertation’s data analysis and organization 
of findings, the literature identified three interrelated types of impacts of collaborative 
processes: (1) process characteristics, including stakeholder representation, problem 
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solving, and conflict resolution; (2) outputs, including policies, coordination, and political 
support for policies; and (3) capacity building and political restructuring. The types of 
impacts are interrelated as the scope of impacts expands outward social-environmentally 
and temporally. 
 
2.3 Collaborative Process Impacts on Ecosystem Management 
Given the requirements of ecosystem management and the characteristics of 
collaborative processes discussed above, what do we know about the impacts of 
collaborative processes on ecosystem management, and what are the gaps in our 
understanding? The comprehensive literature review yielded the following potential 
changes in the integrative, adaptive, and protective tenets of ecosystem management.40 
Each potential impact represents a force for changing one or more of the tenets, but the 
literature review does not indicate the net effect for any tenet. Scholars have, however, 
extrapolated their findings and theories concerning direct impacts to systemic effects, and 
in these cases the conclusions become inconsistent. The terms in parentheses indicate the 
common way the literature describes the type of impact (originating with the work of 
Innes and Booher).41  
 
2.3.1 Integrative Impacts 
To begin, some scholars would argue that collaborative processes contribute to 
more integrative governance, because they bring diverse governance actors together for 
face-to-face dialog, whereas in traditional governance many actors do not communicate 
directly, or they communicate through highly restrictive processes. Such face-to-face 
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dialog would allow a greater exchange of information and decision making transparency, 
thus increasing opportunities for public input and group coordination (organizational 
change), and giving each participant a more holistic, nuanced understanding of the issues 
and a greater appreciation of stakeholder interdependencies and the need to work 
together. Face-to-face dialog can improve relationships (social capital) when participants 
become familiar with the people behind the interest groups. The improved relationships 
may continue to impact governance after the initial collaborative processes, resulting in 
strengthened civic networks.  
Collaborative processes also potentially improve governance integration if they 
holistically assemble information and analyze ecosystem issues (intellectual capital), 
creatively seek win-win solutions (policy innovation), and build shared vision, consensus, 
and support for collaborative recommendations (political capital). The shared visions and 
recommendations resulting from collaboration are expected to be highly integrative of 
diverse values and information. Scholars have noted that collaborative processes are 
usually place-based and thus provide policy recommendations tailored to each issue or 
ecosystem. Collaborative processes are generally believed to promote trust and 
reciprocity, norms of shared power, and appreciation for multiple ways of knowing. All 
the enhancements in integrative governance can create positive feedback loops promoting 
greater use of collaborative processes and strengthening of civic networks, and 
experience with the processes would improve their performance over time. 
Other scholars have noted that collaborative processes may contribute to less 
integrative governance when they replace broadly inclusive public participation 
processes or decision making by individuals or organizations with diverse constituency. 
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The literature also tempers the magnitude of integration suggested by the proponents. 
Collaborative processes, for example, may exclude groups unlikely to reach consensus 
and even when participant representation is broad, a few voices can dominate 
discussions. Additionally, the literature addresses the negative effects of increased 
integration (of a certain kind) on environmental protection, thus suggesting that tensions 
exist between the tenets of ecosystem management. Some researchers have described 
collaborative process outcomes as vague or “lowest common denominator” solutions for 
which no group is ultimately responsible. Other potential dark sides of integration are 
groupthink and distraction, or, if taken to the extreme, governmental and economic group 
cooptation of weaker groups, including environmental interests. There is also the specific 
concern that collaborative process transparency and politicization can inhibit open 
communication among some individuals such as scientists. 
 
2.3.2 Adaptive Impacts 
Collaborative processes are expected to contribute to more adaptive governance if 
they allow governance reorganization around new problems and objects of management 
(ecosystems), whereas bureaucratic and judicial institutions and processes may be more 
rigid, time consuming, and subject to distraction by concerns other than problem solving. 
Collaborative processes are also considered to be efficient forms of communication that 
allow real-time exchanges among a diverse set of actors, thus aiding coordination among 
groups. Many scholars believe that collaborative processes yield more creative solutions 
due to diverse participation, self-organizing dialog, and use of principled negotiation 
strategies. Collaborative processes can also ease tensions, resolve disputes, and provide 
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flexible (but principled) guidance, thus enabling governance to move forward with policy 
implementation. And the potential increases in governance integration discussed above, 
especially enhancements in intellectual and social capital, can facilitate governance 
adaptation. 
Some collaborative process impacts would lead governance to be less adaptive. 
Collaborative processes can require a lot of time and resources, and a ripe context, to be 
done effectively, and researchers have observed that processes are often not created until 
there is a major problem or conflict. At times, collaborative processes cannot reach 
agreement on action or policy, whereas unilateral or more restricted participation would 
be faster. Critics charge that collaborative process outputs are not exceptionally creative 
(e.g., representing the lowest common denominator), and, regardless of output quality, 
groups often revert to standard practices after collaborative processes are over. 
Governance could also be less adaptive if collaborative processes erode its creative 
potential by reducing the diversity and strength of organized interest groups. Last, 
indicating a tension with the protective tenet, governance that is more adaptive may be 
subject to problems if it allows powerful economic interests to capture agreements. 
 
2.3.3 Protective Impacts 
The impacts of collaborative processes on the protection of ecological health are 
the most dependent upon premises, and hence debated. Collaboration proponents argue 
that the use of collaborative processes is more protective of ecological health than 
traditional processes alone for reasons related to the beneficial findings for the integrative 
tenet. Proponents claim that collaborative processes give greater decision making access 
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to formerly marginalized environmental groups through direct participation and process 
transparency, and that the processes build groups’ capacity for a strong voice (such as 
through attaining ecosystem and governance information). Furthermore, collaborative 
processes’ exploration of ecosystem interdependencies and opportunities for mutual gain 
can broaden acceptance of ecologically protective policies. Proponents expect the 
integrative policies resulting from collaboration to experience better implementation 
success due to collaboration’s improvements in decision quality, political support, 
governance networks, and trust in government (i.e., the administering agencies).  
Critics express concern that the use of collaborative processes can be less 
protective of ecological health, primarily because the processes do not resolve 
fundamental value conflicts and have inadequate institutional safeguards against 
domination by powerful governmental and economic groups.42 Critics maintain that the 
integrative collaborative process outputs favor the economically-dominated status quo, 
and that devolution of decision making away from national or international levels 
abdicates federal responsibility and further privileges economic interests. Critics note that 
the marginalized (including environmental) groups are less likely to possess the strong 
communication, analysis, and negotiation capabilities required of effective collaborative 
processes, and that process design is unable to address these inequities. Additionally, 
critics charge that the collaborative process outcomes of improved relationships, 
legitimization of diverse values, and preference for cooperative approaches depoliticize 
decision making. This can leave disadvantaged participants, and the collaborative 
processes themselves, vulnerable to others’ strategic behaviors and manipulation. At the 
level of governance, depoliticization would demobilize environmental interests from 
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focusing on ecological health (or associated values) and from pursuing more combative 
avenues of change necessary to achieve environmental protection; whereas economic 
interests have narrow, immediate objectives less subject to distraction. 
One research project bears special mention because it directly spoke to the 
impacts of collaborative processes on the protective tenet, including for the Everglades. 
Natural Experiments: Ecosystem-Based Management and the Environment by Judith 
Layzer examined the environmental impacts of four “ecosystem-based management” 
initiatives and three comparison cases that used traditional processes.43 Ecosystem-based 
management, according to Layzer, “entails collaborative, landscape-scale planning and 
implementation that is flexible and adaptive.”44 One of the book’s ecosystem-based 
management case studies was planning and implementation of the Comprehensive 
Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), including a sub-case of the Modified Water 
Deliveries Project upon which CERP depends. Layzer concluded for the Everglades case: 
“The main explanation for CERP’s minimal [ecological] protectiveness is that its 
conceptual basis was generated by a collaborative planning process within a context that 
heavily favored development interests.”45 Across the cases, Layzer found that “the 
initiatives whose goals were set in collaboration with stakeholders have produced 
environmental policies and practices that are less likely to conserve and restore ecological 
health than those whose goals were set through conventional politics.”46 The reason, 
Layzer explained, was that “to gain consensus, planners skirted trade-offs and opted 
instead for solutions that promised something for everyone.”47 Alternatively, “When 
restoring ecological health is the paramount goal, planners are more likely to approve, 
and managers to implement, approaches that rely less on energy-intensive manipulation 
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and more on enhancing the ability of natural processes to sustain themselves – even if 
doing so imposes costs on some stakeholders.”48 
While Natural Experiments made the kinds of determinations sought by this 
dissertation, its main research question, conceptual framework, and methodology 
differed. The book’s research question did not focus on the impacts of collaborative 
processes, and hence the conceptual framework for understanding the potential impacts 
of collaboration, and their causal mechanisms, was underdeveloped. Nor did the book 
give equal weight to the three tenets of ecosystem management, instead devoting most of 
the analysis to the protective tenet. The book’s Everglades case study evaluated the 
assortment of environmental accomplishments and economic development impacts of 
one initiative, the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (and the Modified Water 
Deliveries Project to a lesser degree). In contrast, this dissertation observed multiple 
collaborative (and traditional) processes used over decades to address two specific threats 
to ecological health. The next section explains why the dissertation’s research design 
yields a more nuanced understanding of the impacts of collaborative processes on 
ecosystem management, and hence short-term and long-term ecological protection. 
 
2.4 Implications for Research Design 
The literature review indicates that collaborative processes have the potential to 
both positively and negatively impact governance for each of the three tenets of 
ecosystem management. On the whole, the critics of collaborative processes charge that 
the proponents are politically naïve and romanticize the problem-solving and capacity 
building benefits, whereas the proponents would say that the critics are unduly cynical 
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and paternalistic, and too focused on direct outputs. Upon closer inspection, the debates 
occur because of incomplete discussion about the magnitude of impacts and their 
significance on balance (especially in relation to an explicit framework of good 
governance, such as ecosystem management), extrapolations of theory that have not been 
fully tested by empirical research, and assumptions about the ability of good process 
design and application to overcome the potential negative impacts. Additional research is 
needed to give the assortment of claims better coherence and reconciliation, with links to 
conditions under which the impacts occur, in order to effectively guide the use of 
collaborative processes for ecosystem management.  
The theories of ecosystem management and collaboration, and the current gaps in 
understanding, necessitate a comprehensive evaluation approach. Comprehensive 
examination of all potential impacts on a governance system and its ecosystem, and in 
relation to the ecosystem management framework of good governance, will allow 
comparison of the magnitudes of impacts and their significance, and point to other issues 
important for ecosystem management.  
Research should observe the impacts at governance/social-ecological and 
temporal scales sufficient to report environmental outcomes, capacity building, and 
political restructuring, and reduce reliance on theoretical extrapolation. Scholars are 
beginning to recommend the evaluation of collaborative governance rather than solely 
individual collaborative processes. Genskow and Born, for example, remarked of 
watershed groups, “[It] is the total array of activities occurring and evolving within the 
space over time that comprises a watershed management effort,”49 and “those concerned 
with [evaluating] integrated water resource management should take a more expansive 
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view of the organizational space in which integrated initiatives take place.”50 Several 
researchers have reported findings concerning the impacts of collaborative processes at 
this level of observation, especially in terms of relationships with political, bureaucratic, 
and judicial processes and institutions. Innes et al., for instance, stated, “informal 
processes may be deliberately created to make the formal ones work, as for example 
when two state growth management programs invented collaborative processes to make 
the court-based, adversarial system produce more satisfactory land use outcomes in 
Vermont and to supplement the top-down bureaucratic approach in Florida.”51 Cortner 
and Moote’s discussion of the “paradoxes of ecosystem management” suggests the need 
for governance dichotomies,52 and authors have noted that collaboration can serve a 
unique, beneficial role (or niche) by complementing and creating synergies with the 
traditional approaches.53 For the Everglades, Jones suggested a role for collaboration: “A 
key task of the mediator in this complex setting is to help manage the timing of the shifts 
from one context to another so that the process can move towards resolution and to keep 
the parties and their experts engaged in the reframing that ensues at these critical 
junctures.”54 
Scholars’ observation of collaborative processes within the larger governance 
context has also led to greater awareness of the limits of collaborative impacts. Innes et 
al. reported, “Much was accomplished through [collaborative] CALFED’s informal 
systems, yet the formal [i.e., traditional] system retained the funding, the legal authority, 
and the prerogative to intervene, provide approval, or simply allow the program to 
continue.”55 Similarly, Jones reported, “In the East Everglades and Kissimmee River 
cases, the dispute resolution efforts did identify issues affecting the broader system but 
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these were not within their control or jurisdiction to address and resolve.”56 In 
considering the “political niche of collaborative conservation,” Brick wrote, “Existing 
policy regimes, embedded in national environmental laws, bureaucracies, and political 
institutions, are incredibly durable and resistant to change.”57 
Furthermore the research should compare the impacts of collaborative processes 
relative to that which would likely be achieved through traditional processes alone, and 
remain mindful of the benefits of traditional processes that may be sacrificed with 
collaboration. An Innes et al. passage demonstrates explicit comparison of collaborative 
impacts to the likely alternative: “Collaborative processes have replaced gridlock and 
litigation; a comprehensive framework with linkages and balance among activities 
replaced project-by-project decisions; multi-purpose interagency projects increasingly 
became the norm rather than single agency projects; local and regional solutions were 
used instead of just centralized decision making; public involvement was greatly 
increased, with stakeholders playing leadership roles; independent science reviews 
modified agency- and client-based science; accountability and transparency of decision 
making greatly increased; and flexible, adaptive management and joint learning replaced 
mechanistic decision making based on assumptions and mandates.”58  
The Innes et al. passage was not explicit, however, about collaborative process 
impacts on the bottom line concern of ecological health and other environmental 
outcomes, thus showing the need for the ecosystem management evaluation framework. 
To address the protective tenet, capacity building and political restructuring impacts 
should be observed and compared for environmental, economic, and governmental 
interests in order to address critics’ concerns about who wins and who loses. 
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The research should also note the characteristics of collaborative processes and 
their relationships with governance context in order to answer questions about the role 
and potential of process design and application. Better research designs would select 
ecosystem management cases that frequently used collaborative processes under 
conditions supportive of good process quality, thus making the impacts more pronounced 
(easier to observe) and focusing the research on the potential of collaboration (rather than 
avoidable issues of poor process design and application).  
Figure 1 shows the relationships between the concepts discussed in this chapter. 
In summary, ecosystem management is the guiding framework for evaluating the use of 
collaborative processes. Ecosystem management can be expressed as the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of integrative, adaptive, and protective governance (the three tenets). 
Collaboration theory provides the range of potential impacts of collaborative processes 
and explains the importance of considering process and contextual factors. Applying the 
existing knowledge of collaboration to understand its performance for ecosystem 
management results in knowledge gaps. The dissertation modifies the collaboration 
evaluation framework to be more comprehensive and attuned to concerns about the 
protective tenet (i.e., impacts on ecological health and other environmental outcomes), 
including recognition of the need to explicitly examine the relative impacts on the main 
interest groups (environmental, governmental, and economic). The next chapter, Chapter 
3: Methodology, discusses the details of how the dissertation applied this conceptual 
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The previous chapter motivated a comprehensive framework for evaluating the 
role of collaborative processes in ecosystem management. The current chapter explains 
why case study analysis was the appropriate research design for conducting the 
evaluation and presents the methodology, with aspects including case selection and 
analysis, data sources and management, research ethics, methods to enhance internal and 
external validity, and research limitations. 
 
3.1 Research Question and Case Study Design 
This dissertation asks: how does the use of collaborative processes affect 
ecosystem management? Chapter 2 asserted that a comprehensive accounting of the 
range of impacts of collaboration within the entire governance and social-ecological 
systems yields a better model for relating impacts to the three tenets of ecosystem 
management. This approach is consistent with “holistic analysis,” whereby “capturing 
and documenting history, interconnections, and system relationships are part of 
fieldwork.”1 This approach is also attuned to “context sensitivity,” where the traditional 
decision making processes and institutions, and the social-ecological system, are 
important aspects of collaboration’s interactive context.2 Context sensitivity enhances the 
understanding of why certain impacts did or did not occur and provides the basis for 
recommendations to improve ecosystem management. 
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The holistic and context-sensitive perspectives, combined with the substantial 
theory checking and development proposed, suggest the use of a qualitative case study 
research design.3 Indeed, several collaboration scholars concerned with environmental 
outcomes have recommended case study research and associated techniques.4 Case study 
analytic techniques include the use of comparative methods within-case (e.g., congruence 
and process tracing) and across cases (e.g., comparison with actual or counterfactual 
cases using the methods of agreement or difference).5 According to George and Bennett, 
“the congruence method seeks to show that a theory is congruent (or not congruent) with 
the outcome in a case,” and “process-tracing seeks to uncover a causal chain coupling 
independent variables with dependent variables and evidence of the causal mechanisms 
posited by a theory.”6 Counterfactual cases are thought experiments about how outcomes 
would have been different without the intervention of concern (such as collaborative 
processes).7 
Even with well-developed qualitative analytic techniques, researchers interested 
in evaluating the ecosystem management impacts of collaborative processes face 
numerous challenges, especially when assessing the protective tenet. Determining the 
environmental impacts of any governance intervention is difficult and rarely done, and 
this topic has its own literature.8 Methodological difficulties of evaluating changes in the 
environment include lack of environmental data, ecological uncertainty, and the long 
timeframes necessary to observe impacts.9 Additionally, environmental values are 
diverse, and the field of evaluating ecological impacts is immature.10 The typical research 
methods to investigate causal relationships between interventions and environmental 
change are also a challenge because of the presence of many confounding variables 
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affecting the environment, diversity of practice and lack of control cases, and tenuous 
task of predicting what would have happened without the intervention.11 Given these 
challenges, researchers typically rely on measuring precursors or proxies for 
environmental impacts such as implementation of policies and participant opinions about 
impacts.12 Genskow and Born, for example, applied the case study approach to describe a 
“series of temporally and spatially overlapping partnerships and planning initiatives” in 
three watersheds.13 Imbedded in their descriptions were claims of causal relationships 
connecting previous collaborative processes to later ones, to new environmental policies, 
projects, and programs, and to changes in governance capacity.14 
Correspondingly, this dissertation research conducted case studies of 
collaborative governance of two ecosystem threats within a single ecosystem, i.e., two 
sub-cases within a single case of ecosystem management.15 Reduction of these two 
threats is a necessary condition for protection of ecological integrity. Consideration of all 
ecosystem threats was not feasible; however the study of two threats improved validity 
over observation of only one threat.16 The analysis of the impacts of collaborative 
processes on the three tenets of ecosystem management thus centers on integration, 
adaptation, and protection of governance for the reduction of specific threats (rather than 
at a higher scale of the ecosystem). 
The focus of the case studies was analysis of the impacts of multiple collaborative 
processes, but these impacts necessarily involved the larger governance context and 
social-ecological system. Analytic methods included the within-case congruence and 
process tracing techniques, cross-case analysis (literal replication), and counterfactual 
comparisons. The counterfactual cases represented what would have likely happened 
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without the use of collaboration (i.e., using traditional approaches alone) and were 
derived from case participant interviews, the patterns of traditional governance behaviors 
in the cases, and the literature describing traditional governance.  
An additional analytic technique was needed in order to relate the various impacts 
of collaborative processes to the net effects for ecosystem management. The technique 
involved comparing the direction (positive or negative) and magnitude of impacts for 
each of the three tenets of ecosystem management, similar to force field analysis.17 
 
3.2 Case Selection 
 
3.2.1 Case Selection Criteria 
The dissertation research sought multiple cases of highly collaborative 
governance of specific, significant threats to the health of a single ecosystem, where the 
observation period was long enough to include the implementation and evaluation phases 
of the policy cycle.18 This research design was similar to that employed by Ernst, who 
examined governance of two threats to the ecological health of the Chesapeake Bay 
(excess nutrients in watershed runoff and overfishing of blue crabs).19 Ernst’s study, like 
this dissertation, used the congruence method to examine the fit of theories to the 
evidence, and process tracing to link governance activities to environmental policies and 
tangible environmental outcomes for the specific threats.20 
Another desired feature, but not critical, was for the cases to contain a degree of 
environmental success. This increased the chance that the cases would demonstrate the 
potential of collaboration to yield improvements in ecosystem management (the dominant 
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perspective among ecosystem management theorists) and the corresponding factors of 
success. The dissertation’s interest in examining factors of governance success did not 
preclude, however, recognition of shortcomings and analysis of their factors, especially in 
the areas of concerns identified by collaboration critics. Yin called this approach of 
working backwards from outcomes towards theories “rival explanations as patterns.”21 
Multiple cases were also intended to represent different kinds of environmental 
threats, governance actors, and dominant decision making and institutional systems in 
order to explore collaboration’s robustness for producing the observed outcomes (i.e., 
theoretical replication).22 But, by having both cases situated in the same ecosystem, the 
effects of confounding variables would be minimized, allowing a greater understanding 
of each case context and overall governance, including the significance of the ecosystem-
level collaborative processes.  
 
3.2.2 Case Selection 
Meeting the case selection criteria, the dissertation conducted case studies of 
collaborative governance of two threats facing the Everglades ecosystem in South 
Florida.23 The phosphorus case was governance to reduce the ecological degradation of 
the central and southern Everglades resulting from excess phosphorus in runoff from the 
Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA).24 Governance leaders first observed eutrophication 
of the Everglades in the early 1970s and began policy making to reduce it in the late 
1980s. By 2008, governance had completed the world’s largest system of constructed 
wetlands for nutrient removal, thus reducing phosphorus levels entering the Everglades, 
although not to the degree needed to halt degradation. Evaluation of ecological outcomes 
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in the phosphorus case focused on reduction of phosphorus levels.25 Governance in the 
phosphorus case was highly political and judicial, involving the sugar industry, 
significant attention of environmental interest groups, the U.S. Department of Justice, and 
the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida. Over time, governance for phosphorus 
reduction became more bureaucratic with restoration plan implementation by the South 
Florida Water Management District. Between 1973 and 2008, decision making to support 
this governance involved sixteen collaborative processes to address the phosphorus threat 
and closely linked issues. The collaborative processes are listed in chronological order 
and described in Appendix A. 
The Shark Slough case was governance to restore natural flow regime to the 
Shark Slough region of the southern Everglades. Disruption of Shark Slough flow first 
occurred in the early 1900s with the construction of drainage canals to the north and the 
Tamiami Trail highway at the slough’s headwaters. Disruption intensified in the 1960s 
with construction of the Water Conservation Areas in the central Everglades, the North-
South Levee severing the eastern Everglades, and a canal and levee bisecting Shark 
Slough, all components of the Central and Southern Florida (C&SF) Project. Ever since 
the completion of the C&SF Project, Everglades National Park in the southern 
Everglades has advocated restoration of a more natural flow regime, resulting in 
operational changes and planned structural changes, including the Modified Water 
Deliveries Project authorized in 1989 and the WCA 3 Decompartmentalization and Sheet 
Flow Enhancement Project of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan adopted in 
2000; however neither project was completed by the end of the dissertation’s study 
period. Evaluation of ecological outcomes in the Shark Slough case focused on 
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restoration of a more natural flow regime to the slough and its headwaters to the degree 
possible given the new limitations of land development and soil subsidence.26 
Governance in the Shark Slough case was highly bureaucratic, with Everglades National 
Park, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the South Florida Water Management District, 
and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service playing key roles. Private agricultural and 
residential interests in the East Everglades, and the Miccosukee Tribe, were also 
involved. Governance included seventeen collaborative processes focused on Shark 
Slough flow restoration and closely linked issues. The collaborative processes are listed 
in chronological order and described in Appendix B. 
Also having the potential to affect governance of the two threats were ten 
ecosystem level collaborative processes concerned with regional environmental 
governance, with the first occurring in 1971 and with three active at the end of the case 
study period. Moreover, the phosphorus and Shark Slough threats were directly linked 
within the ecosystem. For example, governance leaders recognized that increasing Shark 
Slough flow volume could be ecologically counterproductive if the additional flow 
contained excess phosphorus (such as from the Everglades Agricultural Area). And, 
efforts to restore flow to the Everglades (and meet other water management needs) 
interacted with EAA water use and land use. The collaborative processes are listed in 
chronological order and described in Appendix C. 
 
3.3 Case Construction and Analysis 
The initial, preliminary phase of the research was data gathering to define the case 
study boundaries. For instance, it was not initially known whether the dissertation would 
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examine governance of all sources of excess phosphorus or only a single source, such as 
the Everglades Agricultural Area. Information that was not directly needed for case 
construction and analysis improved internal validity by improving the understanding of 
case context. 
Once case boundaries were established, case construction and analysis proceeded 
in four steps, with each step building upon the previous steps, progressively focusing the 
analysis towards answering the question of how the use of collaborative processes 
affected ecosystem management and making recommendations for improvement. The 
four steps were: (1) constructing case chronologies for governance of the two threats and 
at the ecosystem level (the context), (2) observing the threat impacts of the ad hoc and 
ecosystem level collaborative and traditional processes, (3) relating the collaborative 
process impacts to the three tenets of ecosystem management, and (4) explaining the 
impacts in terms of the characteristics of collaborative processes and the governance 
context. Each step reoriented the analysis according to different aspects of the conceptual 
framework (see Chapter 2, especially Figure 1) and required additional data gathering. 
The third and fourth steps went beyond theory checking and evaluation into the realm of 
theory development. The four-step model of the analysis is a simplification, however, 
since there were several iterations of individual steps and the entire analytic process. 
In the first step, constructing case chronologies, the purpose was to establish 
historical event relationships over time for the phosphorus and Shark Slough cases, and at 
the ecosystem level. The ecosystem level case chronology provided background, 
contextual information for the phosphorus and Shark Slough cases. The case 
chronologies covered the major transformations to the ecosystem from the early 1900s to 
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2009, with finer resolution beginning with the most significant event contributing to the 
two threats, construction of the Central and Southern Florida Project in the early 1960s. 
The governance and ecosystem activities and events in each case chronology were linked 
by causal relationships identified through sufficiently detailed data and reputable causal 
assertions (e.g., from secondary sources such as scholarly case studies, historical 
accounts, and news articles). The case chronologies required information at the level of 
detail to address who was involved in decision making, why they were involved, how 
they interacted, what they decided, what happened to the outputs, and how the 
environment was affected. This step also included a historical account of the use of 
collaboration across the state and in South Florida. The data and causal relationships 
found in the case chronologies provided the foundation for successive analytic steps that 
focused on theory verification and development. To provide the reader with an 
orientation to the cases, Chapters 4 contains overviews of the case chronologies (for the 
ecosystem-level background, and phosphorus and Shark Slough cases, respectively), 
whereas the amount of data gathered and level of causal connections established for this 
dissertation were much greater. 
The second step focused on the two cases, i.e., collaborative governance of the 
phosphorus and Shark Slough flow regime threats, and examined collaborative processes’ 
(1) process characteristics, including problem solving and conflict resolution; (2) outputs, 
including policies, coordination, and political support for policies; and (3) capacity 
building and political restructuring. The research explicitly examined collaborative 
process impacts on environmental, governmental, and economic interests and compared 
them to those of the political, bureaucratic, and judicial processes and institutions. The 
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literature review and conceptual framework described in Chapter 2 provided specific 
indicators of the various kinds of impacts. To guide identification of problem solving 
impacts, the policy cycle categories of knowledge generation and policy advocacy were 
considered.27 Capacity building included changes in intellectual, political, social, and 
institutional capacity. Political restructuring examined changes in relative power of 
groups and their strategic behaviors. To provide a baseline for the political restructuring 
impacts, the analysis qualitatively assessed the relative power of governmental, 
environmental, and economic interests prior to the first collaboration in 1971, including 
via a chronicle of environmental interests’ campaigns and policy accomplishments (e.g., 
the creation of Everglades National Park). The identification of collaborative process 
impacts required additional data gathering beyond the case chronologies, such as review 
of collaborative meeting minutes, reports, secondary case studies, and dissertation 
interviews. The processes examined were the ad hoc collaborative processes concerned 
with the two threats of interest and the ecosystem-level collaborative processes (but only 
to the extent that they affected governance of the two threats).28 
The third step, evaluation of ecosystem management outcomes, analyzed the 
cross-case findings from the first two steps in order to determine whether governance was 
more or less adaptive, integrative, and ecologically protective because it used 
collaborative processes. This analysis required complex comparison of the net effects of 
the various impacts, further analysis of causal relationships, and the construction of 
counterfactual cases and scenarios of the likely future (based on the current situation and 
past tendencies). The results of the third step are reported for the integrative, adaptive, 
and protective tenets in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, respectively. 
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The fourth step, explaining the impacts, identified the characteristics of 
collaborative processes, both intrinsic to communicative rationality and potentially 
variable, and the governance and social-environmental contexts that led to the observed 
impacts for ecosystem management. The results of the fourth step are incorporated into 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 and provided the basis for the recommendations for improving the 
use of collaborative processes (Chapter 8). Table 1 provides an overview of the four 
analytic steps, the analytic techniques applied, and types of evidence used. 
 
Table 1 Summary of Case Construction and Analysis 
Analytic Step Analytic Techniques Types of Evidence 
1. Case chronologies Process tracing Major governmental and environmental events 
2. Impacts based on 
collaboration theory 
(process characteristics, 
outputs, capacity building 
and political restructuring 









3. Impacts for ecosystem 
management (integrative, 
adaptive, and protective) 
Literal replication, net 
effects, theory building 
Actual and predicted 
environmental outcomes, 
policies as proxies 






details, context data 
 
3.4 Data Sources and Management 
 
3.4.1 Data Sources 
Data for the case chronologies, ecosystem context, and details of collaborative 
processes came from several types of primary and secondary qualitative sources. The 
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main data sources for the case chronologies and ecosystem context were primary 
documents (such as governance plans, legislation, reports, and organizational websites) 
and archival records (such as meeting minutes, meeting presentations, and court 
transcripts), most of which were available on the Internet. Secondary sources, such as 
books detailing the history of South Florida governance and environment, were especially 
important, as were newspaper articles. Data sources providing details of collaborative 
processes included published case studies and organizational websites with information 
about collaborative process purposes, participants, protocols, reports, resolutions, and 
meetings (such as through posted meeting minutes, agendas, presentations, and online 
meeting videos), as well as data produced for this dissertation through interviews and 
process observations. Collection and analysis of detailed collaborative process data 
occurred up to March 2007. Major Everglades governance events were observed and 
incorporated into the analysis up to finalization of this dissertation in July 2009. 
This dissertation research included a five-week field visit in South Florida during 
April-May 2004. The field visit included observation of six collaborative processes to 
manage the Everglades, with 25 hours of attendance. The observed processes were the 
South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Working Group, the Water 
Resources Advisory Commission, the CSOP Advisory Committee, and two 
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan RECOVER (Restoration Coordination and 
Verification) committees. The CSOP Advisory Committee was the only collaborative 
process observed that focused on a case (the Shark Slough), whereas the other processes 
were at the ecosystem level. Observations of the collaborative processes were hand-
written.  
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The dissertation research included interviews with 20 governance leaders, many 
of whom had participated in one or more collaborative processes, and one person who did 
not participate in collaboration. The governance leaders represented the public (as elected 
officials), federal, state, and regional agencies, a tribe, major stakeholder groups, and 
collaboration professionals. Several interviewees were technical experts. Table 2 
indicates interviewee representation of the various categories, where individual 
interviewees can represent more than one category. 
 
Table 2 Interviewee Representation 
Organization Represented Number of Interviewees 
Federal agency 10 
State or regional agency 4 
Tribe 1 
State legislature 1 
Environmentalist 2 
Development or community 1 
Collaboration support 7 
Not involved in collaboration 1 
 
 
The main intent of the interviews was to triangulate the case study findings 
regarding the impacts of collaboration. A secondary intent of the interviews was to add 
information to construct the case chronologies and details of collaborative processes. 
Protocols for ensuring ethical treatment of human subjects, including the interviewee 
recruitment script and consent form (Appendix D), were developed with the assistance of 
the Georgia Institute of Technology’s Institutional Review Board. Most of the interviews 
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were conducted in person during the field visit, with several conducted on the telephone 
(one in April 2004, one in May 2004, and two in July 2007), and each lasted from one to 
three hours. Interview questions focused on understanding the interviewee’s impression 
of the role of collaboration in Everglades restoration and varied depending on the 
interviewee’s organizational affiliation and experience with collaboration or other 
governance processes. Hand-written notes were taken of all interview responses. The 
political sensitivity of the interviews necessitated assurance that the interview sources not 
be quoted or attributed by name (a few interviewees requested this), although this reduces 
internal validity. The dissertation cites interview responses in terms of broad categories 
such as “agency employee” or “environmental stakeholder.” 
The five-week field visit incorporated an extensive tour of the South Florida 
region, from the headwaters of the watershed in Kissimmee, Florida, to its terminus in the 
Ten Thousand Islands and Florida Bay. The regional tour improved the dissertation’s 
analysis of environmental impacts and the role of the environment by grounding it in 
first-hand experience. Features observed included the Kissimmee Chain of Lakes, the 
Kissimmee River and restoration projects (toured during the District-sponsored 
Kissimmee River Roundup restoration celebration), Lake Okeechobee/Caloosahatchee 
River/St. Lucie River, the Indian River Lagoon, the Everglades Agricultural Area and 
drainage canals (e.g., the Miami Canal), the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge, 
Water Conservation Area 3 and L-67 levees and canals, Tamiami Trail and Alligator 
Alley highways, Miccosukee Tribe establishments, Big Cypress National Preserve and 
Seminole Tribe Reservation, 8.5 Square Mile Area, the Frog Pond agricultural area and 
C-111 canal system, interior Everglades National Park and Shark Slough/Taylor 
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Slough/Florida Bay, North-South Levee and Lake Belt area, Biscayne Bay, and east coast 
urban/urbanizing areas (Homestead, Miami, Fort Lauderdale, West Palm Beach, etc.). 
Additionally, in 2002, the researcher participated in an ecologically oriented tour of 
Southwest Florida, including Naples, the Ten Thousand Islands, the Picayune Strand 
restoration area (also known as Southern Golden Gate Estates), and Corkscrew Swamp 
Audubon Sanctuary. 
While case construction and analysis sought completeness and accuracy of data, 
data availability and sources were constraints on these objectives and undoubtedly 
introduced some bias in the analysis. Fortunately, data about Everglades governance and 
environmental conditions were abundant and data gaps at the analytic scale and level of 
detail applied were minor. Areas where data were more abundant include the “politics” 
up to passage of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan in 2000 (e.g., The 
Swamp: The Everglades, Florida, and the Politics of Paradise and River of Interests: 
Water Management in South Florida and the Everglades, 1948-2000), recent ecosystem 
level collaborative processes since the late 1990s (e.g., the meeting minutes and 
presentations of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Working 
Group), and the interview opinions of governance participants active since the mid-
1990s.29 Data on the politics since CERP and threat-level collaborative processes were 
sufficient, and case studies of early collaborative processes fill in the gaps about opinions 
of their impacts. Triangulation of data from multiple sources, data quality assurance 
based on source credibility (especially for secondary sources), and checking the logical 
fit of data improved the dissertation’s internal validity. This dissertation reports a 
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sampling of the data used in the analysis, and thus serves as a source for future 
researchers to build upon and critique. 
 
3.4.2 Data Management 
The data generated for this dissertation was voluminous. Data management was 
essential to research efficiency, internal validity, and proper citing of sources. 
Fortunately, most of the data was available electronically, which facilitated acquisition 
and text searches. The electronic files were downloaded and organized according to the 
dominant anchor of the data: process or organization that produced it, restoration project, 
or environmental issue. Field visit and interview data, such as the researcher’s interview 
transcripts and descriptions of collaborative processes, as well as notes taken of non-
electronic sources (e.g., books and reports only available in hard copy) were also stored 
electronically. 
The researcher used several structured approaches discussed in Section 3.3 to 
review the data and assemble it into the case chronologies, with iterative construction. 
The researcher took notes during data review and kept source information alongside the 
processed data (a chain of evidence). Thus the case study database contained raw data, 
data notes, and analysis results. 
 
3.5 Research Ethics, Validity, and Limitations 
 
3.5.1 Research Ethics and Internal Validity 
Research of collaborative environmental governance has many ethical 
considerations that affect methodological and reporting choices.30 Ethical obligations to 
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research subjects and the larger scholarly and professional communities include 
conducting the highest quality research possible and explicitly stating research 
applicability and limitations.  
To enhance research internal validity and attention to ethical issues, a highly 
qualified Thesis Advisory Committee reviewed the dissertation methodology and results. 
The dissertation committee chair, Dr. Michael Elliott at Georgia Tech, is an expert in 
environmental conflict resolution and collaboration, including its use in Florida. Dr. 
Elliott is co-founder and Director of Research for the Consortium on Negotiation and 
Conflict Resolution, and co-founder and former Director of the Southeast Negotiation 
Network. Dr. Cheryl Contant, currently Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs and Dean 
at the University of Minnesota Morris and formerly Chair of the City and Regional 
Planning Program at Georgia Tech, is an expert on environmental and watershed 
planning, especially program evaluation and the identification of cumulative impacts. Dr. 
Ronald Carroll is an ecologist with the University of Georgia’s Odum School of Ecology, 
an expert on water resource policies and ecosystem management, and Co-Director of the 
River Basin Center. In addition to the members of the Advisory Committee, the 
Dissertation Examination Committee included Drs. Bruce Stiftel and Bryan Norton. Dr. 
Stiftel is Chair of the City and Regional Planning Program at Georgia Tech and former 
faculty member in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at Florida State 
University. Dr. Stiftel has extensive research and outreach experience with environmental 
conflict resolution and collaboration in Florida, and he was a founding member of the 
Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium. Dr. Norton is Distinguished Professor of the 
School of Public Policy at Georgia Tech and an internationally renowned environmental 
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philosopher and public policy expert who specializes in collaborative and adaptive 
ecosystem management. 
The Georgia Institute of Technology Institutional Review Board (IRB) provided 
additional ethical and methodological oversight. The Georgia Tech IRB approved the 
dissertation’s protocols concerning human subjects, including the interviewee recruitment 
script and consent form (in Appendix D). As approved by the IRB, interviewees gave 
verbal consent rather than with written signature. All 20 interview participants expressed 
support for this dissertation’s research objectives and appeared to communicate openly 
and honestly. Two persons requested interviews for this dissertation declined to 
participate, but neither expressed disapproval of the research. One of these persons 
referred me to a colleague to conduct the interview.  
In keeping with Prokopy’s recommendations, this dissertation took additional 
precautions to safeguard individual interviewee interests by hand-writing interview notes, 
keeping citations of interviews to a minimum (especially when the information would 
risk negative impacts for the interviewee), and using citations that do not identify 
individuals (instead using a general identifier such as “agency employee”).31 Similar 
precautions were taken with the transcripts of public meetings, including those available 
on the Internet, since it was not necessary for this research to single out individuals unless 
the comments were made for broad public dissemination (such as through interest group 
publications or public statements of government officials). This dissertation methodology 
did not arrange for participant review of the results prior to finalization, because the 
diversity of perspectives and interests created challenges in choosing which individuals 
or organizations to conduct the review, instead relying on external review by the 
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dissertation committee. Several interviewees expressed an interest in receiving the final 
dissertation, and the researcher committed to providing all interviewees an electronic 
copy of the dissertation upon completion. This approach was in keeping with Prokopy’s 
guidelines for ethical nonaction research of collaborative environmental governance.32 
Beyond risk to individuals through reporting interview results, this dissertation 
poses possible controversy and negative reactions because it highlighted some of the 
shortcomings of a high-profile governance system (Everglades restoration) composed of 
specific collaborative processes, organizations, and individual participants. Mitigating 
this concern is the fact that Everglades governance has already weathered biting criticism 
by independent government reviewers, interest groups and organizations, the media, and 
researchers.33 This dissertation, however, is the first study to report the full range of 
impacts of collaborative processes on Everglades restoration, both positive and negative, 
building on the existing scholarly research.  
Because of the personal and political sensitivities, the researcher made every 
attempt to present the dissertation in a balanced manner with scientific integrity and a 
desire for constructive evaluation of Everglades governance. To an extent, the advisory 
and examination dissertation committees provide an outside, yet informed perspective on 
the tone of the dissertation. Any potential dissertation errors, omissions, or other 
problematic aspects, however, are the responsibility of the researcher alone. 
 
3.5.2 Research Limitations and External Validity 
The empirical focus on the Everglades ecosystem illuminates phenomena 
occurring with typical ecosystem management; however the findings also reflect 
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conditions that are not found in all instances, thus limiting the ability to generalize the 
findings.34 Potentially significant characteristics that would affect collaborative 
governance outcomes include the geographic scale of management, the institutional 
affiliations of conveners and participants, and the purpose and scale of institutional 
action. Thus, this dissertation’s results appear to be most relevant to politically intense, 
large-scale and multi-hierarchical ecosystem-oriented restoration efforts, especially with 
respect to water resource management. Limits to generalizing to these situations include 
the unique characteristics of the South Florida environment (after all, “There are no other 
Everglades in the world”35), the presence of a strong watershed-based water management 
agency and a national park, and Florida politics (e.g., the impacts of Florida being a 
“swing state” in U.S. presidential elections). Another factor is the time period under 
analysis and its implications for context, such as the political support for or against 
ecosystem management and collaboration (e.g., the difference between the Bill Clinton 
and George W. Bush administrations, and between the state’s Lawton Chiles and Jeb 
Bush administrations). As Genskow and Born stated, “It is important for resource 
managers and funding organizations to recognize that formulaic assessments of ‘success’ 
and inflexible prescriptive approaches to develop collaboration may serve most 
effectively as general ‘guidance’ but have limited use for successfully undertaking 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOUTH FLORIDA WATERSHED AND THE EVERGLADES 
 
This chapter is the first of three chapters that provide background information and 
governance and environmental chronologies that aid in interpretation of the dissertation’s 
findings in Chapters 7-9. This chapter describes the South Florida watershed and its 
Everglades in their historic (natural) and developed conditions. The chapter then details 
the environmental and governance events, according to four major phases, which moved 
governance towards a more holistic, i.e., watershed or ecosystem, approach. Governance 
at the watershed level was influenced by activities to address the phosphorus and Shark 
Slough flow regime threats (as well as other ecological threats and concerns), and 
watershed governance in turn affected, or had the potential to affect, the two threats. 
These cross-scale connections are especially important since watershed level governance 
was often achieved through collaborative processes. An overview of the major 
environmental and governance events at the watershed level is provided in Table 3 at the 
end of the chapter. 
 
4.1 South Florida Watershed and the Everglades 
 
4.1.1 Historic Watershed 
The South Florida watershed was once an ecologically productive and globally 
unique expanse of wetlands, lakes, and estuaries.1 The watershed spanned the Kissimmee 
Chain of Lakes, the Kissimmee River valley, Lake Okeechobee, Big Cypress Swamp, the 
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Everglades, the Eastern Coastal Ridge, Ten Thousand Islands (including Whitewater 
Bay), and Florida Bay (shown in Figure 2). The enormous size of the wetlands was a 
result of an extremely low, flat terrain and high rainfall, with most delivered during the 
rainy season from May to October. The watershed’s expanse and flatness moderated the 
weather extremes, providing wide, shallow, slowly flowing water (sheet flow), especially 
in the Everglades, that enlarged and shrank in a fairly regular manner.  
The historic Everglades landscape was wet sawgrass plains in the northern part 
and a flow-oriented “ridge and slough” pattern in the central and southern parts, where 
sawgrass and “tree islands” vegetated the ridges, and the sloughs had deeper, swifter 
water with water lilies. The hydrologic and vegetative cycles combined to deposit layers 
of organic soils, with the deepest soils located just south of Lake Okeechobee. The 
Everglades supported a productive food chain based on periphyton, a complex mix of 
algae and other microorganisms that attaches to submerged surfaces. Historic Everglades 
wildlife included large colonies of wading birds, endemic species such as the Everglades 
snail kite and Cape Sable seaside sparrow, and other iconic species including alligators 





Figure 2 Historic South Florida Watershed. Source: U.S. Geological Survey, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Everglades, accessed on August 14, 2009 
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4.1.2 Modification of the Watershed 
Decades of intensive development dramatically reduced the wetlands and 
degraded the remaining portions, as well as damaged areas that were not previously 
connected to the basin. Large-scale human modification of the Everglades and larger 
South Florida watershed began in the early 1900s when settlers built canals and levees to 
drain land for agricultural development and communities, to control flooding, and to 
deliver water supplies.2 The first major infrastructure projects were canals connecting 
Lake Okeechobee with the east and west coasts (to the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee 
estuaries, respectively), and with the “lower east coast” using the four major transverse 
glades cutting through the Eastern Coastal Ridge (see Figure 3 for these and other 
modifications).3 Additionally, a dike was constructed around the southern rim of Lake 
Okeechobee, and the Tamiami Trail highway cut across the southern Everglades in the 
1920s. The first partnership between the federal and state governments for construction 
of the water management infrastructure in South Florida occurred in response to failure 
of the Lake Okeechobee dike in 1928 that killed close to 3,000 people and caused 
extensive property damage.  
During the droughts of the 1940s, several consequences of Everglades drainage 
became apparent, including soil destroying fires and saltwater intrusion into coastal urban 
water sources due to lack of aquifer recharge. The 1940s also saw flooding of east coast 
urban areas. These problems prompted authorization of the massive Central and Southern 
Florida (C&SF) Project in 1948. Less than a year earlier in 1947, Congress designated the 
southern Everglades as Everglades National Park. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
constructed the project during the 1950s and early 1960s, and the newly titled Central and 
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Southern Florida Flood Control District operated it.4 The C&SF Project included a long 
north-south levee that hydrologically separated a substantial portion of the eastern 
Everglades and made it available for development. The C&SF Project also created large, 
shallow water impoundments, the Water Conservation Areas (WCAs), covering the entire 
central Everglades. The eastern portions of the WCAs had high water seepage into the 
surficial Biscayne Aquifer, and thus these areas were not routinely used for water storage. 
The C&SF Project furthermore enhanced the water management infrastructure in the 
historic northern Everglades to create the Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA). The 
improvements led to expansion of farming in this area, especially of sugarcane. The last 
major development of the C&SF Project occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s with 
construction of the Everglades National Park-South Dade Conveyance system in the East 
Everglades in order to provide water supply and flood protection for agriculture in the 
area, as well as water deliveries to the park’s eastern border.5 Overall, the water 
management infrastructure enabled economically significant agriculture in the EAA and 
East Everglades and rapid growth of the Lower East Coast urban population that reached 




Figure 3 Current South Florida Watershed. Source: South Florida Water Management 
District, South Florida Environmental Report 20087 
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The remaining Everglades, consisting of the Water Conservation Areas and 
Everglades National Park, is less than half its historic area and is highly degraded. 
Disruptions in water regime have caused loss of the remaining Everglades’ ridge and 
slough landscape pattern. The timing of the managed water regime has often disagreed 
with the natural patterns upon which wildlife adapted. The stagnant water in the WCAs 
has lower levels of dissolved oxygen, and inflows to the Everglades are nutrient enriched, 
causing conversion of periphyton to a less productive algae and the replacement of 
sawgrass with cattails. The limiting nutrient is phosphorus, for which the major source is 
sugarcane farming in the EAA, due to fertilizer use, soil subsidence, and the biomass 
growing in extensive canal networks within the farms.8 Various other “pollution” threats 
impact the Everglades, including invasive plant and animal species, and airborne mercury 
contamination. The overly dry conditions in some parts have caused substantial soil 
subsidence.9 As an indicator of ecological degradation, wading bird populations in the 
Everglades are at one-tenth their historic levels, and scores of species are imperiled, 
including the Everglades snail kite and Cape Sable seaside sparrow. 
Development of the South Florida watershed has caused problems extending 
beyond the Everglades, especially damaging flows released from Lake Okeechobee to the 
east and west coast estuaries (the St. Lucie/Indian River Lagoon and the Caloosahatchee 
estuaries). Moreover, the water management infrastructure failed to meet the utilitarian 
needs of South Florida development, primarily water supply for growing urban 
populations. And, the combined water management and agricultural land use in the 
Everglades Agricultural Area depleted the soil, making current agricultural practices 
(including sugar farming) unsustainable.10 
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4.2 South Florida and Everglades Governance 
Organized efforts to protect and restore ecological values of the Everglades and 
larger South Florida watershed (or ecosystem) date back to the early 1900s.11 The 
century-plus of ecosystem-level protection and restoration efforts had four phases: 
establishing protected areas amid intensifying water infrastructure (1902-1965), 
coordinating piecemeal restoration and the rise of collaboration (1965-1992), 
collaborative regional water resources planning (1992-2000), and implementing regional 
plans (2000-Present). The first ecosystem level collaborative process occurred during the 
second phase, and each phase since this time had different forms of collaboration. 
Appendix C provides more details about the ecosystem-level collaborative processes. 
 
4.2.1 Establishing Protected Areas Amid Intensifying Water Infrastructure 
In 1902 American conservation history was made in the Everglades when the 
Audubon Society successfully fought to protect wading birds from feather hunters (and 
national and state/regional Audubon groups remain active in Everglades governance 
today). A few years later in 1905, it was first suggested that an Everglades national park 
be created. At this time there were also a few naturalists who warned of the likely effects 
of Everglades drainage on its wildlife and soil, but these warnings went unheeded.12  
The earliest organized initiative for Everglades ecosystem protection was the 
movement to create the national park. The effort began in 1916 with the protection of 
Royal Palm State Park, a large tree island (or hammock) in the southern Everglades. The 
National Park Service proposed the national park in 1923, but it took the advocacy of a 
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passionate preservationist, Ernest Coe, for it to gain momentum. Coe left the movement 
over a dispute of the park’s boundaries, and Spessard Holland, a state senator and then 
governor, took the lead. Holland promoted the national park because soil studies showed 
that the southern Everglades could not support agriculture, and he saw alternative value 
for tourism and the partnership it created with the federal government (Holland was also 
promoting the Central and Southern Florida Project). At the same time, Marjory 
Stoneman Douglas published The Everglades: River of Grass, a book that elevated the 
plight of the Everglades by providing an eloquent historical and scientific account of the 
Everglades ecosystem and issuing a plea for reversal of the degradation underway.13 
Everglades National Park was designated in 1947. Its original boundary, however, 
excluded the East Everglades, including the northeast portion of Shark Slough, to allow 
for development. 
The C&SF Project was authorized in 1948. The origin of the C&SF Project was 
the 1943 Everglades Drainage District recommendation for Water Conservation Areas 
(WCAs) and a 1944 report by an Advisory Committee to the District that provided a 
general plan to address excess drainage (resulting in soil loss and fires), flood control, 
and water storage. Holland and the District gained political support by promising to 
spread the benefits of the C&SF Project to as many stakeholders as possible, including 
environmental interests (a strategy that was later achieved through collaborative 
processes). Even Douglas supported the project (which she later regretted). The C&SF 
Project received federal approval after storms flooded the east coast urban areas, 
demonstrating the flood protection need for the WCAs.14 Governance leaders gave the 
Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission responsibility for managing two of the 
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WCAs in order to generate sportsman opposition to any development threats to these 
areas, and the other WCA became the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge under the 
management of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. A local newspaper editor Ernest 
Lyons advocated that the state restore the historic Everglades flow way for natural flood 
control, but this view was ignored. 
Also contributing to institutional stewardship of the Everglades are two Native 
American tribes, the Miccosukee and the Seminole. These tribes arrived in South Florida 
in the mid 1850s in order to escape federal resettlement initiatives and the Seminole 
Wars. The Miccosukee fled into the deepest parts of the Everglades and now refer to the 
Everglades their “mother.” Both tribes have perpetual leases for tribal lands in the 
Everglades and Big Cypress Swamp (see Figure 3). The Miccosukee Tribe has been a 
staunch litigator on behalf of ecological protection of the central Everglades, where the 
tribe’s lands are located. 
 
4.2.2 Coordinating Piecemeal Restoration and the Rise of Collaboration 
Although the C&SF Project addressed some environmental issues, it ultimately 
accelerated ecological degradation of the Everglades and other areas of the watershed. As 
the many ecological problems became apparent, piecemeal restoration efforts arose along 
with the beginnings of a holistic ecological perspective, thus resulting in coordination of 
the piecemeal efforts (but little comprehensive, ecosystem-level planning for restoration 
at this time).  
Upon completion of the C&SF Project in early 1960s, Everglades National Park 
complained of insufficient inflow from the WCAs and spent the next two decades 
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fighting for incremental changes to the water delivery schedule. The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers first responded with a “Survey-Review” study of the C&SF Project in 1965, 
but the main outcome was operational changes to meet growing urban water supply 
needs.15 Also during the late 1960s economic boosters proposed a large “jetport” (i.e., 
airport) to be located adjacent to the Everglades in Big Cypress Swamp. The jetport 
threat galvanized opposition and led to the creation of the Everglades Coalition, a broad-
based alliance of national and regional environmental organizations (the Everglades 
Coalition remains prominent). At this time, Marjory Stoneman Douglas founded the 
advocacy group Friends of the Everglades. Environmental interests defeated the initiative 
and then focused their attention on attaining federal protection for the swamp, which was 
achieved in 1973.  
In 1971 scientists with the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District 
noted ecological changes from excess nutrients in the WCAs downstream of the EAA, 
although this received little attention. Instead, environmental activists were focused on 
the impacts of channelization of the Kissimmee River (completed in 1971 as part of the 
C&SF Project) and signs of excess nutrients in Lake Okeechobee, presumably from the 
cattle ranches in the Kissimmee Valley. The immediate call was to restore the Kissimmee 
River’s natural wide meandering.  
The problems in the upper watershed, combined with a severe drought affecting 
the entire region, led to the first ecosystem level collaborative process, the Governor’s 
Conference on Water Management in South Florida.16 The Conference resulted in several 
landmark state environmental laws concerning water management, growth management, 
and land conservation. The Florida Water Resources Act of 1972 created the South 
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Florida Water Management District (formerly the Flood Control District) with 
jurisdiction corresponding to the South Florida watershed and having environmental 
regulatory authority for water resources. In 1972 the District developed its first regional 
water plan, emphasizing infrastructure upgrades to meet water needs, even though public 
workshops favored conservation and growth management, and the new Bureau of 
Comprehensive Planning recommended restoration of the natural system for water 
storage.17 Florida’s Environmental Reorganization Act of 1975 created the Department of 
Environmental Regulation (DER) with oversight of District water policies. 
In 1980 ecologist Arthur (Art) Marshall expanded the watershed restoration vision 
to include the Everglades and presented his “Marshall Plan” to the District’s Governing 
Board.18 Marshall had been a strong watershed advocate, including as a leader in the 
Governor’s Conference on Water Management a decade earlier. The Marshall Plan 
proposed capturing the water that was being sent to sea in the name of flood control and 
sending it to the wildlife management areas in the north-central Everglades (i.e., the 
Holey Land and Rotenberger tracts shown in Figure 3), with gradual reclamation of 
wetlands moving northward into the EAA as soil subsidence rendered it unfit for 
cultivation.19 The Marshall Plan also sought to restore sheet flow across the central and 
southern Everglades.20 Marshall advocated his plan by ascribing water supply advantages 
such as wetlands creating more local rainfall and therefore guarding against droughts. 
The Marshall Plan did not immediately persuade the District to restore the Everglades, 
but it planted the notion that there was substantial opportunity to modify the C&SF 
Project in support of ecological and other social values. 
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In the following few years, negative national publicity forced Governor Bob 
Graham to seriously consider the Marshall Plan, Kissimmee River restoration, and 
Everglades National Park’s drive to restore Northeast Shark Slough (presented to the 
District and Corps in 1983). Governor Graham created the first watershed-level 
coordinating group, the Kissimmee-Lake Okeechobee-Everglades Coordinating Council, 
to oversee the governor’s Save Our Everglades program consisting of the various 
ecological restoration projects already underway across South Florida.21 Save Our 
Everglades continued until 1990, adding restoration programs and issues as they were 
independently created. In 1986 Governor Graham revived the dormant Everglades 
Coalition and organized its first annual conference in order to strengthen the 
environmental voice in ecosystem governance. Also during this time, Graham 
recommended that the state provide greater institutional support for collaborative 
environmental dispute resolution, and the legislature formed the Florida Conflict 
Resolution Consortium (originally named the Florida Growth Management Conflict 
Resolution Consortium) in 1987.22 Through the years, the Florida Conflict Resolution 
Consortium provided process design and professional facilitation services for several 
Everglades ad hoc and ecosystem level collaborative processes. In addition, as a sign of 
Governor Graham’s early interest in collaborative processes, he led the legislature to 
amend state law in 1979 to require collaborative processes, i.e., Resource Planning and 
Management Committees (RPMCs), to help build support for the state’s program of 
designating environmentally sensitive Areas of Critical State Concern.23 During the 
1980s, Graham convened a number of ad hoc collaborative processes in South Florida 
(with some being RPMCs), as did the District.24 
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In the late 1980s the impacts of excess phosphorus from the Everglades 
Agricultural Area on the central Everglades finally gained prominence, and the District 
began development of a plan (the Everglades SWIM Plan) to reduce phosphorus and 
improve the flow regime in the Everglades. The plan was a response to the state’s 
watershed-based approach to water quality improvement, the Surface Water 
Improvement and Management (SWIM) Act. The EAA phosphorus issue became very 
contentious after the federal government filed a lawsuit against the state and District, and 
the agencies and stakeholder groups spent several years in litigation and mediation. The 
result was a more fully developed watershed-based phosphorus reduction plan, the 
Everglades Program, required by the Everglades Forever Act of 1994. Save Our 
Everglades never included the Everglades phosphorus reduction efforts. 
 
4.2.3 Collaborative Regional Water Resources Planning 
The 1990s was a decade devoted to collaborative regional water resources 
planning under the District’s Lower East Coast Regional Water Supply Plan (LEC Plan) 
and the Corps’ C&SF Project Restudy. Governance of the two threats of interest for this 
dissertation, i.e., EAA phosphorus and disruptions of the Shark Slough flow regime, 
continued somewhat independently of the regional water resources planning initiatives. 
The details of governance of the two threats are provided in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The Florida Water Resources Act of 1989 and a drought led the District to initiate 
development of LEC Plan in 1990, the purpose of which was to ensure adequate water for 
development and the environment over the next twenty-year period.25 The planning 
process included the formation in 1992 of the LEC Plan Advisory Committee composed 
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of urban, agricultural, and environmental interests. In 1995 the LEC Plan initiative 
combined with the C&SF Project Restudy.  
The Restudy was born from the growing belief that significant modification of the 
C&SF Project was needed for ecological improvement across the watershed, and that a 
major planning effort could also meet other objectives, especially urban water supply, 
thereby gaining political support.26 The technical foundation for the C&SF Project 
Restudy was a modest Corps “restudy” in 1980-84 that supported development of the 
District’s South Florida Water Management Model.27 Everglades National Park scientists 
began using the model to predict the flow effects of canal and levee removal. In the late 
1980s, the idea of a major C&SF Project Restudy gained strength due to the vision and 
advocacy of Jim Webb of the Wilderness Society. In 1989 ENP and the District 
sponsored the first Everglades Symposium scientific conference that formed the 
ecological foundation of a vision of a restored Everglades.28 And simultaneously, as a 
result of advocacy for Kissimmee River restoration, the federal Water Resources 
Development Act (WRDA) of 1990 explicitly stated that environmental protection was a 
purpose of the C&SF Project and authorized the Corps to conduct environmental 
restoration projects. In 1992 Congress authorized the C&SF Project Restudy.29  
Webb convinced the new U.S. Secretary of the Interior in the Clinton 
Administration, Bruce Babbitt, of the Restudy’s importance, and Babbitt presented his 
vision of a collaborative, whole ecosystem approach at the annual Everglades Coalition 
Conference in early 1993. To aid this approach, especially in light of the divisiveness and 
gridlock that had occurred over the Everglades phosphorus issue, Babbitt formed the 
federal South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Interagency Working Group 
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in 1993.30 In 1994 Governor Lawton Chiles created the Governor’s Commission for a 
Sustainable South Florida (GCSSF) to provide for regional governance coordination with 
greater representation of state and local interests, and to show state and local support for 
initiatives requesting federal funding.31 Based on the lackluster performance of the earlier 
“restudy,” the Corps also recognized the political capacity building value of the 
collaborative approach.32 When the C&SF Project Restudy was in full swing during 
1996-98, the Restudy Team consisted of over 100 participants, mostly technical experts, 
representing numerous agencies, local governments, and the tribes. Furthermore, the 
Water Resources Development Act of 1996 instructed the C&SF Project Restudy to 
receive guidance from the Task Force/Working Group and the GCSSF. The C&SF 
Project Restudy and the resulting Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, gained 
additional political support during the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections because of 
Florida’s “swing state” status.33 
When the C&SF Project Restudy published its recommended alternative in 1998, 
Everglades National Park concluded that it would not ensure restoration of the 
Everglades, and a panel of nationally recognized ecologists concurred. The 
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan included projects to reduce barriers to sheet 
flow, improve natural timing of water deliveries, and reduce flow regime extremes, but 
they had long implementation time horizons and lacked full institutional assurances.34 
The plan promised only slight increases in average Everglades flow volumes. Other 
critics charged that the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) was more of 
a water supply plan for the urban areas.35 Indeed, the Lower East Coast Regional Water 
Supply Plan, which was finalized in 2000, relied heavily on CERP to provide additional 
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sources of water to the growing population.36 Moreover, CERP was not well coordinated 
with water quality issues, thus leading to the possibility that ecological concerns and state 
water quality law would prohibit the new flows captured by CERP projects.37 To address 
the concerns and to encourage environmentalists to support CERP, the Corps promised to 
use adaptive management for CERP implementation. Additionally, the Task Force 
contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to form the Committee on the 
Restoration of the Greater Everglades Ecosystem (CROGEE) to independently evaluate 
CERP’s ecological progress.38  
The Water Resources Development Act of 2000 signed CERP into federal law 
and authorized several of its projects. The assumption was that future WRDAs, expected 
about every two years, would continue the funding over the several decades needed for 
full CERP implementation. 
 
4.2.4 Implementing Regional Water Resource Plans 
During implementation of the LEC Plan and CERP, ecosystem level coordinating 
groups continued to function, albeit in a different form at the state/regional level. Upon 
Governor Jeb Bush’s election in 1999, he disbanded the Governor’s Commission for a 
Sustainable South Florida and replaced it with his Governor’s Commission for the 
Everglades (GCE). The GCE discussed CERP implementation among a few other issues, 
disbanded in 2001, and arranged for the District’s Governing Board to form a stakeholder 
committee, the Water Resources Advisory Commission (WRAC), to take on the role of 
the former governor commissions.39 As an advisory body to the District Board, the 
WRAC focused on water supply planning and other water management issues of 
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primarily District concern.40 The South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and 
Working Group continued to facilitate interagency coordination and provide input to 
CERP implementation. 
With finalization of the LEC Plan and CERP in 2000, the District began 
developing policy mechanisms to protect water for the natural system. In 2001, as 
required by state law, the District established Minimum Flows and Levels (MFLs) for the 
Everglades, with the recovery strategy in the event of violation being the implementation 
of the LEC Plan and CERP. In 2003 the District began considering water reservations for 
natural areas including the Everglades. Water reservations are a policy tool authorized by 
state law that set aside water for the natural system and make it unavailable for 
consumptive uses. Water reservations are potentially more institutionally protective than 
MFLs and will be the mechanism for allocating water captured by CERP projects.41 In 
2007, the District Governing Board, following WRAC leadership, approved a Regional 
Water Availability Rule to greatly limit future water withdrawals dependent upon the 
Everglades for recharge, since the District had been authorizing water allocations that 
were not consistent with the Everglades MFLs. The District’s regulations to institute 
water reservations for the Everglades, however, remained elusive up to 2009.42  
With regard to CERP implementation, the Corps and District, as co-sponsors, 
oversaw the work of its interagency teams: RECOVER (Restoration Coordination and 
Verification) at the ecosystem level and Project Delivery Teams for the projects. The first 
few years of CERP implementation consisted of developing the Corps’ Programmatic 
Regulations and other program-level agreements.43 By 2004 it was apparent that the 
federal government was not able to honor its commitment to provide half the funding for 
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CERP (due to lack of WRDAs from 2000 to 2007). The District and state thus negotiated 
with the Corps to create the Acceler8 program to fund and speed implementation of eight 
projects, half of which had significant water storage functions.44 As a further adaptation, 
the District and state began to look for other water supply sources to meet the growing 
demand, especially alternative sources such as brackish water, and the LEC Plan Update 
published in 2007 reflected the change in strategy.45 In 2008 the District announced its 
Comprehensive Water Conservation Program to “[meet] the growing demands on South 
Florida’s limited water supply,” primarily by instituting year-round restrictions on 
landscape irrigation.46 
In 2006 the new National Academy of Sciences oversight panel, the Committee 
on the Independent Scientific Review of Everglades Restoration Progress, published its 
first biennial evaluation of CERP that noted delays in projects primarily serving 
ecological restoration objectives.47 The committee’s second evaluation reported in 2008 
further stressed that Everglades restoration was “making only scant progress toward 
achieving its goals,” and, “To begin reversing decades of decline, managers should 
address complex planning issues and move forward with projects that have the most 
potential to restore the natural ecosystem.”48 
 
Table 3 chronologically lists the major events in South Florida watershed 
governance. For each event, the table indicates the primary type of governance process 
involved or resulting (collaborative, political, bureaucratic, judicial, or scientific), or 
whether it was an environmental change.  
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Table 3 Chronology of Major Events for the South Florida Watershed 
Date Event Type
1910s Large-scale Everglades drainage and development initiated E 
1947 Everglades National Park established B 
1948 Central and Southern Florida Project authorized B 
1965 Water Conservation Areas completed E 
1965 Corps’ Survey-Review of the C&SF Project begun C 
1968 Jetport defeated and Everglades Coalition created P 
1971 EAA phosphorus impacts in WCAs observed B 
1971 Activist attention on Kissimmee River and Lake Okeechobee P 
1971 Governor’s Conference on Water Management in South Florida C 
1972 South Florida Water Management District created B 
1975 Florida Department of Environmental Regulation created B 
1979 Resource Planning and Management Committees required C 
1980 Marshall Plan presented to District’s Governing Board P 
1980 First C&SF Project “restudy” initiated B 
1983 Save Our Everglades initiative begun C 
1986 Everglades Coalition revived P 
1987 Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium created C 
1988 Everglades SWIM Plan planning initiated B 
1988 Federal phosphorus lawsuit initiated J 
1989 First Everglades Symposium S 
1990 Lower East Coast Regional Water Supply Plan planning initiated B 
1992 C&SF Project Restudy authorized B/C 
1993 South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Working 
Group created 
C 
1994 Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida created C 
1994 Everglades Forever Act passed P 
1995 LEC Plan and Restudy combined B 
1999 Committee on the Restoration of the Greater Everglades Ecosystem 
created 
P/S 
1999 Governor’s Commission for the Everglades created C 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Date Event Type
2000 Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan authorized B 
2000 LEC Plan finalized B 
2001 Water Resources Advisory Commission created C 
2004 Acceler8 initiated B 
2007 District’s Regional Water Availability Rule passed B 
2007 LEC Plan Update issued B 
 
Type: C – collaborative process, P – political process, B – bureaucratic process, J – 
judicial process, S – scientific process, E – environmental change 
 
 
This chapter provided watershed and Everglades level views of environmental 
and governance events, and this information provides a foundation for understanding the 
phosphorus and Shark Slough flow regime threats and their governance presented in the 
next two chapters. 
 85
4.3 Notes
                                                 
1 Steven M. Davis and John C. Ogden, eds., Everglades: The Ecosystem and Its 
Restoration (Delray Beach, FL: St. Lucie Press, 1994). ; Thomas E. Lodge, The 
Everglades Handbook: Understanding the Ecosystem, 2nd edition (Boca Raton, FL: CRC 
Press, 2005). ; Curtis J. Richardson, The Everglades Experiments: Lessons for Ecosystem 
Restoration (New York, NY: Springer, 2008). 
2 Nelson Manfred Blake, Land into Water—Water into Land: A History of Water 
Management in Florida (Tallahassee, FL: University Presses of Florida, 1980). ; Stephen 
S. Light and J. Walter Dineen, “Water Control in the Everglades: A Historical 
Perspective.” In Everglades: The Ecosystem and Its Restoration, edited by Steven M. 
Davis and John C. Ogden (Boca Raton, FL: St. Lucie Press, 1994). ; Ted Levin, Liquid 
Land: A Journey through the Florida Everglades (Athens, GA: University of Georgia 
Press. 2004). ; Matthew C. Godfrey, “River of Interests: Water Management in South 
Florida and the Everglades, 1948-2000” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2006). ; 
Michael Grunwald, The Swamp: The Everglades, Florida, and the Politics of Paradise 
(New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
3 These canals are named Miami, North New River, Hillsboro, and West Palm Beach. 
4 The agency had formerly been called the Everglades Drainage District. 
5 Joel I. Wagner and Peter C. Rosendahl, “History and Development of Water Delivery 
Schedules for Everglades National Park through 1982” (South Florida Research Center, 
National Park Service: Homestead, Florida, 1987). 
6 South Florida Water Management District, “LEC Plan Update 2005/2006, Executive 
Summary” (2006), 
http://www.sfwmd.gov/portal/page?_pageid=1874,4166676,1874_4166342:1874_41670
53&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (accessed August 20, 2009). 
7 South Florida Water Management District and Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection, “2008 South Florida Environmental Management Report. Volume 1: The 
South Florida Environment,” 
https://my.sfwmd.gov/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PG_GRP_SFWMD_SFER/PORTLET_SFE
R/TAB2236041/VOLUME1/vol1 (accessed July 18, 2008). 
8 Richardson, The Everglades Experiments. 
9 The high organic content of the soil leads to oxidation when exposed to the air. The 
organic soil can also burn when dry. 
10 G. H. Snyder, and J. M. Davidson, “Everglades Agriculture: Past, Present, and Future.” 
In Everglades: The Ecosystem and its Restoration, edited by Steven M. Davis and John 
C. Ogden (Boca Raton, FL: St. Lucie Press, 1994). 
11 Michael Grunwald, The Swamp, provided much of the information about early 
Everglades politics. Other significant sources are listed in note 2. 
12 The naturalists were John K. Small and Charles Torrey Simpson. 
13 Marjory Stoneman Douglas, The Everglades: River of Grass (Coconut Grove, FL: 
Hurricane House Publishers, 1947). 
14 The federal government was not interested in paying for the WCAs for the purpose of 
water supply to enable Florida development, but it would act to prevent flooding. 
 86
                                                                                                                                                 
15 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Survey-Review Report: Water Resources for Central 
and Southern Florida” (1968). 
16 Governor’s Conference on Water Management in South Florida, “Statement to 
Governor Reubin O’D. Askew from the Governor’s Conference on Water Management 
in South Florida” (1971). 
17 In 1978 the state issued its water use and water quality plans, and in 1979 is first State 
Comprehensive Plan. The plan recommended historic surface and groundwater levels and 
a natural hydroperiod. The state legislature accepted the plan as advisory rather than 
policy. 
18 Arthur R. Marshall, “A Critique of Water Management in South Florida” (November 
20-21, 1980), http://everglades.fiu.edu/marshall/FI06011110/index.htm (accessed on 
August 20, 2009). 
19 The Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission began leasing the Holey Land 
tract to establish a portion of the Everglades Wildlife Management Area. The state 
purchased the Rotenberger tract in 1975 through Environmentally Endangered Lands 
Program. 
20 WCA 3A, WCA 3B, and Northeast Shark Slough using culverts along levees and 
highways, blockage of canals, and opening the S-12 gates at Everglades National Park 
21 The projects were restoration of the Kissimmee River, the Holey Land and Rotenberger 
tracts, and flows to Everglades National Park. Kissimmee River – Lake Okeechobee – 
Everglades Coordinating Council. “Annual Summary Report” (1986). 
22 The Florida judicial system paralleled the legislative and administrative branch interest 
in collaboration. The first court based alternative dispute resolution program occurred in 
Dade County in 1975. The state’s Supreme Court established the Florida Dispute 
Resolution Center in 1986, and the court established a program for court annexed 
mediation in the circuit and county courts. In 1987, the state legislature allowed civil trial 
judges to refer any civil case to mediation or arbitration. Michael Elliott, Bruce Stiftel, 
Kathryn Frank, Severine Mayere, Robert M. Jones, and Thomas Taylor, “Societal Effects 
of Collaborative Decision-making in Florida: The Impact of Environmental Conflict 
Resolution Institutions on Public Choice, Civic Culture and Environmental Management 
Systems” (Unpublished Draft for the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, 2002). 
23 The original act designating the Areas was the 1972 Environmental Land and Water 
Management Act that required regional review of large-scale development. James C. 
Nicholas, “State and Regional Land Use Planning: The Evolving Role of the State.” St. 
John's Law Review, 1999. 
24 Governor Graham created RMPCs for the East Everglades and Kissimmee River. 
Graham also convened two interagency committees to address deer management in the 
WCAs and a proposal for an airport in WCA 3B. Graham’s leadership permeated the 
South Florida Water Management District with his appointments to the District’s 
Governing Board in 1985, and the District built its internal capacity for collaboration and 
ecosystem management. Patricia A. Bidol and Stephen S. Light, “Innovative Approaches 
to Managing Water Crises: Alternative Dispute Resolution for Lake Okeechobee” (South 
Florida Water Management District, no date). 
 87
                                                                                                                                                 
25 The Water Resources Act contained guidelines for regulating water allocation 
including consumptive use permitting, reservation of water, minimum flows and levels, 
and water shortage program. 
26 As part of the LEC Plan process, modeling determined that existing restoration projects 
(e.g., Modified Water Deliveries) would achieve “less than a quarter” of the regional 
hydrological patterns necessary to meet ecological goals. 
27 In 1984 the District developed the first version of its South Florida Water Management 
Model. 
28 Davis and Ogden, Everglades. 
29 The Reconnaissance Phase occurred from 1993 to 94. 
30 Stuart Langton and Walter A. Rosenbaum, “Historical highlights of the South Florida 
Ecosystem Task Force” (Florida Center for Environmental Studies, 2000). 
31 Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida, “Initial Report” (Coral 
Gables, Florida, 1995). 
32 Godfrey, River of Interests. 
33 During the 2000 election there was a dispute over whether to convert the Homestead 
Base near the Taylor Slough headwaters into a major airport serving the Miami area. The 
airport initiative was defeated. See: Grunwald, The Swamp. 
34 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and South Florida Water Management District, “Central 
and Southern Florida Comprehensive Review Study Final Integrated Feasibility Report 
and Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement” (1999), 
http://www.evergladesplan.org/pub/restudy_eis.cfm#mainreport (accessed January 30, 
2006). 
35 Friends of the Everglades and the Sierra Club stating the plan was unacceptable, and 
Environmental Defense and the National Resources Defense Council threatened to sue 
the federal government. Grunwald, The Swamp. 
36 South Florida Water Management District, “2000 Lower East Coast Regional Water 
Supply Plan” (2000). 
37 South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Working Group, “Meeting Minutes” (various 
dates), http://www.sfrestore.org/wg/minutes.html (accessed August 20, 2009). 
38 CROGEE issued five reports and disbanded in 2004 when a new NAS oversight 
committee formed. The Government Accounting Office prepared additional CERP 
oversight reports. For example: General Accounting Office, “Comprehensive Everglades 
Restoration Plan: Additional Water Quality Projects May Be Needed and Could Increase 
Costs” (GAO/RCED-00-235. Washington, DC: GAO, 2000). 
39 Governor’s Commission for the Everglades, “Meeting Minutes” (various dates), 
http://www.everglades.state.fl.us/ (accessed March 2, 2007). ; South Florida Water 
Management District, “Water Resources Advisory Commission,” 
https://my.sfwmd.gov/portal/page?_pageid=834,1804313&_dad=portal&_schema=PORT
AL&navpage=home (accessed June 15, 2006). 
40 Water Resources Advisory Commission, “Meeting Minutes” (various dates), 
https://my.sfwmd.gov/portal/page?_pageid=834,1804313&_dad=portal&_schema=PORT
AL&navpage=home (accessed on August 20, 2009). 
 88
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Joel VanArman, “Minimum Flows and Levels Priority List and Schedule.” In “2007 
South Florida Environmental Report” (South Florida Water Management District, 2007), 
3-5. 
42 South Florida Water Management District, “2009 South Florida Environmental Report. 
Executive Summary,” 
https://my.sfwmd.gov/portal/page?_pageid=2714,14424181,2714_14424223&_dad=port
al&_schema=PORTAL (accessed August 20, 2009). 
43 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and South Florida Water Management District. 
“Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan: Programmatic Regulations: Six Program-
wide Guidance Memoranda. Revised Final Draft,” 2007. 
http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/pm_docs/prog_regulations/072707_prog_regs_rev_fi
nal_dft_gm.pdf (accessed May 7, 2008). 
44 Governor’s Press Office, “Governor Bush Accelerates Restoration of America’s 
Everglades,” http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/news/2004/oct/1014_01.htm (accessed 
on June 12, 2006). 
45 South Florida Water Management District, “LEC Plan Update 2005/2006, Executive 
Summary” (2006), 
http://www.sfwmd.gov/portal/page?_pageid=1874,4166676,1874_4166342:1874_41670
53&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (accessed August 20, 2009). 
46 South Florida Water Management District, “Water Conservation: A Comprehensive 
Program for South Florida” (2008). 
47 National Research Council, Committee on Independent Scientific Review of 
Everglades Restoration Progress, Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The First 
Biennial Review (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006), 
http://www.csis.msu.edu/Publications/Restoring_the_Everglades_2006.pdf (accessed 
August 16, 2009). 
48 National Research Council, Committee on Independent Scientific Review of 
Everglades Restoration Progress, Progress Toward Restoring the Everglades: The 





This chapter presents an overview of progress to reduce the Everglades 
Agricultural Area phosphorus threat and details of the governance events that produced 
the progress. This chapter (along with the next chapter concerning the Shark Slough case) 
thus provides the background information for understanding the dissertation’s main 
findings in Chapters 7-9.  
The overview of restoration progress describes the historic northern Everglades, 
its agricultural development and phosphorus impacts to the remaining Everglades, and 
the major restoration projects and policies. The chronology of events is divided into four 
subsections according to significant progressions towards improved ecosystem 
management, primarily in terms of the protective tenet. For each subsection, a brief 
discussion of the role of collaborative processes is included. A table outlining the major 
events is provided at the end of the chapter. 
 
5.1 Overview of Phosphorus Restoration Progress 
 
5.1.1 Historic Northern Everglades and the Phosphorus Threat 
The source of the phosphorus threat of concern for this dissertation is the 
Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA) (see Figure 3 for features discussed in this chapter). 
The EAA was formerly the northern third of the historic Everglades.1 Tall sawgrass 
plains dominated the historic landscape because the phosphorus level (phosphorus is the 
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limiting nutrient) was about 15 ppb in water flowing overland from Lake Okeechobee. 
By the time flow reached the central Everglades, phosphorus level had dropped to less 
than 10 ppb, and the ridge and slough landscape became predominant.2  
Efforts to drain and farm the northern Everglades began as early at the late 1800s, 
and modification became complete with construction of the C&SF Project that created 
the Everglades Agricultural Area in the early 1960s.3 Sugar farming was the main activity 
in the EAA. Farming in the EAA contributed excess phosphorus to water runoff through 
fertilizer application, soil oxidation, and vegetation growing in the extensive canal 
network serving the farms. The different sources contributed a variety of forms of 
phosphorus, the sum of which is “total phosphorus.” Total phosphorus is composed of 
soluble reactive phosphorus, soluble unreactive phosphorus, and particulate phosphorus.4 
Soluble reactive phosphorus is the form readily available for uptake by organisms. Prior 
to restoration efforts, the concentration of total phosphorus in inflows to the Everglades 
from the EAA was a flow-weighted average of 170 ppb for the ten-year period from 1978 
to 1988.5 Soluble reactive phosphorus represented about 30% of total phosphorus (from 
1978 to 2003).6 
The excess phosphorus flowing into the remaining Everglades caused a number of 
problems. The excess phosphorus converted the periphyton microbial community 
(adhering to surfaces under water) that formed the basis of the food chain into a less 
ecologically beneficial algae. The excess phosphorus entered the soil and favored the 
growth of cattails rather than sawgrass, and the cattails were inferior wildlife habitat. 
Once phosphorus enters the soil, it continues to leach out and its presence is virtually 
irreversible. The impacts of excess phosphorus from the EAA are most significant along 
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canals and downstream of water delivery gates, especially in WCA 2. Everglades 
National Park has detected the impact of excess phosphorus on periphyton several miles 
south of the water delivery gates along Tamiami Trail. 
 
5.1.2 Phosphorus Restoration Progress 
Governance required agriculture to implement non-burdensome source controls 
(best management practices (BMPs)), provided attractive buy-out options for farms 
leaving production, constructed STAs on purchased farms to treat EAA runoff, and 
conducted research into advanced technologies. In all, governance reduced the EAA 
phosphorus threat by about 80% and positioned itself for further reductions. In 2007 
restoration efforts achieved between 20 and 120 ppb phosphorus annual flow-weighted 
averages for inflows to the Everglades via the constructed Stormwater Treatment Areas. 7 
Alternatively, an ecological way to measure the phosphorus threat is in terms of acres of 
sawgrass converted to cattails per year. The South Florida Water Management District 
reported that sawgrass conversions to cattails in the most impacted WCA (WCA 2A) 
went from 2400 acres per year in the early 1990s to 800 acres per year in 2003.8 
Achieving the 10 ppb total phosphorus limit to maintain the natural ecology will 
remain a challenge given the technical difficulty of reducing phosphorus to such a low 
level, competition for use of public lands by other restoration projects (e.g., water 
storage), and the potential increase in the phosphorus threat from changing land use of 
private property. By 2050 the soils in the southern half of the EAA will become too 
shallow for current sugar production practices and will be more suitable for cattle and 
urbanization.9 Current land use laws in the area allow houses on 10-acre lots. 
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5.2 Phosphorus Governance 
Phosphorus governance occurred in four phases: emergence of the phosphorus 
threat and governance attention; the federal water quality lawsuit and mediations; 
implementation of the Everglades Forever Act; and amendment of the Everglades 
Forever Act. The types of collaborative processes used and their impacts correspondingly 
changed with each phase. Collaborative processes during the first time period were 
largely technical expert panels focused on an interrelated issue, the eutrophication of 
Lake Okeechobee. Collaborative processes during the second period were mostly tied to 
effort to settle litigation and create an implementable plan. The third and fourth periods 
had ongoing collaborative processes, but they had relatively less impact on the 
phosphorus threat. Appendix A provides more details about the collaborative processes 
for this case. 
 
5.2.1 Emergence of the Phosphorus Threat and Governance Attention 
The District had management control of the Water Conservation Areas (WCAs) 
created in the early 1960s by the C&SF Project and thus slowly gained awareness of the 
phosphorus threat, the responsibility to reduce it, and the policy tools to do so. During 
this time period, collaborative processes played a tangential role in governing the EAA 
phosphorus threat, since they were focused on nutrient problems in Lake Okeechobee. 
In 1971 District staff first noticed signs of eutrophication in the Everglades 
eutrophication, with the suspected cause being runoff from the Everglades Agricultural 
Area, in which farming, especially the sugar industry, had increased during the 1960s.10 
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Prior to this memo, there were no warnings of this potential effect of EAA development 
even though there was general awareness of the negative ecological impacts of excess 
nutrients on water bodies, including for Lake Okeechobee.11 The same year Governor’s 
Conference on Water Management in South Florida made vague reference to the need to 
maintain water quality in Everglades National Park, which is downstream from the 
WCAs. 
In late 1972 an independent technical panel headed by Art Marshall, which was 
focused on the Kissimmee-Lake Okeechobee area, reported “a serious water quality 
problem” in one of the WCAs, with “8 to 10 inches of organic ooze blanketing about two 
thirds of its bottom.”12 Over the next few years, in response to a proposal that the 
wetlands be used to treat urban wastewater for reuse, the District and ENP conducted 
studies to determine the impact of nutrients on the Everglades. The studies found that 
small concentrations of nutrients modified the vegetation (and therefore the wetlands 
were unable to process the levels of pollutants found in the urban wastewater). 
Responding to growing awareness of eutrophication in the WCA, an internal District staff 
memo recommended that the District or another agency immediately develop water 
quality standards for discharges into District waters.13 District staff also considered 
adding nutrient monitoring and runoff detention provisions to a new surface water 
management permit for a sugar grower, but they did not institute this approach.14  
The latter half of the 1970s saw a substantial strengthening of state water quality 
law and regulatory authority that would eventually dictate Everglades phosphorus 
reduction. The state amended its Air and Water Pollution Control Act to contain a 
provision that for water bodies with the state’s highest use classifications, including the 
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Everglades: “In no case shall nutrient concentrations of a body of water be altered so as 
to cause an imbalance in natural populations of aquatic flora or fauna.” This provision is 
known as the “narrative criterion” for nutrients and a main legal basis for the 1988 
federal lawsuit against the state regarding the impact of phosphorus on the Everglades. 
Also during the mid-1970s the Environmental Reorganization Act created the Florida 
Department of Regulation (DER) and required the agency to develop a permitting 
program for point sources of water pollution, or delegate this authority to the water 
management districts.15 Several years later the District began monitoring nutrients in 
EAA flows entering the WCAs. Further tightening water quality standards, in 1979 the 
state designated Everglades National Park and Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge (a 
WCA) as Outstanding Florida Waters, meaning that degradation of water quality beyond 
that level present at the time of designation was not allowed. The federal and state 
agencies signed a Memorandum of Agreement for the standards and a water quality 
monitoring program, including for phosphorus. 
The emerging problem of excess phosphorus in the Everglades was overshadowed 
by the eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee caused by high nutrient loads from its 
tributary basins to the north of the lake, including the Kissimmee River valley. The first 
narrowly focused collaborative process in South Florida was the interagency technical 
panel created by the Florida Legislature in 1973, the Special Project to Prevent the 
Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee.16 The Special Project identified the main sources of 
nutrients to the lake and led in 1976 to the formation of the Coordinating Council on the 
Restoration of the Kissimmee River Valley and Taylor Creek-Nubbin Slough Basin to 
encourage the reduction of these sources. The Special Project was also a precursor to 
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another technical panel formed in 1985, the Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory 
Council (LOTAC I), which evolved in 1987 to address the Everglades phosphorus threat. 
The Special Project to Prevent the Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee had noted 
that the backpumping of a portion of EAA runoff to the lake (to increase its storage 
capacity) also contributed nutrients to the lake. The Special Project, as well as the 
Governor’s Conference several years earlier, recommended this backpumping be 
discontinued in order to reduce nutrient loads to the lake.17 Although there was awareness 
of eutrophication of the WCAs, with probable cause being nutrient laden runoff from the 
EAA, and statutory requirements to prevent this eutrophication, only the Florida State 
Planning Director in the Bureau of Comprehensive Planning expressed concern with the 
potential impacts to the Everglades. The Planning Director recommended that the District 
undertake a “systematic evaluation of all retention areas” to treat EAA runoff.18 In 1979, 
following a lawsuit led by environmental groups to improve Lake Okeechobee, the 
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation approved the District’s Interim Action 
Plan to stop the backpumping EAA without provisions for water treatment. The Interim 
Action Plan took effect in 1981 and caused a 15% increase in phosphorus loads to the 
WCAs.  
Realization of the impact of EAA runoff on the Everglades grew immediately 
following institution of the Interim Action Plan. The attention, however, ignored the 
other 85% of Everglades phosphorus loading from the EAA, and the ideas for responses 
remained conflated with strategies for Lake Okeechobee. In 1982 the Florida Game and 
Fresh Water Fish Commission suggested a redesign of agricultural practices in the EAA 
to reduce demand for water management, and the use of the Holey Land to “provide 
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some degree of water quality and quantity relief to Lake Okeechobee.”19 The District 
considered stormwater permitting strategies in the EAA under delegation from the 
Florida Department of Regulation, but three years later the agency announced that it did 
not intend to regulate individual agricultural interests in the EAA. Instead, District staff 
proposed a half-mile flow-way in the EAA to treat the area’s runoff. In 1985 the Florida 
Legislature formed the first Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Council (LOTAC I), 
and the council recommended the use of the Holey Land to reduce the impacts of the 
Interim Action Plan.  
The LOTAC I report also recommended diversions of nutrient laden inflows to 
the lake without consideration of the impacts on the new receiving waters. These 
recommendations, along with a large algae bloom in the lake at the time, led to 
substantial criticism of the District’s environmental performance. The District responded 
to the criticism with an internal reorganization to better integrate environmental 
programs, substantial gathering of public input, and the formation of the Lake 
Okeechobee Stakeholders Advisory Committee.20 The combined effort resulted in the 
District’s recommendations to the Florida Legislature regarding holistic management of 
nonpoint sources of pollution, especially in regards to the lake.  
Under concern for the impacts of nonpoint sources of pollution across the state, 
and using the District’s recommendations for Lake Okeechobee, the Legislature passed 
the Surface Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Act. The SWIM Act 
established a process for creating watershed-based, comprehensive SWIM plans for 
degraded or threatened water bodies and required the District to establish such a plan for 
Lake Okeechobee. Although not required by law, but under increasing public concern 
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and scrutiny by the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, an interagency 
panel recommended that the District prepare an Everglades SWIM Plan. The District 
initiated development of the plan in 1987, beginning with internal data gathering and 
analysis.21 
The SWIM Act explicitly prohibited lake inflow diversions that would cause 
adverse environmental impacts in other areas, and the Act created the second Lake 
Okeechobee Technical Advisory Council (LOTAC II) to study the impacts of proposed 
diversions as well as those resulting from the Interim Action Plan. LOTAC II’s Interim 
Report issued in early 1988 acknowledged the impact of the entirety of the EAA runoff 
on the Everglades, not just the flow diverted by the Interim Action Plan.22 LOTAC II also 
cited a 1987 study by Everglades National Park that found less than 30 ppb of 
phosphorus were required to maintain the Everglades ecology, and this figure became the 
first basis for a numeric phosphorus standard. LOTAC II recommended agricultural best 
management practices (BMPs) in the EAA, possible use of the Holey Land to treat the 
runoff, and development of a comprehensive plan “to prevent violations of state water 
quality criteria.” LOTAC II’s recommendations led to immediate authorization of the 
first pilot stormwater treatment area, the Nutrient Removal Project, in an area adjacent to 
the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge. 
 
5.2.2 Federal Phosphorus Lawsuit and Reactions 
In the fall of 1988, while the District was preparing the Everglades SWIM Plan, 
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit against the state claiming that the 
excess phosphorus from the EAA violated state water quality standards and agreements 
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with the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge and Everglades National Park. The 
lawsuit reflected the opinion among lead attorney Dexter Lehtinen, environmentalists, 
and the federal preserves that the District did not have the political will to adequately 
regulate the powerful sugar industry, especially given that Governor Bob Martinez had 
recently made a number of agriculture-friendly appointments to the District’s Governing 
Board.23 Indeed, creating firm policy for reducing phosphorus required the extensive, 
repeated involvement of all the branches of government and multiple collaborative 
processes. 
The District responded to the federal lawsuit by hiring a combative law office, 
and a number of groups gained intervenor status, including environmentalists, the 
Miccosukee Tribe, and eventually the sugar industry.24 Through divisive media 
campaigns, environmental groups claimed that the sugar industry was the main cause of 
Everglades degradation, whereas the sugar industry said that it was not the primary 
source of excess phosphorus and blamed “90%” of the problems on disruption of the flow 
regime.25  
While the lawsuit was heating up, the District submitted its first draft of the 
Everglades SWIM Plan in summer 1989. The draft plan, formulated with the assistance 
of LOTAC II and the Everglades SWIM Plan Advisory Committee (created in early 1989 
and consisting of state agencies and agricultural representatives), focused on reducing the 
increase in Everglades phosphorus load that resulted from the Interim Action Plan using a 
combination of agricultural best management practices and use of the Holey Land to 
provide water quality treatment.26 The plan also sought a long-term goal of 30 ppb 
phosphorus, with no deadline for reaching the goal, using a tentative design of 40,000 
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acres of Stormwater Treatment Areas (STAs) extending the length of the levees between 
the EAA and WCAs (with the intention to improve sheet flow).27 During interagency 
review of the draft plan, the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation rejected 
the plan as inadequate, stating that the plan needed stronger language with regard to 
BMPs and that STAs should be built on private, not public, land (and the Florida Game 
and Fresh Water Fish Commission concurred). There was also controversy over how 
much financial responsibility to place on the sugar industry. Meanwhile, the DOJ led the 
federal agencies in negotiations to craft a unified response to the draft plan. 
Side initiatives occurred within the state’s legislative and administrative branches 
of government. At the request of the sugar industry, the Florida Legislature created the 
EAA Environmental Protection District that created a taxing mechanism for the sugar 
industry to fund its own research of the phosphorus threat.28 The Legislature also 
amended the statutes regarding stormwater management, and the DEP then required the 
District to apply for state permits for inflows to the WCAs. The sugar industry lobbied 
for legislation that would exempt the District from the permit requirement, as well require 
the establishment of a large STA on public land, but the bill was defeated.29 
Early in the dispute in 1989 Governor Martinez and several moderate 
environmentalists proposed settlement agreements that were vague and generous to the 
sugar industry.30 In late 1990 the District joined with Martinez, the moderate 
environmentalists, and two sugar companies to endorse a settlement proposal, but the 
DOJ refused to accept any agreement without strict numeric phosphorus standards, 
deadlines, and court oversight.   
 100
In January 1991 Lawton Chiles was elected governor under a platform of 
resolving the federal lawsuit. Chiles appointed new members to the District’s Governing 
Board and requested a 60-day stay on court proceedings. Chiles held an unsuccessful 
“summit conference” among state and District officials, environmental groups, and the 
sugar industry.31 Governor Chiles then directed Lieutenant Governor Buddy MacKay to 
encourage settlement, and MacKay worked with the District to recruit Timer Powers to 
represent the District and facilitate the next round of negotiations.32 Powers was a former 
District board member who had successfully facilitated other District mediations. Powers 
conducted technical negotiations among the parties with the assistance of the Florida 
Conflict Resolution Consortium. 
While the technical negotiations were occurring, the District’s Governing Board, 
with the support of Governor Chiles and environmentalists, lobbied the Florida 
Legislature to enact the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Everglades Projection Act of 1991. 
Environmentalists believed that the law would strengthen political support for the 
Everglades SWIM Plan. The District and Chiles argued to the federal court that the 
changes in state law and administration made the lawsuit moot and unnecessary. The 
DOJ, however, evaluated the Everglades Protection Act as not significantly contributing 
to legal requirements for Everglades restoration, relying on a tenuous funding scheme, 
and strengthening the sugar industry’s ability to challenge the future Everglades SWIM 
Plan in state administrative court.33 The legal proceedings continued, and Chiles 
requested a year-long stay to allow the negotiations to carry on and to free up the 
agencies to implement the Act. The judge overseeing the case was planning to deny 
Chiles’ request for a stay, but Chiles dramatically appeared in court and admitted that 
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discharges to the Everglades were polluted, a fact that the state and District had 
previously denied. The judge granted a 60-day stay for continued technical and policy 
negotiations facilitated by Powers and the Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium. 
At the conclusion of the court stay, the DOJ, District, and DER signed the 
Settlement Agreement that ended the federal lawsuit.34 The Settlement Agreement 
required the institution of BMPs in the EAA, with an achievable goal of 25% load 
reduction (compared to a baseline period), and construction of 35,000 acres of STAs.35 
The Settlement Agreement did not specify a funding source or whether the STAs could 
be built on public land. The Settlement Agreement established numeric interim and long-
term phosphorus standards with deadlines for Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge and 
Everglades National Park.36 Since scientific uncertainty remained concerning the level of 
phosphorus that would not degrade the Everglades (with the Settlement Agreement 
specifying a long-term standard of about 10 ppb phosphorus), the agreement directed the 
agencies to conduct research and make a determination. If the planned BMPs program 
and STAs were unable to achieve the phosphorus standards, the Settlement Agreement 
required actions to meet the standards, i.e., a combination of STAs expansion, intensified 
management of the STAs, and improvements to the BMPs program. These actions were 
likely since the STAs were expected to achieve outflow concentrations around 50 ppb 
phosphorus. The court maintained jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement through a 
federal Consent Decree. To enable the ongoing technical work needed for 
implementation, the Settlement Agreement established the Technical Oversight 
Committee (TOC) composed of representatives from the District, Florida Department of 
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Regulation, Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge, Everglades National Park, and the 
Corps. 
Following the Settlement Agreement, the District finalized the Everglades SWIM 
Plan (which incorporated terms of the Settlement Agreement and Everglades Protection 
Act), developed the BMP Program, established the EAA’s permit with the District, and 
applied for an interim stormwater permit from the DER.37 The District convened the 
collaborative Stormwater Treatment Area (STA) Design Working Group during this 
time. In association with the Everglades SWIM Plan, the District created the interagency 
and multi-stakeholder Scientific Advisory Group for the Everglades (SAGE) to assist the 
District’s Governing Board with technical matters. 
The sugar industry immediately filed numerous lawsuits against the Settlement 
Agreement and the Everglades SWIM Plan, thus blocking implementation of the plan. 
The sugar industry felt that the Settlement Agreement was too open-ended with respect to 
how much the industry would be required to pay for restoration in money and land for 
ever-expanding STAs.38 One of the main arguments the sugar industry made in court, 
however, was that the Everglades SWIM Plan did not place sufficient emphasis on flow 
regime restoration, although it already included project features to address sheet flow and 
flow volume. The federal government and several environmental groups obtained 
intervenor status. Environmental groups were also politically fighting the sugar industry, 
calling for a complete public buy-out of the EAA and proposing a penny-a-pound sugar 
tax ballot measure. 
In late 1992 the District, DER, and DOJ initiated mediation with the sugar 
industry. The Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium connected the parties to Gerald 
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Cormick, a highly regarded environmental mediator based in Seattle, to conduct the 
mediation.39 Cormick persuaded the parties to open up the negotiation to other interests, 
such as small sugar growers, urban communities, environmentalists, and the Miccosukee 
Tribe, because of the interconnectivity of issues and better potential to reach lasting 
agreement.40 The sugar industry requested a stay on the litigation, and Cormick formed a 
Technical Mediation Group and a policy group. The technical mediation produced the 
Technical Plan that refined the design for STAs, relaxed the phosphorus monitoring 
scheme (by incorporating more pristine areas), and delayed deadlines for reaching the 
numeric phosphorus standards. 
During the technical mediation, the newly appointed Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Interior (DOI), Bruce Babbitt, took an interest in Everglades restoration at 
the urging of Carol Browner, administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
and former director of the Florida DER.41 Babbitt, who was ultimately concerned about 
the success of the C&SF Project Restudy, secretly met with Flo-Sun and, with MacKay’s 
blessing, assigned his assistant secretary to negotiate a settlement with the sugar 
industry.42 In summer 1993 the DOI, Corps, District, Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP, formerly Florida Department of Regulation), and sugar 
industry announced the Statement of Principles, which incorporated Cormick’s mediated 
Technical Plan.43 The Statement of Principles limited the amount of money the sugar 
industry would pay for phosphorus reduction, which amounted to about a third of the 
total estimate cost, and specified sources for the publicly funded portion. The sugar 
industry agreed to withdraw its lawsuits after a 90-day period to finalize the details of the 
new agreement with Cormick’s facilitation.  
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Many environmental groups and the Miccosukee Tribe immediately attacked the 
Statement of Principles and Technical Plan for its relaxation of standards and deadlines, 
failure to address larger restoration issues, and for not holding the sugar industry more 
financially accountable. A Florida Bay sportsman and developer, George Barley, founded 
the Save Our Everglades advocacy organization and launched a campaign to place the 
penny-a-pound sugar tax on the upcoming Florida election ballot.44 The Miccosukee 
Tribe hired Lehtinen, who had resigned from the DOJ, as counsel. And the DOI 
convened the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Working Group to 
improve relationships and coordination across the ecosystem to support the C&SF Project 
Restudy.  
In late 1993 the sugar industry withdrew from negotiations because of several 
developments that it found troubling, including the penny-a-pound sugar tax campaign, 
the Working Group’s Federal Objectives report that suggested public acquisition of the 
entire EAA, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requirement of a federal 
NPDES permit for the STAs, and other issues regarding long-term funding and 
schedules.45 Soon thereafter, Chiles announced his intent to continue litigation and 
rulemaking in support of the Everglades SWIM Plan and to lobby for strengthening the 
Everglades Protection Act. One sugar company returned to the negotiations and 
convinced Babbitt to allow the settlement to be finalized through lawmaking in the 
Florida Legislature. The Legislature built upon the mediated Technical Plan and the 
Statement of Principles, and all parties lobbied for additional changes. In late spring 1994 
the state passed the Everglades Forever Act (EFA).46  
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The Everglades Forever Act established the Everglades Program, which replaced 
the Everglades SWIM Plan. The Act continued the BMPs requirement and specified 
40,000 acres of STAs in the EAA (called the Everglades Construction Project). The Act 
required the agencies to complete research regarding the state’s numeric phosphorus 
standard (phosphorous criterion) by December 2001 and for the DEP to adopt it into 
administrative rule by December 2003, otherwise a 10 ppb criterion would apply. The 
federal court retained oversight and the Consent Decree was modified to adjust the 
deadlines.47 
 
5.2.3 Implementation of the Everglades Forever Act 
Implementation and amendment of the Everglades Forever Act (discussed in this 
section and the next) were notable in the lack of obvious use and impacts of 
collaboration, despite high policy making activity and the presence of several ongoing 
processes, including the Technical Oversight Committee and the ecosystem level groups. 
A few ad hoc collaborative processes occurred, but at a low level of import. 
Implementation of the two main components of the Everglades Program, the 
BMPs and STAs, generally met expectations. By early 1995 the EAA BMP Program was 
in place and has reduced annual phosphorus loads from the EAA by about a third.48 The 
phosphorus load reductions were level over the timeframe of the BMP Program rather 
than showing signs of continuous improvement.49 The Everglades Construction Project 
was constructed during 1997 to 2007 and improved water quality to less than 50 ppb 
phosphorus, representing over 70% reduction in phosphorus loads for the water passing 
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through them.50 The largest STA reported an annual outflow concentration as low as 13 
ppb phosphorus in 2005.  
The Everglades Forever Act recognized that the STAs were not capable of 
reaching the approximately 10 ppb phosphorus level required to maintain the Everglades 
ecology, so in 1996 the District began a research program to identify supplemental 
technologies. The most promising technology was periphyton-based STA, and the Corps 
constructed large-scale pilot projects during 2003-07. The periphyton-based STA studies 
found that the technology could reduce phosphorus concentrations to less than 10 ppb, 
but the large acreage required was problematic. By 2005 there were concerns about STA 
aging (i.e., loss of phosphorus removal efficiency over time) and susceptibility to storm 
damage. 
The Save Our Everglades group continued to fight the sugar industry over 
restoration funding. In 1996 the group placed three measures on the ballot. The penny-a-
pound sugar tax measure was narrowly defeated, but the “polluter pays” and publicly 
funded Everglades Trust Fund measures passed. The polluter pays provision, which 
would require the sugar industry to entirely fund cleanup, required enabling state 
legislation that was not forthcoming. In 1996 the U.S. Congress considered a sugar tax 
but instead contributed $200 million to the restoration initiative. In 1997 the state 
legislature, District, and DEP dealt with a number of restoration funding issues. 
The Everglades Forever Act settled the sugar industry lawsuits, but it did not end 
litigation. The Miccosukee Tribe, under Lehtinen’s counsel, filed numerous lawsuits over 
the years in support of implementing the Settlement Agreement.51 In 1995 the Tribe sued 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for failing to review the Everglades Forever 
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Act under the federal Clean Water Act. The court ruled that the agency must review the 
Act, and the agency subsequently found the state’s law to be acceptable.  
The Miccosukee Tribe also sued DEP in 1995 to begin rulemaking for the 
phosphorus criterion, and an appeals court ruled in favor of the tribe. The deadline for 
DEP to propose the phosphorus criterion was December 2001. In 1999 DEP scientists 
reported that a concentration of 8.5 ppb phosphorus was needed to protect the 
Everglades. From summer to fall 2001 the DEP held facilitated collaborative workshops 
to “take a fresh look at the science.”52 Following the workshops the DEP recommended a 
phosphorus criterion of 10 ppb. 
In 2002 the Miccosukee Tribe complained of delays in STA construction and 
violations of the interim phosphorus standard in the Loxahatchee National Wildlife 
Refuge. At the insistence of the tribe, federal judicial oversight became more active, 
although the court denied the tribe’s request to appoint a special judge to review progress. 
The Miccosukee then sued the District and other agencies over the exceedance of the 
LNWR interim phosphorus standard. 
 
5.2.4 Amendment of the Everglades Forever Act 
The Everglades Forever Act required the District to submit by December 2003 an 
application for modification of Everglades Construction Project’s permit to achieve the 
state’s phosphorus criterion (known as the Long term Compliance Permit). In support of 
this process, the District commissioned, with significant funding from the sugar industry, 
Basin Specific Feasibility Studies from the same consultants that prepared the mediated 
Technical Plan. In early 2002 the District admitted that the fully implemented Everglades 
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Program would not achieve the phosphorus criterion and that additional technological 
measures were uncertain and cost prohibitive. The District also claimed that 
implementation of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan would make some 
water quality measures unnecessary (mainly for basins other than the EAA), although 
such CERP water quality components had yet to be defined. Simultaneously, the DEP 
proposed language for the Phosphorus Rule (to establish the phosphorus criterion) that 
included the possibility of basing the standard on available pollution control technology 
rather a strictly numeric standard. The District’s Governing Board directed the 
consultants to prepare a Conceptual Plan for Achieving Long term Water Quality Goals 
in the Everglades Agricultural Area (Long term Plan) using the likely DEP phosphorus 
rule rather than the initially presumed 10 ppb limit. The Governing Board approved the 
draft Long term Plan in spring 2003 and sent it to the Florida Legislature for 
consideration.53 Several months later the Legislature amended the Everglades Forever 
Act in accordance with the Long term Plan, and the District finalized its permit 
application. 
The Amendment to the Everglades Forever Act directed a lenient phosphorus 
criterion (averaged over many monitoring stations over five-year periods, with individual 
stations allowed to reach an annual level of 15 ppb), delayed compliance with the 
phosphorus criterion to 2016 (with possible extension to 2026), deemed permittees in 
compliance as long as they followed the Long term Plan (which was based on available 
technology), and prohibited new taxes on the sugar industry. Since the federal Consent 
Decree still held, the Amendment proposed construction of additional STAs after 2006 if 
necessary (the state’s Acceler8 initiative announced in fall 2004 included STA 
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expansions). Additionally, the sugar industry filed a lawsuit to postpone institution of the 
10 ppb default criterion until final adoption of the rule and conclusion of administrative 
challenges and appeals.  
In keeping with the amendments to the Everglades Forever Act, the Florida 
Environmental Regulation Commission approved DEP’s Phosphorus Rule in late 2003. 
The rule presented a complicated phosphorus criterion with no deadline and instead 
required implementation of pollution control technology by the end of 2006. The 
phosphorus criterion sought “net improvement” rather than strict limits and applied 
different standards for areas of the Everglades already impacted by excess phosphorus. 
Several additional changes to the rule occurred in 2005. 
After the EFA Amendment and following from an earlier request and lawsuit by 
the Miccosukee Tribe, the judge who was overseeing the Consent Decree, William 
Hoeveler, ordered a Special Master to monitor compliance with the terms. Hoeveler was 
dismissed from the case after he criticized the EFA Amendment, but the newly appointed 
judge, Federico Moreno, followed through with the appointment of a Special Master.54 
By mid-2005 the Special Master’s investigations found problems with exceedances of the 
phosphorus standard in LNWR occurring since 1999 and failure to construct one STA (to 
serve LNWR) by its deadline. Moreno required the state and Corps (which was 
constructing the STA) to provide a detailed plan of action or the court would mandate 
deadlines. Following Moreno’s statements, Governor Jeb Bush met with the federal 
George W. Bush administration over a year’s time to persuade it to release the state from 
court oversight. In summer 2006 the Special Master reported additional violations, but 
recommended that Moreno accept the existing Long term Plan, including the Acceler8 
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projects and other planned improvements, while maintaining court oversight. At the end 
of 2006 the Technical Oversight Committee (TOC) failed to reach agreement concerning 
whether the state’s phosphorus criterion or the long-term standards from the Settlement 
Agreement was more ecologically protective, so the latter took effect on its December 
31st deadline. 
Characteristically, the Miccosukee Tribe responded to the Everglades Forever Act 
Amendment and the Phosphorus Rule with lawsuits. In 2003 the tribe sued the state 
regarding the rule, and the court sided with the state.55 In 2004 the tribe along with 
Friends of the Everglades sued the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency claiming that 
the EFA Amendment violated the federal Clean Water Act. The court required the agency 
to determine whether the amendment was consistent with federal law and whether the 
state’s phosphorus criterion would protect LNWR and ENP.56 The EPA in turn approved 
the law and rule.57 In mid-2008 the court ruled that the EFA Amendment changed water 
quality standards and that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in declaring 
otherwise. 
With the initial Long term Plan in place, the District frequently revised the plan to 
incorporate projects to expand and improve the functioning of the STAs, such as those 
proposed under Governor Jeb Bush’s Acceler8 initiative announced in late 2004. 
Acceler8 planned an additional 23,000 acres STAs in the EAA and canal improvements 
to allow better distribution of flow among the STAs.58 Construction of the additional 
STAs began in 2006 and was expected to be complete by 2010. In 2006, under public 
pressure, the District commissioned a study of water quality data across the EAA in order 
to identify opportunities for improving the BMP Program. 
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In mid-2008 planning for the EAA took another leap when the newly elected 
Governor Charlie Crist announced the District’s intention to purchase U.S. Sugar 
Corporation, including its 187,000 acres primarily in the northern EAA, to provide land 
for construction of water storage reservoirs.59 The details of the agreement were still 
under discussion at the end of the case study, but there were signs that the purchase 
would be scaled back. 
The future land use of the Everglades Agricultural Area is uncertain. Depletion of 
the shallow soils in the southern EAA allowed the land to convert from agriculture to 
STAs and planned reservoirs (under CERP). Eventually soil loss in the northern EAA 
will make that area more economically suitable for cattle grazing and urban development. 
The pressure for urban development in the EAA, however, is not strong, and most 
population growth in the area is expected to occur in existing communities along Lake 
Okeechobee.60 Several environmental groups are advocating the creation of a coordinated 
land use plan for the EAA that recognizes its special relationship to Everglades 
restoration.61 
Table 4 lists the major events in the phosphorus case. For each event, the table 
indicates the primary type of governance process involved or resulting (collaborative, 
political, bureaucratic, judicial, or scientific), or whether it was an environmental change. 
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Table 4 Chronology of Major Events in the Phosphorus Case 
Date Event Type
1965 EAA and WCAs created by the C&SF Project E 
1971 District observed impacts of excess phosphorus in WCAs B 
1973 District first considered water quality standards for nutrients 
discharged to District waters 
B 
1973 Special Project to Prevent the Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee 
initiated 
C 
1975 State’s narrative criterion for nutrients legislated P 
1975 District first considered requiring a sugar grower to monitor 
nutrients and detain runoff 
B 
1978 Florida’s Planning Director recommended that the District consider 
a regional approach to creating retention areas for treating EAA 
runoff (the idea for STAs) 
B 
1979 ENP, LNWR, and state signed water quality protection agreement B 
1981 District’s Interim Action Plan increased phosphorus load to WCAs B/E 
1982 Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission first suggested 
changes in EAA agricultural practices (idea for BMPs) 
B 
1985 Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Council (LOTAC I) initiated C 
1986 Lake Okeechobee large algae bloom and criticism of District E/P 
1986 District reorganized and submitted recommendations for watershed 
approach to Florida Legislature 
B/C 
1987 Surface Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Act passed P 
1987 Interagency panel recommended District prepare Everglades SWIM 
Plan, and District initiated planning 
C/B 
1987 LOTAC II initiated C 
1988 STA pilot project initiated B 
1988 Department of Justice sued state and District concerning phosphorus J 
1989 Advisory Committee for Everglades SWIM Plan created C 
1989 Martinez settlement agreements proposed and rejected P 
1991 Mediated technical negotiations (under Timer Powers) initiated C 
1991 Marjory Stoneman Douglas Everglades Protection Act passed P 
1991 Settlement Agreement ended federal lawsuit J 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Date Event Type
1991 Technical Oversight Committee created C 
1991 Stormwater Treatment Area Design Working Group convened C 
1992 Everglades SWIM Plan issued B 
1992 Scientific Advisory Group for the Everglades (SAGE) created C 
1992 Sugar industry filed lawsuits against the Everglades SWIM Plan (in 
addition to lawsuits against the Settlement Agreement) 
J 
1992 Mediated technical and policy negotiations (under Gerald Cormick) 
initiated 
C 
1993 Negotiations under DOI’s Bruce Babbitt resulted in Statement of 
Principles 
C 
1993 Babbitt created South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force 
and Working Group 
C 
1994 Everglades Forever Act passed P 
1994 Everglades Program replaced Everglades SWIM Plan B 
1995 EAA BMP Program established B 
1995 First of several Miccosukee lawsuits against state and federal 
agencies to implement the Everglades Forever Act 
J 
1996 District began researching technologies to reach 10 ppb phosphorus B/S 
1996 Save Our Everglades placed ballot measures to force sugar industry 
to pay for phosphorus reduction 
P 
1997 Construction of STAs initiated E 
2001 Collaborative workshop for phosphorus criterion convened C 
2002 Basin Specific Feasibility Studies determined that Everglades 
Program would not achieve the phosphorus criterion 
B 
2002 Miccosukee reported violations of Consent Decree and requested 
Special Master 
J 
2003 Periphyton STA pilot projects initiated B 
2003 District’s Governing Board approved the draft Long term Plan B 
2003 Everglades Forever Act amended P 
2003 State’s Phosphorus Rule issued B 




Table 4 (continued) 
Date Event Type
2003 Special Master appointed for Consent Decree J 
2003 Water Resources Advisory Commission convened first workshops 
for revisions to Long term Plan 
C 
2004 Acceler8 announced B 
2006  Acceler8 STA expansions initiated E 
2006 Technical Oversight Committee (TOC) failed to reach agreement 
concerning protective phosphorus standard 
C 
2006 Deadline for attaining long-term phosphorus standards in Consent 
Decree 
J 
2007 Everglades Program STAs completed E 
2008 District announced plans to purchase U.S. Sugar Corporation B 
2008 Court ruled U.S. Environmental Protection Agency review of EFA 
amendment was insufficient 
J 
 
Type: C – collaborative process, P – political process, B – bureaucratic process, J – 
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CHAPTER 6 
SHARK SLOUGH CASE 
 
This chapter presents an overview of Shark Slough restoration progress and 
details of the governance events that produced the progress. The overview of progress 
describes the historic Shark Slough and its ecological significance, development impacts 
to the slough, and a summary of the major restoration projects and policies. The 
chronology of events is divided into four subsections according to significant 
progressions towards improved ecosystem management, as Shark Slough governance 
gained a more holistic perspective. For each subsection, a brief discussion of the role of 
collaborative processes is included. A table outlining the major events is provided at the 
end of the chapter. 
 
6.1 Overview of Shark Slough Restoration Progress 
 
6.1.1 Historic Shark Slough 
Shark Slough, also known as Shark River Slough, is a limestone depression in the 
southern Everglades that historically funneled over a million acre-feet of flow per year 
(see Figure 2).1 The Shark Slough’s ridge and slough landscape provided an important 
dry season and drought refuge for aquatic life when the adjacent wet prairies dried out.2 
Shark Slough’s flows supported the mangrove forests and estuaries of Whitewater Bay 
and the Ten Thousand Islands. On the eastern edge of the Everglades, seasonal floods 
recharged the Biscayne Aquifer that flowed to Biscayne Bay. At times of high flooding, 
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some flows passed across gaps in the coastal ridge to the much smaller Taylor Slough 
that fed Florida Bay (shown in Figure 2). 
 
6.1.2 Shark Slough Flow Regime Threat 
Figure 4 shows many of the features of the central and southern Everglades that 
are discussed in this subsection and Section 6.2. Disruption of flow in Shark Slough 
began in the early 1900s. The Everglades drainage canal closest to Shark Slough, the 
Miami Canal, was connected to the coast in 1912 and moderately reduced southward 
sheet flow. The first direct modification of Shark Slough occurred during the 1920s with 
the construction of the Tamiami Trail highway and the adjacent canal across the northern 
part of the slough (which is 11 miles wide at this location). Flow under the highway was 
permitted via numerous culverts, and at times flow overtopped the roadbed. Degradation 
of the Everglades landscape to the south of Tamiami Trail was observable by about a 




Figure 4 Southern Everglades with Restoration Projects. Source: U.S. Institute for 
Environmental Conflict Resolution, 20024 
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The largest assault on the Shark Slough flow regime occurred with the 
construction of the Central and Southern Florida (C&SF) Project during the 1950s and 
early 1960s.5 The C&SF Project created Water Conservation Areas 3A and 3B that 
eliminated natural overland flow at Shark Slough’s headwaters north of Tamiami Trail. 
The C&SF Project released (or “delivered”) flow to Everglades National Park from WCA 
3A via gates located west of Shark Slough (the S-12 gates). Upon construction of WCA 
3A, the South Florida Water Management District released water through the S-12 gates 
depending on the need to maintain water level in the WCAs for water supply and flood 
control purposes, and not on the needs of ENP. A north-south levee extension (L-67 Ext) 
built across the slough along the original eastern boundary of ENP discouraged these 
water releases from spreading to the east. The C&SF Project prohibited flow to Northeast 
Shark Slough (i.e., WCA 3B and a portion of the East Everglades), the area that had 
historically received the majority of flow, in order to keep water from seeping into the 
aquifer and because of interest in developing the area. Additionally, the C&SF Project’s 
large north-south levee and canal severed a portion of the slough’s headwaters, opening 
up the land for westward expansion of Miami. The area between the original ENP eastern 
border and the north-south levee L-31N (see Figure 4) is called the East Everglades.  
In the mid 1960s, the canal system was extended for agricultural development in 
southeast Dade County, connecting the C&SF Project to the existing C-111 System that 
served the coastal area to the southeast of Taylor Slough. The connected system drained 
the East Everglades, including the headwaters to Taylor Slough, further promoting 
agricultural and residential development. Figure 4 shows development areas in the East 
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Everglades, including the 8½ Square Mile Area (8.5 SMA) residential and agricultural 
area, the Frog Pond agricultural area, and the Rocky Glades (or L-31N Transition Lands) 
agricultural area. These areas are very vulnerable to flooding, since they are west of the 
major north-south levee and have a highly porous surficial aquifer. The 8.5 SMA was 
particularly controversial because development occurred against local land use policies 
designed to protect aquifer recharge and discourage development in areas lacking flood 
protection. 
The various modifications have caused Northeast Shark Slough to convert from a 
ridge and slough landscape to homogenous sawgrass plains.6 Soil subsidence has 
occurred in the drier areas, especially WCA 3B. The southeastern section of WCA 3A, on 
the other hand, has experienced excessive water levels. The area south of the S-12 gates 
received more flow than it did historically and has converted from wet prairie to 
sawgrass. The most eastern portion of the historic southern Everglades has been lost to 
development. In addition to habitat alteration, the managed water flow regime has had 
numerous direct deleterious impacts on wildlife, including via complete dry down during 
droughts and sudden, excessive water levels during the nesting season. 
 
6.1.3 Shark Slough Restoration Progress 
Shark Slough restoration has many aspects to consider. A restored flow regime 
across the central and southern Everglades is defined by its ability to reproduce the ridge 
and slough landscape, maintain soils, meet the needs of native wildlife, serve other parts 
of the ecosystem (especially wet prairies, Taylor Slough, and coastal areas), and protect 
endangered species and other natural values (such as historic tree islands).7 Exactly how 
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such a restored flow regime should look has yet to be determined. Restoration progress is 
indicated by adjustments believed to move the flow regime closer to achieving the 
ecological objectives and within the constraints imposed by irreversible alterations such 
as urban development and soil subsidence. Much of the attention of Everglades flow 
regime restoration has focused on the Shark Slough area because of its importance to 
Everglades National Park. 
The planned and implemented Shark Slough restoration policies and projects have 
addressed flow volume, timing, distribution, and profile (sheet flow). The first major 
initiative in 1970 improved flow through the S-12 gates, with a guaranteed minimum 
annual volume and more natural seasonal variation based on a static schedule (rather than 
actual weather patterns). The next major initiative, the Experimental Water Deliveries 
Program (Experimental Program), began in 1983 and distributed the WCA 3A releases 
by directing some flow to Northeast Shark Slough through operational changes. The 
Experimental Program reduced flow through the S-12s and included a rainfall-based 
delivery schedule for these releases. The Experimental Program tripled the annual flow to 
Northeast Shark Slough over the previous flow regime.8 The improved flow, however, 
was still only a quarter of the historic flow, and measures to reduce flood risk to 
developed areas resulted in some wetlands of the East Everglades being drier than before 
the program.9 Moreover, the Experimental Program’s flood mitigation measures were 
partially to blame for the exceptionally high flood releases in 1993-95 that devastated the 
endangered Cape Sable seaside sparrow and led to the Interim Structural and Operational 
Plan/Interim Operational Plan (ISOP/IOP).10 The ISOP/IOP resulted in less flow through 
the S-12 gates (and a portion of the extension levee was removed to allow spreading of 
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flow) without increasing flow to Northeast Shark Slough, thus leading to a drier lower 
Shark Slough.11 The ISOP/IOP also led to a drier WCA 3B.12 This is the flow regime 
currently in effect. 
The Modified Water Deliveries (MWD) Project and related C-111 Project were 
authorized in 1989, and implementation is expected after 2013.13 These so-called 
foundational projects required substantial foundational work of their own, namely 
expanding Everglades National Park into the undeveloped East Everglades, acquiring and 
securing flood protection for private properties in the 8.5 SMA, modifications to 
Tamiami Trail, and coordination with downstream restoration projects in the C-111 basin 
(see Figure 4), including development of the Combined Structural and Operational Plan 
(CSOP). The MWD Project will restore some flow to WCA 3B, slightly improve sheet 
flow across Tamiami Trail (with a one-mile bridge), and increase annual flow volume to 
Northeast Shark Slough to close to forty percent of the historic level.14 The 
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) authorized in 2000 included the 
WCA 3 Decompartmentalization and Sheet Flow Enhancement (Decomp) Project that 
intends to substantially restore sheet flow across WCA 3A, WCA 3B, and Everglades 
National Park. Other CERP projects will marginally increase annual flow volume to 
Shark Slough and improve natural flow timing and variation.15 Implementation of these 
CERP projects is not expected before 2020 and will likely take longer given the history 
of delays and increasing competition for resources. 
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6.2 Shark Slough Governance 
The first step in protecting and restoring Shark Slough was creation of Everglades 
National Park in 1947, and the park has since been a strong advocate for restoration of 
flow volume and timing within its borders. As described above, the policies and projects 
advocated by ENP evolved from a minimum water delivery schedule to a set of 
interrelated projects to restore flow to Northeast Shark Slough. Governance leaders used 
a variety of ad hoc collaborative processes in response to ENP’s advocacy spanning four 
decades. Additionally, the collaborative ecosystem-level planning during the C&SF 
Project Restudy in the 1990s recognized the need for modifications beyond the 
foundational projects in order to meet ecological objectives. The governance events are 
presented below according to four major initiatives: early restoration of Shark Slough 
flow volume and timing (including the Minimum Delivery Schedule for ENP); early 
restoration of Northeast Shark Slough flow (including the Experimental Program); 
implementation of the Modified Water Deliveries Project; and the Comprehensive 
Everglades Restoration Plan. The presentation is roughly chronological, but some 
initiatives’ activities occurred in parallel. Appendix B provides more details about the 
collaborative processes for this case. 
 
6.2.1 Early Restoration of Shark Slough Flow Volume and Timing 
The first initiative towards improving flow regime for Everglades National Park, 
and hence the portion of Shark Slough within the park, established ENP as an interest 
deserving attention. As ENP gained power, this increased communication and 
collaboration between Everglades National Park (and at times its parent agencies, the 
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National Park Service (NPS) and the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)), the District, 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The evolution of ENP’s status and interagency 
relationships eventually led to formal partnerships to design and implement restoration 
projects. 
The account of Shark Slough restoration begins with the establishment of 
Everglades National Park. The purpose of the park was to preserve the ecological values 
of the southern Everglades and neighboring ecosystems, including Florida Bay and Ten 
Thousand Islands. One of the park’s early promoters, Ernest Coe, advocated that the 
park’s boundaries extend fifteen miles north of Tamiami Trail to protect overland flow, 
eastward to Biscayne Bay (thus including Northeast Shark Slough), and westward into 
Big Cypress Swamp.16 Coe’s failure to compromise on the boundaries eventually led to a 
park about half the size that excluded Northeast Shark Slough (to enable development of 
private property in the East Everglades). As the designation of the park neared and plans 
for the C&SF Project took shape in 1947, there were concerns about the long-term 
survival of the park since it was dependent upon upstream flow.17 
A year later in 1948 the U.S. Congress approved the C&SF Project. The 
legislation authorizing the project directed the Corps to protect Everglades National Park, 
however there were no guarantees of water deliveries. The U.S. Department of the 
Interior suggested that ENP and the Corps negotiate the operational plans prior to 
construction, however the negotiation did not happen. In the early 1950s the District 
conducted studies of pre-C&SF Project overland flow to Shark Slough, and Corps 
engineers noted that the ENP would not receive sufficient flow under the project’s 
design. 
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The construction of WCA 3 in the early 1960s halted all overland flow to 
Everglades National Park, and the National Park Service requested a water delivery 
schedule from the Corps and District. The Corps stated that it did not have authority for 
water allocation and deferred to the District. The Secretary of the Army suggested that an 
interagency coordinating committee be formed to determine a delivery schedule each 
year, and the NPS agreed to participate, but this was not done. ENP determined a 
minimum amount of annual flow needed by the park, and the National Park Service 
asked Congress to guarantee that amount (with a monthly schedule accounting for 
seasonal variation).18 The District proposed a delivery schedule based on water levels in 
WCA 3A, which the park accepted rather than have no delivery schedule. The NPS then 
pressed the Corps to conduct a C&SF Project Survey-Review planning process (similar to 
a “restudy”) in order to identify structural and operational means of improving water flow 
to the park. 
In 1965 the Corps agreed to conduct a Survey-Review and, in a pattern that 
repeated throughout the Shark Slough case, the agency broadened the planning scope to 
include consideration of all water needs of the region. During this time environmental 
management of the Everglades received national media and environmentalist attention as 
a result of wildlife (especially deer) deaths due to high water in the central Everglades, 
followed by a drought that negatively impacted the park.19 The Corps’ response was to 
construct the L-67C canal (parallel to the existing L-67A levee and canal along the border 
between WCA 3A and WCA 3B) to capture seepage and send it to the park, and the L-67 
Extension canal to deliver flow to the center of Shark Slough, but also with a levee to 
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prevent water from spreading into the East Everglades during flood releases. Later 
restoration efforts would seek to remove these components.  
In 1968 the Survey-Review process itself resulted in a new delivery schedule for 
ENP based on water level in Lake Okeechobee, recommendations for additional water 
management infrastructure (that the park rejected), and backpumping to the lake to 
increase its storage for water supply for future development.20 As a result of additional 
advocacy by Everglades National Park since 1963, the Everglades National Park-South 
Dade Conveyance System was authorized to provide increased flow to Taylor Slough 
(via new pumping stations and canal enlargement), as well as increase water supply and 
flood control to South Dade County agriculture.21 The system was constructed during 
1978-82 and would later undergo modification as part of the C-111 Project. 
Everglades National Park still did not have an acceptable water delivery schedule, 
therefore the agency elevated the issue to the federal judicial system. The U.S. Attorney 
General left office before resolving the issue, and the U.S. Senate asked that the agencies 
negotiate an agreement. The result was another schedule based on Lake Okeechobee 
levels. The Senate then conducted a hearing and recommended legislation guaranteeing 
the minimum water delivery schedule proposed by Everglades National Park. The 
Minimum Delivery Schedule became law in 1970 (even though the state argued that it 
had sovereignty over water allocation).22  
The law that instituted the minimum delivery schedule also required the Corps to 
review (or “restudy”) the C&SF Project in 1980 to determine if additional modifications 
were needed to ensure an adequate water supply to the park.23 The Corps initiated the 
“restudy” in 1980 and instead focused on how the project could increase water supply for 
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agriculture and development. The study ended in 1987 without making any 
recommendations. A useful output of the “restudy,” however, was the District’s creation 
of the South Florida Water Management Model. ENP used the model to simulate flow 
restoration through the removal of canals and levees, thus planting the technical seed for 
the major C&SF Project Restudy in the 1990s (discussed in Subsection 6.2.4).24  
 
6.2.2 Early Restoration of Northeast Shark Slough Flow 
The late 1960s and early 1970s had low rainfall. Civic and homeowner groups 
became concerned about aquifer recharge, and attention turned to the development 
occurring in the East Everglades. This marked the beginning of conflict over water 
management and land use in the East Everglades. The conflict intensified when ENP 
began advocating restoration of Northeast Shark Slough. Over the four decades since, 
stakeholder tensions and complexity of planning led to numerous collaborative processes 
concerning the East Everglades. 
The drought accelerated residential and agricultural development in the normally 
flood-prone East Everglades, especially the 8.5 SMA. In 1973 civic and homeowner 
groups petitioned Dade County to place a moratorium on East Everglades growth, citing 
issues of aquifer recharge and lack of flood protection. The County complied and 
conducted the East Everglades Moratorium Study that recommended stringent land use 
regulations in the area. In 1975 the County adopted a comprehensive plan that recognized 
the environmental values of the East Everglades and discouraged development. Despite 
land use policy, development continued. 
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In 1978 Dade County initiated the East Everglades Resources Planning Project to 
address the multiple concerns in the area. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
funded the Project as part of a program to study sensitive areas adjacent to national parks. 
An interagency steering committee, a citizens advisory committee, and a residents and 
property owners advisory committee assisted the effort. The final report focused on the 
importance of the East Everglades for aquifer recharge, and it briefly mentioned that ENP 
was exploring ways to return flow to Northeast Shark Slough.25 Everglades National Park 
began considering restoration of flow to Northeast Shark Slough in 1978 when the Corps 
added control structures to the canal adjacent to Tamiami Trail. The purpose of the 
control structures was to enhance water supply to South Dade County, but ENP saw their 
potential to disperse flow across the slough. The Project’s report recommended against 
residential development because of the environmental values of the area and the technical 
infeasibility of providing flood control given the porous surficial aquifer. In 1981 Dade 
County adopted the report’s recommendations and designated the East Everglades as an 
“Area of Critical Environmental Concern” in the comprehensive plan. 
In 1982 WCA 3B, the headwaters to Northeast Shark Slough, averted the threat of 
an airport, as Big Cypress Swamp did in the late 1960s. Some environmentalists had 
opposed an airport in WCA 3B, but most were in favor of the site, because they believed 
it was preferable to other likely locations that would have a greater impact on Everglades 
National Park. The newly elected Governor Bob Graham formed a committee to study 
the issue, and the committee recommended that no airport was needed until 2000. Indeed, 
an airport between ENP and Biscayne Bay, at Homestead Air Force Base, was considered 
in the late 1990s and rejected after another fierce political battle.26 
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Restoration of Northeast Shark Slough began in earnest in 1983 when Everglades 
National Park declared a crisis situation resulting from a series of ill-timed high flow 
releases to the park and urgently requested that the District’s Governing Board approve 
ENP’s ambitious Seven Point Proposal.27 The park’s proposal laid out most of the 
structural and operational changes to the C&SF Project, especially restoration of flow to 
WCA 3B and Northeast Shark Slough, that restoration projects would be addressing for 
decades to come.  
The District was supportive of ENP’s proposal and adopted it as the Seven Point 
Plan, but the Corps resisted making any changes that would increase flood risk to 
adjacent development (due to the porous surficial aquifer). East Everglades farmers were 
particularly concerned with the potential flood impacts of placing gaps in the L-67 
Extension and therefore filed a lawsuit against the District and Corps for failing to 
complete an Environmental Impact Statement for the action (to which the Corps 
concurred). Mediation resulted in a negotiated settlement that allowed Northeast Shark 
Slough restoration to proceed provided agriculture would receive annual canal 
drawdowns to lower groundwater levels for agriculture (even though they would drain 
water from Taylor Slough in ENP).28 
To revise ENP’s water delivery schedule to incorporate more natural timing 
through the S-12 gates and distribution to Northeast Shark Slough, Congress authorized a 
two-year field test of operational changes that would become known as the Experimental 
Program of Water Deliveries (with General Plan for a longer timeframe of the program 
approved in 1985). Congress directed the Corps, District, and ENP to negotiate the terms 
of the experiments, and the Corps demanded that the program include operational 
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protocols to compensate for any increases in flood risk to developed areas. Congress also 
authorized the Corps to acquire potentially flooded agricultural properties and to 
construct a flood protection system for the 8.5 SMA (even though the East Everglades 
Resources Planning Project had deemed such a system to be technically infeasible).29 The 
Corps began preparation of the plan for the Modified Water Deliveries Project for these 
and other structural and operational changes needed to implement the Seven Point Plan.  
During the start of the Experimental Program, the District was concerned about a 
campaign by East Everglades property owners to change zoning laws to allow improved 
flood protection and property subdivision, thus Governor Bob Graham declared the East 
Everglades an Area of Critical State Concern.30 The declaration resulted in the formation 
of the collaborative East Everglades/ENP Resources Planning and Management 
Committee (EE/ENP RPMC).31 In 1985 the Corps incorporated the EE/ENP RPMC’s 
recommendations into the Experimental Program’s General Plan, and the state pledged to 
acquire undeveloped properties in the East Everglades, however this initiative stalled 
because of landowner resistance and the initiative’s low priority under the state’s land 
acquisition program. 
Concerns of environmental impacts to other areas of the basin also constrained the 
Experimental Program. In the early 1980s Florida Bay ecological deterioration 
intensified, thus placing more attention on restoring flows to Taylor Slough via the C-111 
system. And by 1987 there were negative impacts on the estuaries at the outlet of the C-
111 system, including as a result of more water being released to mitigate flood risk of 
the Experimental Program. In response, the District asked the Corps to develop the C-111 
Project to address the environmental concerns and agricultural demands for enhanced 
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flood control for year-round crops. In 1988 an interagency committee approved the C-
111 Interim Plan to be instituted until more thorough planning for the C-111 Project 
could occur. At this time the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service raised concerns about the 
potential of the C-111 Project to adversely impact the endangered Cape Sable seaside 
sparrow in the Taylor Slough area. Also, by the mid-1980s the Experimental Program 
had overly drained habitat for the endangered Everglades snail kite in WCA 3A, and the 
issue underwent mediation in 1990. 
In 1988 Governor Bob Martinez followed outgoing Governor Graham’s advice to 
support Everglades restoration. Martinez established the East Everglades Land 
Acquisition Task Force to specify land for acquisition to aid Northeast Shark Slough 
restoration and to determine whether expansion of Everglades National Park would be a 
desirable approach. The task force’s recommendations, supported by then-senator 
Graham, along with the agencies’ planning activities since the beginning of the 
Experimental Program, led to the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act 
of 1989.32 The Act expanded the park into the undeveloped areas of the East Everglades 
and authorized the Modified Water Deliveries (MWD) Project. The MWD Project was 
intended to hydrologically connect Shark Slough’s historic path of flow along WCA 3A, 
WCA 3B, Northeast Shark Slough, and southern Shark Slough (see Figure 2), and to 
reduce seepage losses and provide flood protection for developed areas in the East 
Everglades. The Act also authorized the C-111 Project for the purposes of improving 
flow to Taylor Slough and reducing damaging flows to the southern estuaries. The Corps 
issued the plans for the MWD and C-111 projects in 1992 and 1994, respectively. The 
plans directed that a Water Control Plan for both projects be developed prior to 
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completion of the projects.33 This plan was included in the Combined Structural and 
Operational Plan (CSOP) developed during the mid-2000s. 
 
6.2.3 Implementation of the Modified Water Deliveries Project 
During implementation of the Modified Water Deliveries Project, the full extent 
of the challenges of restoration planning in the East Everglades, C-111 basin, and WCA 
3A and 3B became known. Governance leaders frequently used ad hoc collaborative 
processes to resolve disputes resulting from ENP’s advocacy for ecologically viable 
restoration plans to aid the park. 
The Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act directed an unusual 
implementation arrangement for the MWD Project, with funding provided by the U.S. 
Department of the Interior and design and construction by the Corps. This arrangement 
ultimately led to gridlock when Everglades National Park became concerned over the 
inadequacy or risk associated with each major component of the project’s design.34 
ENP’s concerns stemmed from park scientists’ modeling and accumulated experience 
with past multi-purpose and compromise projects, such as operation of the South Dade 
Conveyance System and the Experimental Program drying out undeveloped wetlands. 
The wetlands adjacent to developed areas were becoming recognized as important short 
hydroperiod habitat for wildlife, including for the endangered Cape Sable seaside 
sparrow. Also, extreme weather events, including Hurricane Andrew in 1992, indicated 
the flow variability the project should handle and the infeasibility of leaving private 
residential properties subject to regular flooding, as would occur under the MWD 
Project’s flood mitigation system for the 8.5 SMA.35 Moreover, modeling of the historic 
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Everglades as part of the C&SF Project Restudy (occurring since 1992) showed that pre-
development flows through Shark Slough had been much greater than originally thought. 
ENP had its eye on restoring flows to this level rather than the moderate level anticipated 
under the MWD Project.36 Implementation of each of the major components of the MWD 
Project is discussed below. 
 
6.2.3.1 8.5 SMA Flood Mitigation and Protection of the Cape Sable Seaside Sparrow 
The first aspect of the Modified Water Deliveries Project over which ENP 
expressed reservations was the flood mitigation system planned for the 8.5 SMA.37 In 
1994, during legislative consideration of an amendment to the ENP Protection and 
Expansion Act (for measures concerning the C-111 Project), ENP advocated (with state 
support) for the option of using the flood mitigation project funds for acquisition of the 
8.5 SMA.38 The Amendment included the provision but did not authorize eminent 
domain. Controversy of the provision led Governor Lawton Chiles to create the 
collaborative East Everglades 8.5 SMA Study Committee, which recommended partial 
acquisition and flood mitigation of the remaining development. When the Corps refused 
to accept the partial acquisition approach, the District studied alternatives for a possible 
Locally Preferred Option (where the District would provide the funding), and in 1998 the 
District declared that it supported full acquisition.  
The reactions to the District’s plans to buy out the 8.5 SMA were intense. 
Residents formed the United Property Owners of 8.5 SMA, and a national Hispanic rights 
organization took up their cause. The Miccosukee Tribe was concerned that an attempt to 
buy out the entire 8.5 SMA would significantly delay implementation of the MWD 
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Project and would therefore not relieve high water levels in WCA 3A that the tribe 
believed resulted from recent operational changes to protect the Cape Sable seaside 
sparrow.39  
Poorly timed flood releases in the mid-1990s had decimated a sub-population of 
the Cape Sable seaside sparrow south of the S-12 gates, and in 1997 the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service had sent a letter to the Corps urging modifications to the water 
management protocols.40 The Corps had resisted operational changes to protect the 
sparrow41, but through mediation, the agencies reached agreement on annual “emergency 
deviations,” followed by the Interim Structural and Operational Plan (ISOP) in 2000 and 
the Interim Operational Plan (IOP) in 2002 (also using interagency mediations).42 The 
“interim” status of these plans denoted their use until completion of the MWD and C-111 
projects and development of the Combined Structural and Operational Plan. Scientists 
were in agreement that the eventual restoration of flow to Northeast Shark Slough 
through the MWD and C-111 projects would achieve protective measures for the sparrow 
and relieve negative ecological impacts to other areas. 
The Miccosukee Tribe filed several lawsuits in response to changes to the 8.5 
SMA flood mitigation system and against the emergency deviations.43 In 1999 the 
Miccosukee and several homeowners sued the District for failure to comply with the 
state’s “sunshine” law for transparent government.44 The Miccosukee also sued the 
interagency Southern Everglades Restoration Alliance (SERA) created to coordinate the 
Experimental Program, MWD Project, and C-111 Project. The Miccosukee claimed 
SERA violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act and had influenced decisions to 
acquire the 8.5 SMA and the emergency actions for the sparrow. In response, the District 
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backed off its commitment. When Governor Jeb Bush took in office 1999, he appointed 
new members of the District Governing Board, and the board overturned the decision to 
buy out the 8.5 SMA.45 
To assist the District with identification of its Locally Preferred Option for the 8.5 
SMA, the Corps prepared (with extensive public input) a report that presented the various 
proposed alternatives. In 2000, after additional agency interactions and public comment, 
the Corps selected the final alternative, which included acquisition of the western third of 
the 8.5 SMA and flood mitigation for the remaining development. In 2001 the Corps and 
8.5 SMA landowners could not agree on flowage easement purchase prices. Landowners 
initiated negotiations with DOI, but the Corps was not aware and condemned the 
properties. The landowners responded with a lawsuit claiming that the Corps did not have 
authority to implement the alternative. The court ruled that the federal government could 
not purchase private land in the 8.5 SMA without state participation, and the Corps 
appealed. In 2002 Congress clarified that it intended for the Corps to implement the 
alternative and directed its expeditious completion. The 8.5 SMA partial acquisition and 
flood mitigation system was completed in late 2008, and the Corps was developing an 
interim operational plan for this system until completion of the MWD Project and 
institution of the Water Control Plan. 
 
6.2.3.2 Tamiami Trail Modifications 
The second set of concerns that Everglades National Park had regarding the 
Modified Water Deliveries Project was the ability of the Tamiami Trail modifications to 
pass the amount of water and degree of sheetflow desired for restoration of Northeast 
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Shark Slough. Like the flood mitigation system for the 8.5 SMA, the Tamiami Trail 
modifications underwent frequent revision and encountered delays.  
The 1992 plan for the MWD Project recommended two water control structures in 
the levee adjacent to Tamiami Trail and elevation of a 1,500-feet section of the highway 
(i.e., a bridge). In 1996 ENP suggested to the District that, under the existing design, 
higher water in the canal adjacent to the highway could damage the roadbed and that 
flooding of the road was possible during storms, and the District began studying the 
concerns. In 1999 an ENP study (conducted in coordination with the District and Corps) 
found that the planned Tamiami Trail modifications were not large enough to pass 
anticipated restoration flows, and would thus cause high water levels in WCA 3B and 
increased water loss due to evapotranspiration and seepage (and therefore drier 
conditions in ENP).46 In 2001, following scientific research stressing the importance of 
sheetflow to the Everglades, the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force’s 
Science Coordination Team wrote a letter to the Corps in support of elevating Tamiami 
Trail.47  
In late 2003 the Corps issued the plan for the Tamiami Trail modifications of the 
MWD Project. The report selected a 3,000-ft bridge, which was the longest span 
affordable under the U.S. Department of Interior’s budget. New modeling then predicted 
higher water levels in WCA 3B that could damage tree islands, and the DOI asked the 
Corps to consider a higher water level in the canal adjacent to the highway, as well as a 
4-mile bridge to coordinate with the Decomp Project under the Comprehensive 
Everglades Restoration Plan (see Subsection 6.2.4). Even more significant, the Florida 
Department of Transportation would not approve the Corps’ plan without upgrading the 
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unbridged portion of eastern Tamiami Trail in order to avoid damage to the roadbed. The 
Corps withdrew the Tamiami Trail plan.  
In late 2005 the Corps issued a revised plan for the Tamiami Trail modifications 
that included a raised road profile with two bridges (spanning two miles and one mile, 
placed at two of the four deepest sloughs within Northeast Shark Slough). In 2007 a 
design refinement led to another plan revision to reflect an increase in the amount of land 
acquisition needed. The federal Water Resources Development Act of 2007 (the first in 
seven years) provided funding for the Tamiami Trail modifications, but Congress also 
asked the Corps to reanalyze the modifications in light of significant increases in 
construction costs. In early 2008 the Corps yet again revised the plan and eliminated the 
two-mile bridge (thus leaving the one-mile bridge at the eastern corner of the ENP 
expansion area). The Miccosukee filed a lawsuit claiming that planning for the Tamiami 
Trail modifications did not follow the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
requirement to consider a range of alternatives, with the Miccosukee contending that a 
cheaper and faster means of improving flow to Northeast Shark Slough would be to build 
swales and clean the highway culverts. The Miccosukee were also concerned about the 
economic impacts of the bridge on tourism-oriented tribal and other private lands along 
the highway.48 In late 2008 a federal judge agreed with the Miccosukee and placed an 
injunction on construction of the bridge. In spring 2009 Congress included language in 
the Omnibus spending bill that exempted the project from the federal law and directed the 
Corps to begin construction immediately. 
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6.2.3.3 Combined Structural and Operational Plan (CSOP) 
The third major aspect of the Modified Water Deliveries Project was the 
Combined Structural and Operational Plan, consisting of the Water Control Plan for the 
MWD and C-111 projects and the MWD Project’s Conveyance and Seepage Control 
Features.49 The Conveyance and Seepage Control Features included structures to allow 
flow from WCA 3A to WCA 3B (across L-67 A and C levees and canals) and a pump to 
collect seepage in the north-south canal between WCA 3B/ENP and development (see 
Figure 4). Like the 8.5 SMA and Tamiami Trail components of the MWD Project, the 
CSOP has also been subject to debate and revision. Because of the controversial nature of 
CSOP planning, it has employed two collaborative processes to negotiate 
technical/agency and stakeholder aspects, respectively. 
In 1996 Everglades National Park questioned whether the L-67 conveyance 
components were sufficient to allow anticipated restoration flows, but a 1999 study by 
the National Park Service found that they were. In early 2001 the Corps issued a Value 
Engineering Report for the MWD Project, as required by law for large projects. The 
report recommended design changes to the L-67 features, an interim pump to control 
WCA 3B seepage, and additional conveyance across the levee adjacent to Tamiami 
Trail.50 At the District’s request, the Corps formed the interagency CSOP Project 
Delivery Team and began planning the CSOP to address the changes to the Conveyance 
and Seepage Control Features, to develop the Water Control Plan, and to refine the C-111 
Project. 
In early 2003 the Corps issued the Draft CSOP Overview and Project Purposes 
and Objectives, and the Everglades Coalition criticized the document as focusing more 
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on flood protection than ecological restoration. At the request of the Corps, the South 
Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force convened the stakeholder-based CSOP 
Advisory Team to provide consensus recommendations to the agencies. In late 2006, with 
support of the CSOP Advisory Team and additional input from the District, the Corps 
selected a CSOP alternative that balanced ecological and flood control objectives. In 
early 2007 the Corps began preparation of the CSOP environmental impact statement but 
put the effort on hold following changes to the Tamiami Trail modifications. 
Achieving any environmental benefit of the Modified Water Deliveries Project 
requires completion of the 8.5 SMA partial acquisition and flood mitigation system, the 
Tamiami Trail modifications, the Conveyance and Seepage Control Features, the C-111 
Project, and the Water Control Plan. The current estimated date for completion of this 
suite of components is 2013. 
 
6.2.4 The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan 
The Central and Southern Florida Project Restudy, guided by multiple 
collaborative processes from 1992 to 1998, recognized that the so-called “foundational” 
projects, including the Modified Water Deliveries Project and the C-111 Project were not 
enough to revive the southern Everglades. The Restudy sought ways to restore the entire 
remaining Everglades, and the result was the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration 
Plan (CERP). Several CERP projects aimed to improve sheetflow, reduce seepage losses, 
and enable more natural flow volumes and timing in the Shark Slough area.51 Soon after 
CERP was presented, however, the U.S. Department of the Interior and the Florida Game 
and Fresh Water Fish Commission, determined that the plan did not substantially restore 
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historic Everglades flows, and the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Working Group 
concurred. During implementation, again guided by multiple collaborative processes, the 
bias away from environmental improvement and towards water supply planning has 
become even more pronounced. 
The main CERP project to improve Everglades flow regime was the WCA 3 
Decompartmentalization and Sheet Flow Enhancement (Decomp) Project.52 The Decomp 
Project included components to further enhance flow across L-67 A and C and Tamiami 
Trail (along the entire northern border of Everglades National Park and including the 
adjacent levee and canal). The Decomp Project also proposed to fill Miami Canal, with 
expansion of the North New River Canal between WCA 3A and WCA 2A to maintain 
water supply (see Figure 3). The Decomp Project was to be completed in two phases, 
with the first phase authorized in 2000 and covering changes to Miami Canal and the 
portion of Tamiami Trail across Northeast Shark Slough. 
The Decomp Project Management Plan was issued in early 2002, but several 
months later the Corps and District suspended planning as a result of delays in the MWD 
Project and other CERP projects, resistance by recreational fishing interests who use the 
Everglades canals, and uncertainties about the ecological impacts of project features.53 
Several years later in 2006, under pressure for CERP to achieve environmental gains, the 
interagency RECOVER group developed the Decomp Adaptive Management Plan 
(DAMP) to address the planning hurdles caused by scientific uncertainty.54 The agencies 
also segmented the project components into three phases (rather than two), and the 
Decomp Project Delivery Team reconvened in late 2006 to pursue the first phase which 
included burying Miami Canal (rather than backfilling it to reduce cost), a flow-way for 
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L-67A, and a bridge for the western portion of Tamiami Trail (between two of the S-12 
gates). Around this time, the South Florida Ecosystem Task Force convened a 
subcommittee to provide input to Decomp Project planning. 
The long-term plans for restoring Shark Slough and its headwaters are ambitious, 
but there are serious concerns over whether and when these plans will come to fruition. 
Past multi-purpose projects, such as the Experimental Program, have led to development 
gains (e.g., improved flood control) at the expense of the environment (e.g., drying of 
adjacent wetlands). Other projects, such as the Modified Water Deliveries Project, have 
required frequent revision and conflict resolution, thus taking decades to become 
functional. Even with completion of the MWD Project, significant improvements in 
Shark Slough flow must wait for the Decomp Project and other CERP projects to reduce 
seepage losses (in order to increase restoration flows and mitigate flood risk to developed 
areas east of the large north-south levee). The timeline for implementation of these 
projects is likely decades. 
Table 5 lists the major events in the Shark Slough case. For each event, the table 
indicates the primary type of governance process involved or resulting (collaborative, 
political, bureaucratic, judicial, or scientific), or whether it was an environmental change. 
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Table 5 Chronology of Major Events in the Shark Slough Case 
Date Event Type 
1905 Idea for Everglades National Park first suggested P 
1912 Miami Canal completed E 
1928 Tamiami Trail highway completed E 
1947 Everglades National Park created B 
1948 C&SF Project authorized and DOI first requested water delivery 




District studied pre-C&SF Project flow to Shark Slough, and Corps 
noted C&SF Project deliveries would not meet ENP’s needs 
S/B 
1962 Water Conservation Area 3 completed E 
1964 ENP determined and requested minimum flow from Congress S/B/P 
1965 First ENP water delivery schedule (based on WCA 3A water level) 
established 
B 
1965 Corps’ Survey-Review initiated B/C 
1966 C&SF Project connected to the C-111 System E 
1967 L-67C and L-67 Extension constructed E 
1968 ENP-South Dade Conveyance System authorized B 
1970 Congress passed ENP’s Minimum Delivery Schedule P 
1973 Groups petitioned Dade County to place moratorium on East 
Everglades development 
P 
1978 ENP first considered restoration of flow to Northeast Shark Slough B 
1978 East Everglades Resources Planning Project C 
1980 First Corps “restudy” conducted B 
1982 WCA 3B airport site study committee convened C 
1983 ENP’s Seven Point Proposal submitted to District B 
1983 East Everglades farmers lawsuit initiated (and then mediated) J/C 
1983 Experimental Program authorized B 
1984 East Everglades/ENP Resources Planning and Management 
Committee convened 
C 
1985 State pledged to purchased undeveloped land in East Everglades B 
1987 District requested Corps develop the C-111 Project B 
1988 East Everglades Land Acquisition Task Force C 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Date Event Type 
1989 ENP Protection and Expansion Act passed, including Modified 
Water Deliveries and C-111 projects 
B 
1990 Experimental Program impacts on snail kite mediated C 
1992 Modified Water Deliveries plan issued B 
1992 C&SF Project Restudy initiated B/C 
1994 C-111 Project plan issued B 
1994 ENP Protection and Expansion Act amended, including potential 
acquisition of 8.5 SMA 
P 
1994 East Everglades 8.5 SMA Study Committee C 
1996 ENP first expressed concerns about MWD Project Tamiami Trail 
and L-67 conveyance components 
B 
1997 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service urged Corps to protect Cape Sable 
seaside sparrow (led to mediation and ISOP/IOP) 
B/C 
1998 District supported full acquisition of 8.5 SMA P 
1999 Miccosukee and homeowners sued District and SERA over 8.5 
SMA acquisition decision 
J 
2000 Corps selected alternative for Locally Preferred Option for 8.5 SMA B 
2000 Decomp Project authorized by CERP B 
2001 Corps issued Value Engineering Report for MWD Project and 
recommended changes to MWD Project conveyance and seepage 
components 
B 
2001 CSOP Project Delivery Team initiated C 
2001 Landowners sued Corps claiming agency did not have authority to 
implement 8.5 SMA alternative 
J 
2002 Congress stated it intended for Corps to implement 8.5 SMA 
alternative 
P 
2003 CSOP Advisory Team convened C 
2003 Tamiami Trail modifications plan issued and withdrawn B 
2005 Tamiami Trail modifications plan revised (two bridges) B 
2006 Decomp Project’s Adaptive Management Plan issued C 
2006 Decomp Project Delivery Team reconvened C 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Date Event Type 
2006 South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force formed ad hoc 
Decomp Project team 
C 
2008 Tamiami Trail modifications plan revised (one bridge) B 
2008 Miccosukee sued over Tamiami Trail plan J 
2008 8.5 SMA partial acquisition and flood mitigation system completed E 




Type: C – collaborative process, P – political process, B – bureaucratic process, J – 
judicial process, S – scientific process, E – environmental change 
 
 
This chapter concludes the case backgrounds and chronologies. The remainder of 
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The literature review and conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2 
recognized three tenets of ecosystem management. The ecosystem management approach 
is (1) integrative across the ecosystem and connected with smaller and larger scales of 
management, (2) adaptive in the face of changing conditions and information, and (3) 
protective of ecological health and other values. The first tenet affects the second tenet, 
and the first two tenets have implications for the third tenet. Indicators for these 
interrelated tenets form the basis for evaluating collaborative processes and collaborative 
governance (i.e., the combined action of collaborative, political, bureaucratic, and judicial 
processes). The most important evaluative comparison is between the impacts of 
collaborative processes/governance relative to what would have likely happened without 
collaboration. Also of interest are the impacts relative to ideal collaborative 
processes/governance, including process quality or contextual reasons for any 
discrepancies. The dissertation reports the findings for each tenet in separate chapters, 
beginning with this chapter. 
Additionally, the literature review identified three, interrelated types of impacts of 
collaborative processes: (1) process characteristics, including problem solving and 
conflict resolution, (2) outputs, including policies, coordination, and political support for 
policies, and (3) capacity building and political restructuring. Each of the findings 
chapters is thus organized according to the types of collaborative process impacts, as they 
relate to each tenet. The presentation of impacts in each chapter thus progressively 
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expands in social-environmental and temporal scales. The findings from the phosphorus 
and Shark Slough cases are presented together as a cross-case analysis. Table 6 shows the 
organization of the findings chapters. 
 




Collaborative Process Impacts 
Process 
Characteristics 
Outputs Capacity Building and 
Political Restructuring 
Integrative Chapter 7 
Adaptive Chapter 8 
Protective Chapter 9 
 
 
This first findings chapter describes the impacts of collaborative processes on the 
degree of governance integration relative to the needs of reducing the phosphorus and 
Shark Slough flow regime threats. Ecosystem management directs governance integration 
according to an ecosystem’s ecological and social conditions and interactions. Decision 
making processes, policy outcomes, institutions, and group interactions can be more or 
less integrative in accordance with an ecosystem and across scales. The components to be 
integrated include stakeholder values and objectives, information, governance activities, 
and social relationships and alliances. Some forms of governance integration are 
represented by the concepts of social, intellectual, political, and organizational capital 
(see Chapter 2). Governance integration is expected to improve environmental decision 
making and policy implementation, because it reflects important ecosystem components, 
interactions, and information. This expectation of improvement holds for governance of 
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specific threats to ecological health, such as the phosphorus and Shark Slough flow 
regime disturbance threats in the Everglades. 
The results for the integrative tenet are presented below according to the impacts 
of process characteristics, outputs, and capacity building and political restructuring. 
Overall, the research found that collaborative processes increased governance integration 
beyond what would have likely been achieved through the traditional processes alone, but 
that the degree and kinds of integration fell short of collaboration proponents’ 
expectations. Specifically, collaborative processes were strongly political and less 
analytically or communicatively rational than assumed. For government to function, the 
integration of stakeholder positions into policies via stakeholder participation in decision 
making was the key to conflict resolution and building political support, and this function 
was collaboration’s forte. Collaborative processes thus conducted holistic information 
gathering and problem solving to the degree needed to resolve conflict and build political 
support. Collaborative processes simultaneously advocated multiple values (i.e., 
environmental, economic, and social), recommended compromise solutions and multi-
purpose projects, and promoted consensus building over competition. Collaborative 
processes were also advantageous from a bureaucratic perspective, because they enabled 
efficient public outreach and interagency coordination, and alternative cross-scale 
working relationships. The combined effect was greater bureaucratic control and political 
competence, especially by the South Florida Water Management District. The combined 
effect for other interests was improved access to information and decision making, and 
stronger working relationships between individuals from diverse groups. The use of 
collaborative processes decreased, but did not squelch, criticism of government actions. 
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Across governance, collaborative processes raised the profile of Everglades restoration in 
the public consciousness and built an ethic of setting limits on human sequestration of 
natural resources. The implications of integration for adaptation and protection of 
ecological health are incorporated into the discussions in Chapters 8 and 9, respectively. 
 
7.1 Process Characteristics 
This section examines the integrative impacts of the motivations behind the 
convening of collaborative processes, how the processes were conducted, and policy 
precursors such as the development of integrated understanding and the promotion of 
diverse values. The findings for process characteristics lead into the process outputs and 
systemic changes covered in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, respectively. 
 
7.1.1 Process Creation, Participants, and Activities 
Collaborative leadership and authority usually came from the highest levels: the 
governor’s office (via executive orders), the state legislature (via legislation, either 
specifically mandating collaboration or enabling it), the District Governing Board 
(reflective of gubernatorial appointments), and the federal administrative cabinet. 
Government leaders, especially within the bureaucratic system, convened collaborative 
processes for the expressed purposes of integrating information and values concerning 
environmental problems, and increasingly to consider the overall watershed, primarily to 
resolve conflict and build support for policies. Prior to the use of collaboration in South 
Florida, such as during planning of the massive Central and Southern Florida Project, 
governance achieved support for policies and projects the traditional way, through 
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bargaining and horse trading, building of coalitions, and promises to satisfy all major 
interests or dole out sufficient compensation. These elements remained within 
collaborative processes, but with added efficiency, trust, legitimacy, and communicative 
rationality. Other motivations included improved problem solving, better administrative 
efficiency, and greater control over the policy agenda. Secretary of the Interior Bruce 
Babbitt’s creation of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, for instance, 
was in part driven by an interest in unifying and strengthening the federal agencies’ 
position for the C&SF Project Restudy. Moreover, the initiative required substantial 
federal funding for planning and implementation, and Congress would only authorize this 
funding if it believed that the Restudy/CERP was in the federal interest, was 
noncontroversial and bipartisan, and had strong state support. Likewise, a main impetus 
for the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida was to rebuild the 
relationships that had been damaged during the phosphorus litigation in preparation for a 
united front in support of the Restudy. Finally, the Water Resources Advisory 
Commission was formed early in implementation of the Comprehensive Everglades 
Restoration Plan in order to have “everyone at the table” to avoid citizen lawsuits over 
the District’s restoration policies.1 
Early collaborative processes were intended to bring diverse agency experts, 
scientists, and select stakeholders together to understand and solve complex 
environmental problems. This was also a time when society viewed technical expertise as 
objective and highly legitimate, and able to provide effective and lasting solutions. 
Examples include the Governor’s Conference on Water Management (1971), the Special 
Project to Prevent the Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee (1973), and the East 
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Everglades Resources Planning Project (1978). To illustrate, for the East Everglades 
process, consultants to an interagency steering committee conducted “numerous 
technical, economic, and social planning studies in the East Everglades” and gathered 
input from citizen advisory panels.2 The steering committee’s proposed management plan 
was the first to paint a picture of the highly interconnected hydrology and multiple values 
present in the area. 
The privilege afforded to technical panels to make policy recommendations faded 
in the 1990s and 2000s for a number of reasons. Society in general became more aware 
of the subjectivity of science and technical expertise. The performance of past technical 
panels was mixed, since the problems were more challenging than originally thought and 
required greater analysis of social, political, and institutional aspects (whereas technical 
panels tended to focus on the physical sciences), and some conflicts could not be resolved 
by better information alone. And the politics around the issues became highly developed 
and contentious, and governmental and interest groups would not allow further loss of 
control of the agenda and fragmentation of power by turning decision making over to 
scientists. During this time policy makers emphasized the distinction of science as value-
free in order to argue for technical panels to resolve questions of fact alone and not make 
policy recommendations. Reference to this distinction became pronounced following the 
unwelcomed advocacy of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Working 
Group/Science Coordination Team’s Federal Objectives report in 1993.  
After the dominant agencies (mainly the District and Corps) gained greater 
competence with the ecosystem’s physical complexity, leaders’ interest in integration 
usually stemmed from the desire to resolve conflict and build support for policies, thus 
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allowing the agencies to continue with their work and meet their objectives. When 
requesting a stay on the federal phosphorus litigation to allow mediation, Governor 
Lawton Chiles exclaimed, “much more could be accomplished if the state and federal 
governments put their heads together, utilize their respective scientific, administrative 
and legal talents to work out a joint solution to these problems, instead of directing their 
energies and talents at great expense to the taxpayers to the burdens of protracted 
litigation.”3 In the Shark Slough case, for example, Chiles’ executive order creating the 
East Everglades 8.5 SMA Committee stated, “It is in the public interest…[to] mutually 
develop a long-term resolution to the conflicts relative to restoring water flow to the Park 
and Bay and existing land uses in the 8.5 square mile area.” And as Corps leaders stated 
in interviews, the use of collaboration for the C&SF Project Restudy was primarily driven 
by the Corps desire that the Restudy be perceived as “new and different,” because the 
Corps reputation as “the bad guys” would not have led to the necessary cooperation for 
such an ambitious initiative.4  
The desire to resolve conflict and build support largely dictated process 
participants and activities. Collaborative processes varied widely with respect to who 
participated and the specific process objectives, and this affected the kind of integration 
that resulted. Collaborative processes, however, had to adhere to a minimum level of 
stakeholder inclusion and integrative problem solving, according to collaborative best 
practices, to remain viable and legitimate. The Governor’s Commission for the 
Everglades illustrated the need for appropriate collaborative practice. The GCE used 
majority voting with participant representation biased towards economic interests, and as 
a result some members expressed lack of trust and equal participation, and the process 
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dissolved after only six meetings.5 Collaborative process participants varied depending 
upon the type of process, such as technical panel, stakeholder advisory panel, mediation, 
and coordinating group. Mediations, for example, tended to be narrowly representative 
(i.e., limited to lawsuit participants), whereas ecosystem level coordinating groups were 
often very broadly represented (although each process had participant biases). 
Participants also varied by virtue of the problem addressed, institutional constraints (e.g., 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)), and other goals of the conveners, 
including the desire to control the policy agenda. The FACA open process requirement, 
for instance, led to the disbandment of the Southern Everglades Restoration Alliance after 
the Miccosukee filed a lawsuit against the group for excluding them from meetings. 
Collaborative process designers tended to separate technical consultations from policy 
negotiations, and intergovernmental committees from nongovernmental stakeholder 
panels. The CSOP Advisory Team membership, for example, was nongovernmental for 
voting purposes. Governance leaders also created separate collaborative processes at 
different scales, with ad hoc short-lived planning for specific issues at one end of the 
spectrum, and ecosystem level ongoing coordination at the other end. 
Collaborative processes were conducted according to a cross between the 
motivations for convening (and participating) and professional best practices. 
Collaborative processes brought groups together in ways that the traditional governance 
systems did not, i.e., face-to-face and concurrently across a diverse constituency, and 
focused on negotiating policy issues. Collaborative processes performed planning and 
implementation functions, i.e., they gathered and analyzed information, sought broader 
public input, developed recommendations, and oversaw the institution of policies. 
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Planning and implementation functions, i.e., technical and institutional capacity for 
problem solving, are typically considered major activities of the bureaucratic system. 
Collaborative processes performed these functions because they were institutionally 
flexible and able to address special problems for which the existing agencies were not 
suited, as well as to support collaborative consensus building functions. Collaborative 
processes, whether ad hoc or ongoing coordinating groups, frequently incorporated 
scientific and technical information presented by participants, including agencies and 
stakeholder groups. A common analytic practice of collaborative groups was to form 
issue sub-groups. The Water Resources Advisory Committee, for example, increased its 
policy-recommending productivity by convening many “issue workshops,” a cross 
between collaboration and traditional agency public involvement meetings. Thus, much 
of collaboration’s technical analyses were actually coordination with the bureaucratic 
system, where agencies gathered and analyzed information and drafted plans, with 
collaborative committee review. Collaborative technical analysis, however, was not 
identical to bureaucratic problem solving. According to one participant of the technical 
mediations for the phosphorus lawsuits, “the people in the negotiation team were 
technically unqualified to design the wetlands, and it would have been better if they had 
gone through the normal public works process, with plenty of opportunity for public 
review and comment.”6 
Although integration was a major intention, collaborative processes, due to their 
emphasis on conflict resolution and building political support, were not strongly 
rationalized according to ecosystem management (i.e., holistic and comprehensive), 
despite some leaders’ statements and process goals to the contrary. The ecosystem level 
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collaborative groups of the 1990s, for example, had broad mandates for ecosystem 
restoration and regional sustainability, but the focus was on advising and overseeing the 
C&SF Project Restudy. The ecosystem level collaborative processes avoided the 
controversies of the phosphorus and Shark Slough flow regime threats, even though these 
threats were considered the most important to resolve for ecosystem health. Collaborative 
processes’ aversion to strong leadership on behalf of ecosystem health occurred because 
the processes had multiple objectives and depended on the support of conveners and 
diverse participants.  
 
7.1.2 Integration of Information 
Collaborative processes were attuned to concerns of relative group power, 
political feasibility, and process viability and were thus incremental in their gathering, 
acknowledgement, and incorporation of new information and issues. Ecosystem 
management requires attention to information that has long term significance, but this 
involves greater uncertainty, opportunity costs of expanding attention, and impacts on 
future (not current) leaders. Ecosystem management thus requires institutional structures 
and incentives that collaborative processes alone could not provide.  
The first Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Council (LOTAC I), for example, 
recommended diversion of nutrient laden flows without considering the ecological 
impacts on the receiving areas, including the Everglades. Upon its release, LOTAC I’s 
report was greatly criticized in public. Similarly, in the Shark Slough case, the East 
Everglades 8.5 SMA Study Committee report did not mention the detrimental effect of 
canal operations on the Cape Sable seaside sparrow even though the Natural Resources 
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Defense Council was corresponding with the District over the issue.7 A few years later 
the sparrow issue would dominate Shark Slough governance. The South Florida 
Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, the collaborative process most intended for 
ecosystem management, struggled to keep ecological health as the main goal of 
restoration as other collaborative processes and forces drove governance towards a 
regional orientation more integrated with development concerns. As of 2009, after 16 
years in operation, the Task Force had not yet reported measurements of indicators of 
ecological health. Such a report was eminent, however the indicators, such as bird 
populations, were too integrative to be useful for policy making regarding specific 
threats.8  
Collaborative processes primarily contributed to moderate information 
integration, sharing, and legitimacy. LOTAC II’s Interim Report, for example, publicly 
stated what had been known since the mid 1970s, that “ecological changes [were] 
occurring in the Everglades marsh adjacent to points of discharge from the EAA,” and 
that “left unchecked, these impacts could spread throughout the Water Conservation 
Areas and the marsh within Everglades National Park.” And, contrary to the District’s 
position, LOTAC II holistically noted that the District’s Interim Action Plan had only 
increased phosphorus load to the WCAs by 15% and that there had been “an existing 
nutrient loading problem.” In terms of information sharing, the District explained that the 
mediated phosphorus negotiations provided the agency with “a clearer understanding of 
the needs and interests of the parties and the options available for addressing [the] 
complex problem.”9 Similarly, a governance leader in the South Florida Ecosystem 
Restoration Task Force commended the District’s Water Resources Advisory 
 163
Commission for bringing recreational values to the attention of federal restoration 
planners (especially as they related to the Decomp Project). At the ecosystem level, a key 
role of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Working Group and Science 
Coordination Group was to synthesize and repackage groundbreaking scientific 
understanding and critiques of restoration in order to add legitimacy and reach a wider 
audience. The “Federal Objectives Report” prepared by the Working Group’s Science 
Sub-Group in 1993, for instance, reflected the holistic ecological understanding that had 
emerged with the first Everglades Symposium sponsored by the District and ENP in 1989 
and associated edited volume, Everglades: The Ecosystem and Its Restoration.10  
The phosphorus case contained a few instances of collaboration bogging down 
with inaccurate scientific claims, however this also occurred in the traditional systems. 
The Scientific Advisory Group for the Everglades (SAGE) spent most of its year of 
meetings considering alternative technologies proposed by the sugar industry, as the 
industry maintained its judicial posturing within collaboration, however the group finally 
asserted that Stormwater Treatment Areas were the only viable option (in addition to 
agricultural best management practices). The Technical Oversight Committee assisting 
implementation of the Everglades Program could not agree on whether the federal 
standard or state phosphorus criterion was more ecologically protective. 
One process, the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida, was 
uncommonly integrative in the sense that the process convinced diverse groups of their 
interdependencies, thus leading them to accept major reform of the water management 
infrastructure. The common ground, however, was more dependent on political 
agreement than conditioned on long-term ecological health. The common ground was 
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thus tenuous as social and political winds changed, especially in the fact of technological 
and funding limitations, a fact that came as a surprise to many who had the false 
impression that agreement was rooted in ecological health.  
On the whole, though, collaborative processes’ integrative efforts maintained a 
higher level of analytic rationality (although still subject to strategic communications), 
especially when stakeholder competition was the fiercest and subject to greater political 
distortions. The ecosystem level collaborative processes helped keep the goal of balanced 
ecosystem restoration, i.e., including ecological health, on the governance agenda during 
periods of less supportive leadership (such as the Jeb Bush and George W. Bush 
administrations). Chapter 9 elaborates on the connections between governance integration 
and the protection of ecological health. 
 
7.1.3 Promotion of Diverse Values 
The promotion of diverse values is a form of governance integration that had 
implications for policies, capacity building, and political restructuring. The frequency at 
which governance leaders solicited assistance from collaborative processes depended not 
only upon the degree to which technical problems, fragmentation, conflict, and power 
dynamics stymied the traditional systems but also the leaders’ desire to better integrate 
environmental goals into policy making. Florida governors often stated a desire to find 
balance between economic and environmental values when they convened collaborative 
processes. At the ecosystem level, Governor Reubin Askew kicked off the first 
collaborative process, the Governor’s Conference on Water Management in South 
Florida in 1971, by telling participants that he wanted to “build a peace between the 
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people [of South Florida] and their place.”11 Twelve years later, Governor Bob Graham 
said, “although the [Everglades] system can never be the same as it was before 
[drainage], many of its natural functions and values can be restored while providing water 
supplies and flood protection to south Florida.”12 Collaborative processes were well 
suited to reinforce this multi-valued perspective. 
Collaborative process statements expressed support for diverse and seemingly 
conflicting stakeholder values, the hope that technical design could meet multiple needs, 
and the advantages of collaboration and holism. The vision was often one of regional 
sustainability in which human activities coexisted with a stable, desirable environment, 
rather than ecological health per se. The Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South 
Florida defined sustainability for South Florida as “adequate water quality, flood 
protection, and water supply for agriculture and urban areas as well as the natural 
system.” The integrative value statements functioned to mainstream environmental 
protection while strengthening political support for restoration policies. Collaborative 
value statements were generally non-threatening to economic interests, however, because 
they were inclusive of them, satisfied environmentalists, and were sufficiently vague, 
hollow, redundant, or malleable. 
Examples from the phosphorus case illustrate the tendency of collaborative 
processes to promote diverse values. Early, technically oriented collaborative processes 
were bold in their criticism and calls for threat reduction, but the political repercussions 
quickly led to tempered statements. The first collaborative process to directly address the 
EAA phosphorus threat, LOTAC II (1988), pointedly advocated a plan “to prevent 
violations of applicable State water quality criteria,” yet spread the responsibility by 
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explaining, “This is not a case of recalcitrant polluters; this is a situation where an 
unwanted side effect of beneficial public and private efforts must be corrected through 
public and private efforts.”13 A goal of the first draft Everglades SWIM Plan, developed 
with input from two collaborative processes, was to “protect and improve the natural 
resources of the [WCAs] as an integral part of the Everglades system, while maintaining 
the multiple functions of the WCAs.” The 1991 Settlement Agreement, which resolved 
the federal phosphorus lawsuit, differed from every other collaborative statement in that 
it focused entirely on environmental values. This is compared to the federally led 
Statement of Principles two years later that declared, “The Everglades is a wetland and 
wildlife resource unique in all the world,” yet added, “By [draining the Everglades], we 
have sought to provide a healthy, attractive living environment for millions of people safe 
from flooding and other natural forces; and to provide a base for a flourishing agricultural 
industry that provides important products, jobs, and income regionally and nationally.” 
Inclusive collaborative value statements were also nonthreatening to all interests 
because collaborative processes promoted the belief in creative, win-win solutions. 
Collaborative process recommendations tended to overestimate implementing agencies’ 
technical capacity to simultaneously meet diverse stakeholder needs. The Comprehensive 
Everglades Restoration Plan, for example, made many assumptions that did not prove 
accurate, including the most fundamental premise that CERP could recover enough water 
for the growing urban areas and the environment. The complexity of the issues and 
accompanying uncertainties permitted agreement, with each party hoping to have the 
upper hand in the long run. Indeed, collaborative agreements and consensus statements 
were usually advisory and at best represented an informal contract. The division of 
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collaborative labor also enabled consensus building based on overly optimistic 
expectations. Collaborative processes found agreement by assuming that some other 
process, collaborative or traditional and occurring either simultaneously or in the future, 
would develop a creative solution that meets seemingly incompatible stakeholder needs. 
As the first independent oversight committee under the National Academies of Science, 
Committee on the Restoration of the Greater Everglades Ecosystem (CROGEE) noted, 
“Building broad stakeholder support for the program has been achieved in part by 
promoting goals and targets that may not be entirely achievable or even internally 
consistent.”14 Everglades National Park, however, remained skeptical of the promises of 
collaboration and its agreements, since it had suffered repeated broken promises, 
unintended consequences, and slippery slopes beginning with the authorization of the 
C&SF Project under the guise of meeting multiple objectives. As a result, other parties 
branded ENP “not a team player” and “only concerned about the park” during many of 
the collaborative processes in which it participated. 
Traditional governance also declared diverse values, yet the accompanying 
fragmentation and competition of these approaches created a more realistic sense that 
there would be winners and losers. Towards the end of the case studies, governance 
leaders were beginning to realize that a sustainable balance between environment and 
development was more challenging than originally thought – that “restoration” projects 
could not keep up with development’s demands for more resources and that ecological 





7.2.1 Policies and Their Political Support 
Collaborative process outputs include policies and their political support (another 
type of output, coordination, is addressed in the next subsection). Most collaborative 
process policy recommendations were correspondingly integrative, representing 
compromise positions between the disputing parties or proposing multi-purpose projects. 
Independent of the collaborative system, a “consensus politician” was occasionally able 
to craft bi-partisan legislation or an agency restructured itself to address multiple values, 
but these approaches were more difficult to achieve on a consistent basis. In comparison, 
many considered the widespread solidarity and support for the Comprehensive 
Everglades Restoration Plan during its approval process in Congress to be the most 
significant achievement of the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida.15 
In another example, the Miccosukee Tribe criticized the District’s decision to acquire the 
8.5 SMA as going against “three commissions.”16 Groups also argued against policies 
created non-collaboratively, even though the traditional processes were legal. At a South 
Florida Ecosystem Restoration Working Group meeting, for instance, a member 
complained that the Amendment to the Everglades Forever Act was “an end-run around 
local government, the Working Group, Task Force, WRAC, and public participation, and 
the process resulted in a breach of confidence.”17 
The quintessential compromise solution proposed by collaborative processes was 
the East Everglades 8.5 SMA Study Committee’s recommendation for acquiring half of 
the 8.5 SMA and providing flood protection for the other half. Previous collaborative 
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processes for the East Everglades had sought win-win solutions that were later deemed 
technologically and socially unattainable, and the compromise solution was recognition 
of this reality. The evolution of restoration in the East Everglades is possibly a preview of 
the path that implementation of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan will take 
as groups come to realize the limits to technologies, budgets, and social controls. 
As the paragraph above suggests, collaborative processes often resolved disputes 
by creating multi-purpose projects by adding features to satisfy participants, under the 
assumption that the features would not significantly detract from the benefits of existing 
features. In other words, mutual benefits were sought through the expansion of problem 
definitions and solution boundaries. For example, the Stormwater Treatment Areas to 
reduce phosphorus were designed with features to improve sheet flow. The keystone 
assumption during development of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan, and 
one heavily promoted by governance leaders and collaborative processes in order to build 
political support for the plan, was that multi-component redesign of the water 
management infrastructure could be a mutual gain for all interests. More broadly, 
collaborative processes assumed that technology and funding would become available to 
resolve the disputes, or that policies would work as envisioned.  
Such multi-purpose projects were attractive from a consensus building 
perspective, for without them agreement would be much more difficult, but they were 
problematic during detailed design and implementation as the true timetables, project 
interdependencies, and interactions between features (and societal reactions to them) 
became known. ENP/East Everglades Resource Planning and Management Committee 
(RPMC), for example, recommended construction of a flood protection system for the 8.5 
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SMA, with design to handle a one-in-ten-year flood event (the standard for the District), 
provided it was compatible with efforts to restore flow to Northeast Shark Slough.18 This 
was later found to be technically impossible (and believed to be so prior to the RPMC’s 
analysis). Collaborative processes also overestimated the power of governmental controls 
of society. The RPMC, for instance, requested a guarantee from Miami-Dade County and 
District that flood protection would not set a precedent for further development beyond 
the 8.5 SMA, even though the county had been unsuccessful in regulating growth of the 
area in the past. 
A particular problem was prioritization of the economic development features 
during plan formulation and implementation, to the delay of environmental features and 
increasing threats to the environment. The Experimental Program in the Shark Slough 
case, for example, left some areas of the East Everglades drier than before the program in 
order to reduce flood risk to development. The Comprehensive Everglades Restoration 
Plan was frequently criticized for moving ahead with projects that provided urban water 
supply while the plan’s primarily environmental projects languished. This phenomenon 
occurred because economic and governmental interests dominated at all times, during and 
after collaborative processes. The incremental policy and planning progress achieved 
through collaborative processes was not as environmentally productive as it first seemed 
(see Chapter 9 for further discussion). Despite this pitfall, Everglades National Park’s 
persistent advocacy and a series of collaborative processes to resolve the associated 
tensions, for example, were able to gradually shift restoration plans towards greater 




Coordination is a less demanding form of negotiation in order to integrate 
decision making for greater governance efficiency and efficacy. Associated with 
coordination are information sharing and proactive conflict resolution. As the executive 
director of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force said, “the strength is in 
the ideas.”19 Coordination thus affects the integrative aspects of policy outcomes, 
capacity building, and political restructuring. 
Interagency coordination at the sub-regional and ecosystem levels was an explicit 
function of several collaborative processes in South Florida. At the sub-regional level, the 
Southern Everglades Restoration Alliance (SERA) formed to coordinate the interrelated 
restoration projects resulting from Everglades National Park’s Seven Point Proposal 
(initiated 13 years prior to SERA). At the ecosystem level, the Kissimmee-Okeechobee-
Everglades Coordinating Committee for Save Our Everglades resulted from a summit of 
state agencies involved with South Florida restoration projects. The Lower East Coast 
Regional Water Supply Plan initiative merged with the C&SF Project Restudy in order to 
improve coordination between the two and reduce duplication of effort. Major purposes 
of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Working Group included “to 
promote and facilitate coordinated Federal actions to restore the South Florida 
Ecosystem.”20 Not all ecosystem-level groups were intended for coordination, however. 
The Water Resources Advisory Commission composed of numerous agency and 
stakeholder groups, for example, primarily served as a forum for public input to the 
District’s Governing Board (whereas the WRAC’s issue workshops were more oriented 
towards problem solving).21 Information sharing and conversations during all 
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collaborative processes, however, affected coordination. Ongoing collaborative processes 
thus varied in the degree of coordination they provided, with some coordination 
significantly affecting policy (as with SERA and the Restudy/LEC Plan process) and 
others (such as Save Our Everglades) being less active. 
The fact that high-level officials usually convened collaborative processes to deal 
with special environmental challenges or opportunities meant that the processes deviated 
from the traditional hierarchical structure, allowing communication between the high-
level officials and mid-level staff jumping across chains of command and organizational 
boundaries. As noted in River of Interests (2006, p. 304), “Although Task Force members 
would delegate most of the effort to the Interagency Working Group, such attention to an 
ecosystem by so many senior officers in the executive branch of government was 
unprecedented,” and this eventually produced “significant tensions.” Governmental and 
interest group observers of collaboration were at times concerned about particular 
collaborative processes or groups gaining too much policy making influence and political 
cohesion, and thus the observers resisted further attempts by the processes to enhance 
their status. As a District representative told the South Florida Ecosystem Task Force (led 
by the U.S., Department of the Interior), the latter should “respect the processes already 
in place.”22 At other times, however, gaps between governance scales were evident. The 
South Florida Working Group regularly commented that communication between it and 
the Task Force was inadequate. 
The purpose of improving coordination (and other aspects of administrative 
efficiency) was the least compelling of the reasons for convening collaboration. As such, 
many coordinating processes were relatively weak, at least in a direct, short-run sense. 
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Without strong leadership such processes avoided politically contentious issues and 
tended to provide support for implementation as opposed to creative or proactive 
planning. The high-level political support and organizational strength of the Task Force 
and Working Group (such as possessing an executive director, advisors, and staff), for 
example, led the group to be fairly productive with respective to the politically safer 
activities of scientific and governance capacity building at the ecosystem level. These 
groups, however, had relatively little influence on governance of the phosphorus and 
Shark Slough threats. 
 
7.3 Capacity Building and Political Restructuring 
Beyond directly making policy recommendations, collaborative processes 
changed governance integration in ways that affected future policy making. Sections 7.1 
and 7.2 suggested the mechanisms for changes in integration that would be observable at 
the governance scale, such as through the building of political, intellectual, social, and 
organizational capital, and political restructuring (i.e., changes in strategic behaviors and 
relative power). The most observable systemic impacts were changes in governance 
alliances and beliefs, networks and agency power, scientific consensus, and civic 
capacity. 
 
7.3.1 Collaborative Alliances and Beliefs 
Collaborative processes’ focus on conflict resolution and building political capital 
expanded political alliances in support of multi-purpose projects. In particular, 
collaborative processes promoted the beliefs that multi-purpose projects were possible 
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and that a unified front was necessary to achieve broader political support and therefore 
funding. This was especially true regarding the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration 
Plan for which some (but not all) environmental groups resisted public criticism of the 
plan that was increasingly seen as favoring economic development. Collaborative 
processes furthermore published statements critical of adversarial approaches such as 
litigation.23 This effect did not, however, substantially squelch the range of stakeholder 
advocacy and use of adversarial strategies such as litigation, the main ways that 
stakeholders asserted their power. The solidarity formed during the Restudy, for instance, 
did not prevent Everglades National Park from declaring the plan as “not restoration” 
(during its consideration by Congress) and the Sierra Club from withdrawing its support 
of the plan (a few years into CERP implementation).24 During CERP implementation, 
members of the Everglades Coalition debated the merits of multi-purpose projects and 
political solidarity, and a rift formed between “hard liners” and “compromisers.”25 
 
7.3.2 Collaborative Networks and Reinforced Agency Power 
Collaborative processes’ face-to-face communication and promotion of respectful, 
productive relationships enhanced flexible governance networks beyond political 
alliances. Several collaborative processes reported that they restored relationships 
damaged by previous adversarial processes, such as with the sparrow crisis and 
phosphorus litigation, and to have created more positive perceptions of opposing 
groups.26 The ENP/East Everglades Resource Planning and Management Committee, 
according to River of Interests, “sowed good will among the many parties.27 
Collaborative processes also affected the ability of groups and individuals to work 
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together by promoting beliefs in the benefits of integrated values, the potential for win-
win solutions, the necessity of compromise and shared adversity, and the superiority of 
collaborative decision making. Evidence of the strength of intergroup relationships was 
the great extent to which individuals changed employment affiliation across ecosystem 
groups (such as from the District to Everglades National Park, or from the Corps to the 
Miccosukee Tribe).  
The group of participating individuals was small compared to the entirety of 
governance actors, thus limiting the network building impacts of collaborative processes. 
This occurred because the recurring set of collaborative participants reflected the major 
players as well as those groups that were collaboration-friendly, i.e., able to participate 
and reach agreement, such as the moderate national environmental groups (e.g., the 
Audubon Society). The participants in collaborative processes, as in traditional processes, 
thus often remained the same. In the phosphorus case, even with expanded stakeholder 
participation in the lawsuit mediations and several District-convened panels, John 
observed that, “More than one person told me I could learn the whole story by talking to 
fewer than twenty people.” The ENP/East Everglades Resource Planning and 
Management Committee, for example, created the Southern Everglades Technical 
Committee (SETC), consisting of many of the same members.  
Despite the relationship building, without strong leadership for collaboration, 
groups tended to fragment back to their traditional turfs and instrumental alliances. The 
Task Force “lessons learned” self-reflection in 2003 cited participant parochialism as a 
major cause of the collaborative group not producing greater restoration benefits.28 And 
the explicit organizational linkage between the ongoing cabinet-level Task Force and 
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agency-level Working Group did not result in significant communications between these 
two groups. To offer another example, as late as 2006 the Inspector General for the 
Department of the Interior found that the Modified Water Delivery Project had been 
ineffective in part because of insufficient coordination between the DOI and Corps. 
Interestingly, the report recommended a hierarchical (not distributed or collaborative) 
governance structure to remedy the problem.29 Likewise, the District’s Basin-wide 
Feasibility Studies managed to keep a low profile for several years prior to amendment of 
the Everglades Forever Act. 
Collaborative processes integrated public concerns into decision making; however 
the processes also gave governance leaders and the dominant agencies greater control of 
the policy agenda and enhanced their legitimacy. After passage of CERP, the ecosystem 
collaborative processes functioned akin to traditional public participation, whereby the 
powerful agencies largely controlled the agenda and information dissemination, and the 
conversation served to publicly vet policies, with the powerful agencies informally taking 
the feedback into consideration. The ecosystem coordination meetings provided an 
opportunity for non-insiders (i.e., those representing the less powerful groups) to ask 
pointed questions and express their opinions, but in matters concerning the two threats of 
interest for this dissertation, the exchange did not appear to make much difference. 
Several persons interviewed for this dissertation stated that the conversations where the 
most important decisions were made occurred outside the formal collaborative meetings, 
between the few agencies and jurisdictions with the main responsibility for policy 
institution. As governance gained experience with collaboration and open government 
laws, political leaders and government agencies and jurisdictions learned how to draw the 
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legal line between public collaboration and private conversations, by institutional design 
to avoid the Sunshine law or fall under exemptions. For example, implementation of the 
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan occurred under a partnership between the 
Corps and District, including the high-level CERP Quarterly Review Board composed of 
the partner agencies and others agencies at times to discuss issues and project status. The 
Quarterly Review Board was highly influential of CERP implementation, yet it did not 
hold public meetings or publish minutes, because the partnership was considered intra-
agency. The Miccosukee wrote in an appendix to the Task Force’s Strategic Plan (2006), 
“The Tribe has attended more than a decade of meetings on the Everglades Restoration 
plans…The Tribe fears that the public process, much like the Task Force process, is often 
used pro forma to give an appearance of public involvement.” 
The collaborative spirit, however, was apparent within instrumental alliances and 
strategic outreach. An informal environmental network, the “Barley Group,” held 
informational and coordinating conference calls every week, and the larger, formalized 
Everglades Coalition hosted annual high-profile conferences. In terms of strategic 
outreach, the group representing Everglades recreational fishers, for example, developed 
an approach to educate and communicate with environmental groups over the issues of 
concern (i.e., removal of internal Everglades canals). Collaboration within the scientific 
community is discussed in the next subsection. 
 
7.3.3 Greater Scientific Consensus 
A special type of network is the scientific community, and its goal is to 
continuously update understanding as indicated by scientific consensus. Collaborative 
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processes aided scientific consensus by synthesizing scientific information, coordinating 
scientific studies, and encouraging broader scientific collaboration, including through 
conferences. The first Everglades Symposium was jointly sponsored by Everglades 
National Park and the District for the purpose of advancing scientific understanding of 
the ecosystem’s health, restoration goals, and issues in conflict. The scientific community 
continued to collaborate to produce a compilation in 1993, and the new South Florida 
Ecosystem Restoration Task Force’s Science Coordination Team further synthesized the 
information. The agencies and Science Coordination Team maintained regular 
Everglades Symposiums and issue-specific conferences such as on avian ecology. The 
collaborative RECOVER group developed the Decomp Project’s adaptive management 
plan that will direct experiments to better understanding the ecological impacts of 
removal of barriers to sheet flow. Additionally, the Scientific Coordination Team, as well 
as other groups such as the Technical Oversight Committee and the Congressionally-
mandated CERP oversight (CROGEE and CISRERP), provided communication conduits 
between scientists and policy makers. The two reports by the Committee on Independent 
Scientific Review of Everglades Restoration Program (CISRERP) have been especially 
effective in refocusing restoration concern on ecological improvements. The ability of the 
Task Force and the Department of the Interior to coordinate science, however, has been 
limited by political resistance, primarily from the District.30 Many important scientific 
questions remain unanswered 
With regard to the impact of collaboration on scientific inquiry, there was also the 
prospect that collaboration facilitated the development and enhanced legitimacy of 
“scientific” information from new sources, such as stakeholder groups, and the related 
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“consensus science.” Collaboration did not significantly prompt stakeholder-originated 
science beyond that required for effective negotiation. The sugar industry, for instance, 
had formed its Environmental Quality Committee in 1963 in order to provide scientific 
input into a state legislative debate regarding regulating the practice of field burning. 
Since that time the sugar industry sponsored and used its science to argue its case in 
political, bureaucratic, and judicial forums. The collaborative system provided a means to 
openly debate special interest science; however politics continued to cloud agency search 
for administrative rationality. 
 
7.3.4 Intellectual Capacity through Education and Observation 
Collaborative processes increased the intellectual capacity of governance actors 
through the communication of information to participants and observers (most 
collaborative processes were open to the public). Collaborative processes included many 
presentations about environmental and social conditions, policy responses, and group 
activities. Face-to-face negotiations gave participants greater understandings of each 
other, group power and positions, and opportunities for agreement than were possible 
using traditional interactions. As to be expected, the presentations were also vehicles for 
groups to communicate and advocate for their interests, either overtly or indirectly. This 
was especially true for the dominant agencies (the District, Corps, and Department of 
Interior). Despite the process inclusion and transparency, Everglades restoration was 
disconnected from the larger societal consciousness and culture of South Florida, with 
even those constituent groups most affected, such as residents of the 8.5 SMA, not 
understanding the basic premise of restoration. 
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This chapter is the second of three to report the findings of the impacts of 
collaborative processes on ecosystem management. This chapter describes the impacts of 
collaborative processes on the adaptive tenet. Adaptive governance responds to changing 
conditions and new knowledge, promotes social learning, and evolves institutions. 
Ecosystem management calls for governance to adapt at various scales, including at the 
scale of governance of specific threats, in order to maintain ecological health and other 
values.  
The adaptive tenet requires governance learning at different levels, from 
instituting specific solutions to environmental threats (single-loop learning), to addressing 
root causes and governance approaches (double-loop learning), to transforming the 
underlying paradigms about what constitutes a desirable social-ecological system and 
good governance, and changing governance’s capacity for useful learning at any level 
(triple-loop learning). Moreover, given current trends and stresses on ecosystems, 
learning at all levels must happen quickly in order to avoid irreversible loss of ecological 
health and other valuable system attributes. Complex, adaptive systems theory suggests 
that learning at the lower levels happens faster and leads to slower learning at the higher 
levels.  
Collaborative processes for Everglades governance affected the degree of 
learning, relative to what would have occurred without collaboration, at each of these 
levels. The expanding levels of adaptation roughly correspond to the expanding levels of 
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impacts of collaborative processes, from process characteristics and outputs to capacity 
building and political restructuring. Some of the impacts reported for the integrative tenet 
in Chapter 7 have implications for the adaptive tenet, and the discussion is extended here. 
Overall, the research found that collaborative processes allowed policy making to 
occur sooner than with traditional processes alone (single-loop learning). The resulting 
policies represented “low hanging fruit” and incremental environmental improvements 
over previous policies. Collaborative processes favored multi-purpose projects, and 
implementation of environmental features, however, lagged behind that of economic 
ones. Collaborative processes facilitated the generation of new knowledge and its 
dissemination, especially towards a holistic perspective and scientific consensus (double-
loop learning), however, these changes had little impact on governance of the phosphorus 
and Shark Slough flow regime threats. At the governance level, collaborative processes 
enhanced the legitimacy of partnerships and agency discretion, thus improving adaptive 
capacity beyond typical bureaucratic constraints (triple-loop learning). Collaborative 
processes failed to question fundamental assumptions, since they focused on achieving 
consensus for implementable policies, or they were so loosely coordinating that actors 
did not have the incentive to consider alternative perspectives presented (such as during 
public comment). The improved networks described for the integrative tenet, however, 
had the potential to eventually bring alternative perspectives into the mainstream, 
provided governance maintains its diversity over the long run. 
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8.1 Process Characteristics 
The lowest level of adaptation (single-loop learning), i.e., responding to 
environmental threats, requires problem recognition, advocacy, problem solving, and 
policy implementation and enforcement (the policy cycle). The impacts of collaborative 
processes on the policy cycle are covered in this section and the next (Section 8.2: 
Outputs). 
 
8.1.1 Responsive Decision-Making 
In the Everglades, governance actors primarily used the traditional, including 
scientific, processes to recognize environmental threats, advocate their reduction, and 
develop specific solutions. Governance leaders convened collaborative processes when 
the traditional processes were inadequate, such as when leaders were faced with 
substantial crises, conflict, criticism, and risk.  
Collaborative processes primarily aided the policy cycle in these situations by 
creating opportunities for policy advancement sooner than would have been possible with 
traditional processes alone, and by building political support for the negotiated 
agreements. The flexibility and legitimacy of collaborative processes, combined with the 
justifications of emergency conditions or extra-jurisdictional status (thus suggesting the 
need to work together), allowed governance leaders to quickly convene collaborative 
processes tailored to the problems. This occurred on several occasions such as when an 
interagency committee reviewed the District’s C-111 Interim Plan to address the negative 
effects of the Experimental Program of Water Deliveries on estuaries downstream of the 
C-111 system. Expedited negotiations also occurred to develop new operational protocol 
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to address the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s biological opinion for the Cape Sable 
seaside sparrow that found the need for considerable changes in operation of the water 
management infrastructure in order to prevent species extinction. Such special, expedited 
processes necessarily limited participation, especially to agencies, in order to act swiftly. 
Collaborative processes also enabled faster governance response when conflict 
prohibited traditional bureaucratic planning, such as happened during formulation of the 
Everglades SWIM Plan and policies concerning the East Everglades. In this regard, 
collaboration broke through impasse and conducted the technically demanding work of 
analysis, negotiation, and crafting of mutually acceptable and sound agreements. 
Associated with the collaborative planning approach was the public vetting of policies 
that also occurred with traditional agency-led public participation. Collaboration thus 
provided tailor-made planning services with enhanced stakeholder access and buy-in to 
address the particular concerns of governors, the state legislature, or the District, and so 
on. President George W. Bush, for instance, thanked the East Everglades Land 
Acquisition Task Force for “doing two years worth of planning for the [Everglades 
National Park Protection and Expansion] Act.”1 
Another barrier to communication and joint analysis was the toll of conflict on the 
ability of people to work together. This occurred during the height of interagency efforts 
to reach agreement on operations to protect the sparrow. As dialog became increasingly 
polarized and alarmist, with species extinction pitted against catastrophic infrastructure 
failure, interpersonal and interagency relationships became so damaged that professional 
conflict resolution and facilitation services were needed to overcome this barrier to 
cooperation. 
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As time went on, however, collaborative processes were more often used 
proactively for high profile planning processes when the powerful groups possessed a 
degree of flexibility, such as when deciding how to use the U.S. Sugar Corporation land 
the District proposed to purchase (but, flexibility was not the case, for example, when the 
District was technically, financially, and politically unable to meet the federal phosphorus 
standards by the deadline, so very little collaboration occurred). The ongoing ecosystem 
level collaborative processes gave governance the capacity to quickly and frequently 
form stakeholder “workshops.” It should be reiterated, however, that the dominant groups 
(primarily the District) largely determined what issues to present for consideration by the 
workshops. 
 
8.1.2 Controlling the Agenda 
Governance leaders used collaborative processes to solve political or bureaucratic 
problems as well. Governor Bob Graham created the ENP/EE Resource Planning and 
Management Committee to counter the threat that Miami-Dade County would relax its 
land use policies for the East Everglades under pressure from private interests in the 
area.2 Graham thus asserted his political agenda to restore the Everglades by convening a 
collaborative process that by design would likely yield policy recommendations desired 
by Graham, but with an administrative framework and legitimacy that went beyond that 
which the governor could have accomplished independently. As early as 1986, the 
District viewed collaboration as a means to stay involved in decision making and 
maintain some control, rather than leaving it to the courts or legislature to decide, as 
stated in a report summarizing the District’s response to the controversy following the 
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LOTAC I report and large algae bloom in Lake Okeechobee.3 In another instance, during 
the federal phosphorus lawsuit, the Department of Justice countered the District’s attempt 
to form a rift between the federal agencies by leading negotiations to produce joint 
federal comments on the draft Everglades SWIM Plan.4 Organizations also used 
collaboration to avoid having to make a decision, such as when the Corps deferred 
identification of the preferred alternative for the 8.5 SMA flood mitigation project to an 
interagency committee. 
Beyond the direct diversion of the policy making process to collaboration, the 
creation of collaborative processes had symbolic value indicative of initiative, leadership, 
and authority. Collaborative processes suggested group status by virtue of who convened, 
facilitated, and participated in the processes. Some observers of the Task Force saw its 
creation as a move by the Department of the Interior to improve its status and become a 
leader for South Florida restoration, while others were concerned with the more broadly 
federal presence.5 Some persons interviewed for this dissertation speculated that the 
Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida was formed in direct response to 
the creation of the Task Force a year earlier, in order to provide a state and regional 
counter-balance to the federal process. Likewise, a similar comment was made about 
continuation of the state/regional-federal balance of power through the creation of the 
District’s Water Resources Advisory Commission. In the phosphorus case, collaboration 
appeared to be a concession to the sugar industry. The Statement of Principles negotiated 
between the Department of the Interior and the sugar industry “pledge[d] to inaugurate an 
unprecedented new partnership, joining the Federal and State governments with the 
agricultural industry of South Florida…,” and a direct result of this arrangement was the 
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District’s Scientific Advisory Group for the Everglades (SAGE) to assist the District in 
selecting phosphorus reduction technologies (within which the sugar industry 
unsuccessfully used this forum to try to steer efforts away from Stormwater Treatment 
Areas).6 
 
8.1.3 Incremental Knowledge Development 
Collaborative processes’ orientation towards conflict resolution and consensus 
building meant that collaborative problem solving sought the minimum degree of 
analysis and system change in order to reach short term agreement among diverse groups; 
but this was still more than would have been achieved through traditional processes 
alone. As discussed for the integrative tenet, collaborative processes largely synthesized 
existing information and found compromises among existing positions. Collaborative 
processes, however, also generated new information at a finer level of planning detail, 
with support of resourceful groups’ technical capabilities. Technical mediation for the 
initial phosphorus lawsuits, for example, refined understanding and design of the 
Stormwater Treatment Areas, whereas the District originally developed the STA 
approach. The highly technical aspect of restoration meant that the dominant agencies 
(District and Corps) largely controlled technical planning and asserted their technical 
superiority in order to maintain their control.  
On the whole, collaboration functioned very slowly to resolve scientific 
uncertainties, because uncertainties and misinformation worked to the advantage of some 
interest groups (especially the sugar industry). In this regard, science was used 
strategically to argue for more of less of something, such as acres of Stormwater 
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Treatment Areas. Agencies and environmentalists wanted more acres, the sugar industry 
wanted less, and both sides leveraged science during the negotiations. In the end, it came 
down to acceptability of the overall agreement, rather than finding a true technical 
answer. As is now widely known, even 42,000 acres of STAs is not enough to prevent 
phosphorus from degrading the Everglades. Similarly, the performance standard of the 
agricultural best management practices (BMPs) remained the same from the 1991 
Settlement Agreement to the 1994 Everglades Forever Act, a time period that included 
lawsuit mediations and District-convened roundtable discussions to develop the BMPs 
regulatory program, even though it is now known that the sugar industry was capable of 
consistently achieving even greater phosphorus reductions. 
In the Shark Slough case, the multiple collaborative processes concerning the East 
Everglades did not provide the kind of proactive insights that mattered, or could have 
mattered, the most, especially with respect to social issues and sources of possible 
conflict, topics for which collaboration should have excelled compared to strictly 
bureaucratic technical analyses. The East Everglades Resources Planning Project failed to 
explore the social complexities in the 8.5 SMA and potential challenges of implementing 
land use controls and Shark Slough restoration, even though the area had an outlaw 
image since the early 1970s. The ENP/East Everglades Resource Planning and 
Management Committee and East Everglades Land Acquisition Task Force (1988), 
primarily stakeholder forums, did not acknowledge the intractability of flood 
“mitigation” leading to greater expectations and usage for flood protection at the expense 
of the adjacent wetlands. The East Everglades 8.5 SMA Committee did not broach the 
sparrow issue that was to dominate policy making in the area beginning in 1998, even 
 190
though the issue was known since 1980 and had recently been receiving the attention of 
an environmental organization.7  
Instead, appreciation of the socio-environmental governance challenges in the 8.5 
SMA developed through passive trial and error. To the credit of the ENP/East Everglades 
Resource Planning and Management Committee, the process report recognized the 
technical uncertainties of Shark Slough restoration and generally acknowledged the 
potential for conflict as the nascent Experimental Program moved forward. It was 
through the Experimental Program’s explicit adaptive management approach that the 
ENP discovered that flood mitigation for the 8.5 SMA was drying out some undeveloped 
wetlands to a greater extent than had occurred prior to the program. This information 
compelled the park to withdraw its support for the structural flood mitigation project 
proposed by the Corps as part of the Modified Water Deliveries Project and to request 
further study by the District.  
As part of the mediations that developed the Interim Structural and Operational 
Plan (ISOP) and Interim Operational Plan (IOP) to protect the sparrow, the South Florida 
Ecosystem Restoration Working Group and the American Ornithological Union 
convened an independent scientific panel to review the sparrow science, and the Working 
Group continued to host regular avian ecology conferences, but consensus beliefs about 
the sparrow and its restoration needs remained elusive into the late 2000s.8 Regarding the 
unintended environmental side effects of the Interim Operational Plan, they were 
discovered through a Congressionally mandated study conducted by Everglades National 
Park.  
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To respond to criticism and implement best governance practice, the collaborative 
implementation team of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (RECOVER) 
developed an adaptive management plan for the Decomp Project, however some 
considered the scale of experimentation insufficient to resolve the uncertainties, while the 
project was rapidly moving forward with the component designed to increase water 
supply to South Dade County.9 In the CSOP Advisory Team’s final letter, it emphasized 
the group’s “strong consensus support for the adaptive management approach…however, 
[the Team] underscored that this will require a sustained commitment…”10 The Shark 
Slough experience with collaboration thus illustrated the ability of collaborative 
processes to not fully explore the issues to enable long-term conflict resolution.  
The collaborative system occasionally provided oversight of restoration program 
implementation and as a result generated new information. In the phosphorus case, the 
Settlement Agreement formed the Technical Oversight Committee (TOC) to “plan, 
review and recommend all research, monitoring and compliance” and “make technically 
based recommendations by consensus approach.” At times of exceedance of the 
phosphorus standard, the TOC recommended changes in operation of the water 
management system and STAs, or found reasons to ignore the data such as data quality or 
extenuating circumstances. The TOC did not directly contribute to development of the 
District’s Long Term Plan or the state’s phosphorus criterion, and it was a Miccosukee 
Tribe lawsuit, not the TOC, that was the catalyst for the judicial system to eventually 
become concerned about whether the phosphorus exceedances constituted violations. 
Ecosystem level collaboration, such as during planning and implementation of the 
Comprehensive Ecosystem Restoration Plan, directed agencies and scientists to gather 
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ecosystem level information, and collaboration reported the results. Much of the 
ecosystem level information, however, was either not yet obtained (such as in the case of 
the ecological indicators) or was not very useful for governance to address the two threats 




8.2.1 Incremental Policy Progress 
Collaborative processes achieved incremental policy progress through several 
means: by finding the points to which groups could agree, by making ambitious 
assumptions about governance and societal capacity to honor the agreements or satisfy all 
interests, and by delaying resolution of issues for which consensus could not be reached. 
Collaborative processes occasionally reached agreement by expanding the problem scope 
and solution boundaries through incremental addition of components that were not 
objectionable to other interests (see Chapter 7). It should be noted, however, that the 
scope expansions did not directly affect governance of the two threats studied for this 
dissertation. The combination of technical analysis along with attention to political 
feasibility resulted in recommendations that governance leaders were able to adopt and 
thus do something to relieve the problems and government gridlock. Collaborative 
processes achieved the “low hanging fruit” while avoiding the discomfort associated with 
more dramatic ecological improvements.  
Collaborative outputs represented compromises between the existing warring 
parties and were not especially creative. The phosphorus lawsuit mediations, for example, 
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allowed dialog such that the settlement details could be worked out. The project and 
program specifications were similar to the initial draft Everglades SWIM Plan. Instead, 
the enhanced policy (not project) details provided all parties with greater assurances that 
their needs would be protected. Environmental interests achieved restoration deadlines, 
oversight, and more funding for projects. The sugar industry, on the other hand, gained 
approval for the final agreement to be drawn up by the state legislature, where the 
industry’s lobbyists had considerable influence. The result for the sugar industry was a 
cap on its financial responsibility and a shift away from federal, and towards state, 
governance. 
In an unusual instance of collaboration yielding a solution that had not previously 
been proposed, the East Everglades 8.5 SMA Study Committee discussed and eventually 
recommended partial acquisition of the 8.5 SMA to form a buffer between the park and 
the more developed portion of the area, noting that “full acquisition for purposes of 
restoration and public management is fairly unrealistic.” The solution was, however, a 
clear compromise, with the Committee specifying that the Corps design the buffer within 
the 8.5 SMA to “provide opportunities to implement a reasonable level of flood 
protection for the currently developed or developable areas within the 8.5 [SMA]…to 
provide the maximum flexibility for re-establishing hydropatterns in Northeast [Shark 
Slough]…and to minimize relocation of residences.” 
For the several instances in which solutions could be characterized as “win-win,” 
collaborative problem-solving was sound, but still not exceptionally creative. The initial, 
strategic insights into opportunities for joint gain occurred outside collaboration. For 
example, governance leaders believed they could gain political support for an 
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environmental overhaul of the C&SF Project by “expand[ing] the water pie” in order to 
increase political support.11 The concepts of ecosystem management (favored by the 
federal interests) and regional sustainability (favored by state and local interests) 
provided additional legitimacy.  
Occasionally, however, collaborative processes could not achieve consensus on 
policy recommendations for some issues and thus left it to the traditional systems, or 
perhaps higher-level collaboration, to resolve. The CSOP Advisory Team, for instance, 
could not reach consensus on operation of a seepage pump because of the conflict 
between urban and agricultural desire for flood protection and ENP not wanting urban 
stormwater runoff pumped into the park.12 With regard to the flood protection of the 8.5 
SMA, the Advisory Team simply stated, “The Corps must meet Congressionally 
authorized flood protection for the 8.5 SMA and areas east while maintaining 
Congressionally authorized environmental benefits for ENP.” The Advisory Team hoped 
that future decisions and projects, particularly CERP, would provide opportunities to 
meet all the team’s performance expectations. 
Ecosystem level collaboration often made recommendations at a high level of 
abstraction, and the recommendations were overly optimistic about the potential for 
implementation, balance, and sustainability. The processes largely shied away from 
making (or they were not invited to make) specific recommendations on controversial 
issues that affected the ecosystem, including the phosphorus and Shark Slough threats. 
The processes instead preferred to reiterate values, share information, and advocate 
expedited implementation of authorized projects. For instance, even though an intention 
of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Working Group was to focus 
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on the Restudy, the groups did not directly engage in the Restudy’s plan formulation 
process until mid-1998 when the Task Force issued its first letter to the Corps as required 
by Congress. The Task Force letter only recommended major goals for the C&SF Project 
Restudy, such as “restore hydrological structure and function as well as water quality 
conditions,” “improve water supply,” and “flood protection.”13 Meanwhile the ENP and 
the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission independently criticized the 
proposed alternative as grossly inadequate for restoring the Everglades. The Working 
Group then confirmed that the alternative did not significantly increase overland flow to 
the park and would result in ecologically damaging high and low water levels in the 
WCAs, but the Working Group said there was not enough time to resolve the issues 
before the plan was due to Congress.14 In 1999 the Task Force issued a second letter to 
the Corps expressing support for the largely unchanged CERP.  
The Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida was more effective 
at addressing the details and challenges that were necessary to make environmental 
progress. Every person interviewed for this dissertation attributed the success of the 
GCSSF to its chair, Richard Pettigrew. The GCSSF input to the Restudy was more 
frequent, and the group’s recommendations for the two threats of interest became more 
specific over time, including recommendations for adding water quality features, 
examining methods of seepage control, coordinating with the Modified Water Deliveries 
and C-111 projects, balancing urban water supply with other needs, the need for 
“aggressive water conservation measures,” and implementation balance.15 The GCSSF’s 
Report on the Draft Implementation Plan foresaw additional problems with maintaining 
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the environment-development balance during CERP implementation. Each of these 
points proved to be tragically prescient.  
At least one ecosystem-level collaborative group, the District’s Water Resources 
Advisory Commission, was moderately proactive in recommending policies to guard 
against future threats. The WRAC demonstrated important leadership for protecting 
Everglades water from future allocations to development, including proposed District 
rules limiting new consumptive permits and an initiative to increase water conservation 
across the region, but observers have noted that the leadership was due to more to the 
WRAC’s chair rather than directly from the collaboration. On other issues the WRAC did 
not show strong leadership, such as when the WRAC recommended that the Decomp 
Project balance canal fishing needs with restoration of sheetflow, but without specific 
strategies to do so. 
 
8.2.2 Biased Implementation and Political Support 
Adaptive governance must balance faithful implementation of policies and 
projects with their revision in light of new conditions and information. As governmental 
and stakeholder groups brought forth their issues in the traditional systems, policies, 
projects, and their implementation evolved. Collaboration had limited ability to shape 
implementation, since ad hoc collaborative processes usually disbanded soon after 
making recommendations, and the ecosystem level collaborative processes often lacked 
the leadership to tackle controversial issues (such as the phosphorus and Shark Slough 
flow threats). In this context, the implementation of multi-purpose projects, which 
commonly resulted from collaborative processes, biased economic interests. This 
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occurred despite the enhanced political support for the original, balanced vision for the 
projects. The commitments and alliances of collaboration were present even decades 
following specific collaborative processes, but not so strong as to tightly regulate group 
behaviors for a substantial period of time. 
There were many mechanisms for the economic implementation bias, including 
unpredicted technical-social problems, stronger advocacy of economic interests during 
implementation, legal/procedural and funding challenges, and changing information. The 
evolution of the Experimental Program and Modified Water Delivery Project illustrate 
the several dimensions of governance adaptation. At the level of individual project 
decisions, or iterations involving collaborative processes, implementation resulted in the 
reduction of flood risk to development (and strengthening of expectations for additional 
flood protection) at the somewhat unexpected expense of wetlands. At the level of 
evolution of the projects, however, collaborative processes facilitated project revision in 
order to address environmental shortcomings. Collaborative processes were thus involved 
in creating policies subject to revision and allowing revision to occur. 
 
8.2.3 Untested Ecosystem Perspective 
At the level of learning to consider root causes of environmental threats and 
alternative governance approaches (double-loop learning), political and 
professional/scientific processes generated the most dramatic, creative, and insightful 
proposals and long-term thinking for the ecosystem, such as the original ideas of 
ecosystem restoration and the recent proposal to purchase U.S. Sugar Corp. Collaborative 
processes incrementally and slowly contributed learning at this level, but to a deeply 
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ingrained and widely accepted extent. The integrative aspect of collaborative processes 
shifted understanding towards a more holistic ecosystem perspective, improving 
understanding of environmental conditions and governance tendencies, although the 
perspective was somewhat skewed by strategic communications. Collaborative learning 
about governance and societal tendencies was the most productive since it was beyond 
the dominant agencies’ capabilities (whereas engineering analyses, under certain 
assumptions, were their fortes). Collaborative processes led by skilled, objective 
facilitators that addressed important issues needing consensus yielded the best learning 
about governance and societal tendencies. Yet, this learning still failed to question 
fundamental assumptions (as discussed below). Powerful groups could ignore this 
learning, but perspectives consistently promoted by multiple collaborative processes 
slowly became widely accepted. In order to enhance legitimacy and satisfy multiple 
interests, collaborative processes (along with traditional processes) also promoted the use 
of science and accountability to goals, thus directly supporting scientific conferences and 
restoration assessment tools (e.g., adaptive management indicators/monitoring, reporting, 
and independent oversight panels). The restoration assessment tools occasionally 
prompted strong political criticism and advocacy that led to more ecologically protective 
policies. 
Learning can be a hindrance if too much information, such as from the holistic 
ecosystem perspective, slows governance down or distracts it from better use of limited 
resources. The ongoing ecosystem level collaborative process most attuned to ecosystem 
management, the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (and its Working 
Group), spent much of its time developing the ecosystem perspective without anchoring 
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it to specific problems, thus the value of the ecosystem perspective was not immediately 
apparent. This ecosystem level information, for example, had no bearing on governance 
of the two threats of interests during the time period observed. The processes designed to 
ensure an ecosystem perspective during implementation of CERP, such as the 
RECOVER team and formulation of the Programmatic Regulations, were also saddled 
with processing holistic information without immediate payoffs. Likewise, too much 
decision making process (e.g., collaborative meetings) can slow down and distract 
governance. Collaborative processes, along with the holistic (ecosystem management) 
perspective, frequently led to additional collaborative processes, further demanding 
governance resources. These holistic and collaborative efforts, though, contributed to the 
slow accumulation of important governance capacity for protection of ecological health 
(and other values) and used the abundance of governance resources devoted to South 
Florida restoration without significantly curtailing groups’ efforts to serve their interests 
through targeted initiatives. 
 
8.3 Capacity Building and Political Restructuring 
 
8.3.1 Adaptive Networks 
As discussed for the integrative tenet, collaborative processes expanded and 
strengthened governance networks across the ecosystem and scales. Such networks in the 
Everglades provided increased opportunity for interactions, including information sharing 
and alliance building, thus facilitating loose governance adaptation. Collaborative 
participants represented a pool of known individuals with which groups could draw for 
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needed actions. For example, a former representative of the World Wildlife Fund who 
participated on the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida later joined 
the District’s Governing Board and became the chair of the Water Resources Advisory 
Commission. 
Networks, however, should also possess diversity and redundancy for adaptation. 
Collaborative processes modified power relations, but governance maintained its 
diversity of interest groups and governmental fragmentation, including overlaps, despite 
several coordinating groups’ stated objective of reducing duplication of effort. 
Collaborative processes, however, did little to selectively build the capacity of 
disadvantaged or unorganized groups. Collaborative processes also enhanced the 
legitimacy of flexible planning arrangements, thus enabling initiatives such as the state’s 
Acceler8 program that acquired planning control of major CERP projects and avoided 
lengthy federal bureaucratic procedures. 
 
8.3.2 Learning Adaptation 
At the level of transforming the underlying paradigms about what constitutes a 
desirable social-ecological system and good governance (and thereby causing political 
restructuring), collaborative processes slightly contributed, but also resisted. 
Collaborative processes provided an additional forum for discussing ideas promoted by 
key players, and this occasionally included innovative or radical concepts, but for the 
most part conversations centered on negotiations of concrete, politically feasible actions. 
To an extent, collaborative conversations reminded the dominant agencies (District and 
Corps) that they did not have all the answers and hinted to the need for natural 
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infrastructure and flexible projects and policies so that options would be available in the 
future. 
Collaborative processes generally steered clear of debating core values, since the 
processes instead promoted compatibility of diverse values. Collaborative processes also 
promoted perspectives conducive to consensus building, such as faith in multi-purpose 
technical solutions and myths concerning the degree of ecological interdependency 
among stakeholders, that were not useful for long term conflict resolution. Collaborative 
processes advocated a collaborative paradigm rather than one that may privilege one 
interest group over another, such as would be the case, for example, if processes led to a 
more natural ecological system requiring less human intervention. Governance leaders 
were increasingly recognizing that economic interests were dominating the 
collaboratively achieved restoration policies relative to environmental interests, and that 
ecological health would require greater sacrifices from development. As these 
perspectives became more widely acknowledged, including through the reports of 
independent oversight panels, collaborative processes began to reference them, but with 
only minor adjustments. Perhaps more significantly, several governance leaders with 
substantial collaborative process experience and credentials used their highly integrated 
perspectives and reputations to independently advocate stronger governance responses to 
the new perspectives. Independent reviewers recommended deliberate change in 
Everglades decision making processes to address issues of uncertainty and 
experimentation, but much less was said about how to reconcile collaborative processes 
or other governance processes and institutions with the possibility of greater sacrifices 
required for ecological health. 
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This chapter examines the impacts of collaborative processes on the third tenet of 
ecosystem management: protective governance. Ecosystem management must ultimately 
protect ecological health, while supporting other social values to the extent possible. The 
focus of this dissertation is on ecological health, since this is the preeminent value for 
ecosystem management. For the Everglades, protecting ecological health means 
preserving natural processes and attributes of the native landscape, thereby necessitating 
elimination of the phosphorus and disrupted flow regime threats for at least portions of 
the historic wetlands, as well as other threats. Addressing these two threats requires that 
governance, at a minimum, enact regulatory policies and modifications to the physical 
infrastructure. 
This chapter presents collaborative process impacts on the enactment and 
implementation of such policies and projects, relative to what would have likely been 
achieved with the traditional processes alone, as well as governance capacity for future 
protection. The analysis draws on the integrative and adaptive findings in Chapters 7 and 
8, and other findings relevant for the protective tenet. Similar to the preceding two 
chapters, the results are organized according to process characteristics, outputs, and 
capacity building and political restructuring. 
Overall, this study found that the traditional processes were the most active and 
therefore primarily responsible for the protective policies (and retreats from them). 
Collaborative processes mainly resolved conflicts and challenges encountered during the 
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policy cycle. Toward this end, environmental interests were well represented in 
collaborative processes. The degree to which environmental groups were able to 
influence protective policies during collaboration was indicated by the processes’ 
recommendations. Collaborative processes recommended compromise and multi-purpose 
solutions. These solutions allowed policy implementation to incrementally move forward, 
albeit in revised form, until the next conflict or challenge brought activity to a halt. These 
solutions, however, also resulted in unintended environmental setbacks during 
implementation as the limitations of technical fixes came to light and governmental and 
economic groups dominated over the long run. In terms of capacity building and political 
restructuring, collaborative processes simultaneously strengthened governmental, 
economic, and environmental groups through network building and information sharing. 
Collaborative processes discouraged adversarial approaches, which have been useful 
tools for environmental interests, but the effect was slight. In total, collaborative 
processes brought governance closer to ecosystem management in most areas of 
evaluation, but collaborative governance’s politically conservative approach did not 
result in the magnitude of change needed to restore ecological health in the foreseeable 
future.  
 
9.1 Process Characteristics 
Several characteristics are indicative of the extent to which collaborative 
processes are protective of ecological health and other values: process purposes, 
participants, communication and analysis, and intermediate products (namely, value 
statements and information). Whereas the previous two chapters examined process 
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characteristics as they relate to the integrative and adaptive tenets, the discussion below 
considers the weight placed on ecological health within each of the characteristics.  
 
9.1.1 Process Objectives 
Chapter 7 described the main reasons that governance leaders convened 
collaborative processes (i.e., to resolve conflict, solve problems, improve administrative 
efficiency, and control the policy agenda). A different aspect is a process’ a priori policy 
goal, which had great influence over process output. Many collaborative processes were 
convened to resolve conflict, and thus the implicit policy goal was to find a balance, or at 
least agreement, between competing interests. A related policy goal was to plan 
successful multi-purpose projects, such as the C&SF Project Restudy and implementation 
of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan. This contrasts to the policy goal of 
achieving ecological health, which was the goal of several early, technical collaborative 
processes. For example, the title of the Special Project to Prevent the Eutrophication of 
Lake Okeechobee speaks to this goal. At the ecosystem level, Save Our Everglades 
strove to achieve an “Everglades of the year 2000 [that] looks and functions more like it 
did in 1900 than it does today.” The South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force 
was intended to ensure that restoration planning attended to federal ecological objectives. 
The Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida moved the goal further 
away from ecological health towards the balancing act of sustainability. Collaborative 
processes were thus dependent upon strong environmental advocacy and traditional 




9.1.2 Process Participants 
Every collaborative process in the two case studies had participants that 
represented environmental interests in some capacity, because the conflicts and 
opportunities addressed were environmental. Environmental values and governmental 
institutions were diverse, and as such there was a wide range of environmentally oriented 
groups participating in collaboration. Every group, including environmentalists, had 
multiple interests, as did the individuals representing the groups. Determining whether 
participants represented ecological health was thus not a simple matter. Some groups, 
such as the South Florida Water Management District, explicitly held multiple values. 
The Miccosukee Tribe advocated policies to improve the ecological health of the central 
Everglades, but they also were concerned with maintaining their economic and residential 
activities along Tamiami Trail and broader issues of tribal status and governance 
precedent. And Everglades National Park, for instance, was criticized for advocating the 
return of historic high flows to Shark Slough in order to aid coastal estuaries within park 
boundaries at the ecological expense of the central Everglades. Nor was it easy to 
evaluate positions in terms of their impacts on ecological health, since it was unknown 
how groups’ proposed solutions would perform given governance, societal, and 
ecological complexities. The Miccosukee Tribe would argue, for example, that its 
seemingly anti-environmental positions, including opposition of full acquisition of the 8.5 
SMA, construction of the Tamiami Trail 1-mile bridge, and purchase of U.S. Sugar 
Corporation were more environmentally protective, because they better reflected the 
limits of government power and resources.  
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Frequent environmental group participants were the National Audubon Society, 
Audubon of Florida, World Wildlife Fund, The Nature Conservancy, and National Parks 
Conservation Association. This set of environmental groups customarily focused on 
particular environmental values such as wildlife, threatened and endemic species, and 
national parks. The environmental groups concerned solely with Everglades integrity, 
such as Friends of the Everglades (formerly the Save Our Everglades non-governmental 
organization), the Everglades Foundation, and the Marshall Foundation, were not direct 
participants in collaborative processes, however they occasionally made public comments 
at collaborative meetings. Collaborative processes were generally open to the public 
(with the exception of some mediations and high-level interagency coordination) and 
allowed time for public comment, many of whom were environmental. Nor did 
leadership of the Everglades Coalition participate in collaboration per se, but the 
Coalition held sway over whether its member organizations would participate. Additional 
groups representing environmental values included the Everglades Coordinating Council 
(association of sportsmen’s and conservation clubs) and sub-ecosystem groups (e.g., 
Florida Keys Fishing Guide Association).  
The diversity of environmental values and their organizational representation led 
to conflicts between environmental interests, such as the Experimental Program to restore 
Northeast Shark Slough having negative impacts on endangered species (the Cape Sable 
seaside sparrow and Everglades snail kite), the emergency measures to protect the 
sparrow negatively impacting the kite, the proposed restoration of historic flow volumes 
to Shark Slough causing potential flooding of tree islands in WCA 3B, and the WCA 3 
Decompartmentalization and Sheet Flow Enhancement Project plan to remove canals that 
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support world-class recreational fishing. Thus not all environmental representatives 
advocated for reduction of the two threats of interest, and some environmental advocacy 
competed with these objectives. Collaboration was used to address environment-versus-
environment conflicts, as well as the traditional environment-versus-development ones. 
The prominence of EAA phosphorus and Shark Slough restoration meant that advocates 
for reduction of these threats were often included in collaborative deliberations. 
Because collaboration addressed conflicts between environmental protection and 
development, stakeholder representation likewise included private development interests 
such as the sugar industry, South Dade agriculture, 8.5 SMA residents, and the 
Miccosukee (based on its tribal lands in WCA 3A). At the ecosystem level, pro-growth 
voices came from local governments concerned with maintaining public water supply and 
developers. Some agencies were development-oriented, such as the Florida Department 
of Agriculture and Consumer Services. Public officials and multi-purpose agencies, 
mainly the District and Corps, represented both environmental and development interests, 
with strength of positions depending upon their main responsibilities and the political 
pressures at the time. These officials and agencies tended to favor development, but not 
exclusively. 
 
9.1.3 Communication and Analysis 
Environmental, governmental, and economic representatives were each given 
opportunities for flexible communication. Processes frequently included “whip-arounds,” 
an open-ended portion of the meetings where each participant was able to comment about 
anything of importance. Other parts of the meetings were fairly structured, including 
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presentations on specific issues by participants or technical staff and work on tasks such 
as developing project performance measures. Following presentations, there was time for 
discussion, and when issues needed more processing, the collaborative groups formed 
sub-groups to conduct the additional work and report back to the larger groups. A 
member of the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida, for example, 
said, “Every issue that came up [was] a major discussion,” and this led to numerous 
working groups.1 Other processes were not as deliberative or focused on reaching 
consensus. The ongoing Technical Oversight Committee, for example, was often split 
between federal and state/regional agencies regarding controversial technical issues. 
Collaborative processes did not have a substantial immediate impact on the 
relative decision making power of groups, in spite of a common belief in the literature 
that collaboration “levels the playing field.” Facilitators in the Everglades cases worked 
to make collaborative processes fair, but communications and negotiations remained 
dependent upon power cues from outside collaboration in order for participants to know 
what information to accept and to identify options for viable policies.  
 
9.1.4 Protective Values Statements and Information 
Recalling from Chapters 7 and 8, collaborative processes advocated multiple 
values. Collaborative statements always included environmental values, but they were 
vague. And the statements did not address the possibility that values would be in conflict 
during policy enactment and implementation, thus necessitating limits on development in 
order to protect ecological health. The legislation authorizing CERP (developed with 
substantial collaborative guidance), for example, illustrates both points. The legislation 
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declared that the purpose of CERP was “to restore, preserve, and protect the South 
Florida ecosystem while providing for other water-related needs of the region, including 
water supply and flood protection.” The simple mainstreaming of environmental values 
within legislation, however, was a significant achievement. 
Chapters 7 and 8 also examined the kind of information generated by 
collaborative processes. The information represented incremental improvements in 
holistic understanding, especially in regard to the societal aspects of how policy 
alternatives would affect stakeholders and how they would respond. In this way, 
collaborative processes functioned as in-depth public participation for policy vetting. The 
collaboratively generated information was also important because of its wider acceptance 
due to the high legitimacy of collaborative processes. This was particularly beneficial for 
the development of scientific and technical consensus. The information was protective to 
the extent that it improved the political and social viability of policies. A more holistic 
consideration of the threats appeared to be environmentally beneficial, but sufficient 
political and bureaucratic support to truly implement this approach was lacking. 
 
9.2 Outputs 
The impacts of collaborative processes on the enactment and implementation of 
protective policies, including improvements in governance efficiency due to 




9.2.1 Impacts of Traditional Processes Prior to Extensive Collaboration 
The contribution of collaborative processes to ecologically protective policies is 
best understood relative to, and within the context of, the functioning of the traditional 
processes. By 1987, traditional processes had laid a foundation of environmentally 
protective policies and bureaucratic capacity, before the most concentrated use of 
collaborative processes. Environmental voices were strong in South Florida since the turn 
of the Twentieth Century because of the region’s exceptional environment and the 
increasingly obvious connections between environmental management and basic 
ecosystem services such as water supply and clean air. As with creation of Everglades 
National Park in 1947, the passion and organizing leadership of a few individuals, along 
with the support of environmental groups and public sentiment, resulted in remarkable 
environmental victories in the 1960s, such as the defeat of the Everglades jetport. The 
1970s saw the passage of numerous statewide environmental laws that provided the legal 
foundation upon which advocates for threat reduction could force action and upon which 
the political and bureaucratic systems could act once forced. Following Governor Bob 
Graham’s meeting with restoration advocates in 1981, an aide recalled, “I do not ever 
remember a time thereafter that the environment was not on the top of the agenda.”2 
Significant governance attention to the Everglades phosphorus and Shark Slough flow 
regime threats arose primarily through traditional processes during the 1980s.3 
 
9.2.2 Impacts of Traditional Processes in Concert with Collaboration 
In the phosphorus case, since the late 1980s, creation and institution of 
environmentally protective policies occurred through a combination of state legislation, 
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federal judicial action, mediated negotiations, reactionary stakeholder lawsuits, and 
technical advisory panel input. This combination of governance actions, especially the 
federal lawsuit, allowed the District to overcome its politically motivated resistance to 
regulating the sugar industry and take a restoration path that District staff and other 
agencies had been recommending for years. The sugar industry, however, continued to 
resist regulation and reduction of its economic base (i.e., land in sugar production), and 
collaboration gave the sugar industry a direct seat at the negotiating table to work out the 
economic details of restoration. Collaboration thus not only resolved conflict resulting 
from the federal intervention to allow significant restoration projects to be implemented, 
it also allowed the sugar industry to regain a degree of control under conditions of 
changing societal values. Collaboration thus contributed to the sugar industry convincing 
the federal government to allow the Florida Legislature to be the primary forum for 
restoration policy agreement. It was in this forum (but not through collaboration) that the 
sugar industry ultimately gained the multiple-decade delays in meeting protective 
standards that the industry needed to continue operations until soil subsidence or 
changing markets took their toll. The Miccosukee Tribe has since had some success in 
challenging this legislative reversal of ecological protection in the courts. 
Unlike the phosphorus case, Shark Slough water flow regime restoration lacked a 
powerful legal framework, therefore the majority of advocacy for flow restoration 
occurred at the mid-level of governance through interagency political-bureaucratic 
interactions. Since its inception, Everglades National Park strongly advocated for 
ecologically beneficial inflows to the park through direct communication with the Corps 
and District. The park’s difficulty with securing interagency agreements and the need for 
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substantial restoration funding meant that the U.S. Congress was often the legislative 
level needed to support restoration. The resulting federally authorized initiatives for 
restoring Northeast Shark Slough encountered local and interagency conflict during 
implementation and thus relied on collaboration, combined with additional Congressional 
action, to resolve conflict and allow incremental project progress. It was the persistent 
advocacy of ENP, as well as the ecological restoration promises of the C&SF Project 
Restudy, that caused Shark Slough restoration project scope and designs to evolve. The 
role of collaboration in redesigning the C&SF Project was primarily as a means of 
building stakeholder support for the multi-purpose initiative that had gained initial 
traction through traditional processes. 
 
9.2.3 Role of Collaboration in Creating Protective Policies 
To reiterate and elaborate, collaborative processes resolved conflicts through the 
planning of compromise and multi-purpose solutions that allowed incremental policy 
progress to be made towards greater ecological protection. Progress was incremental in 
the sense that the solutions recommended through collaborative processes were not 
especially creative or protective compared to those that would have been achieved 
through traditional processes alone. Instead collaborative processes provided the planning 
and focus on dispute resolution needed to bring the environmental policy destiny into 
being through small, tolerable steps rather than dramatic course correction, with the 
policy destiny dictated by the continued use and option of traditional processes during 
collaboration. Progress was also incremental in the sense that collaborative 
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recommendations only applied to issues for which some degree of consensus could be 
reached. 
As part of the planning and negotiation aspects of collaborative processes, 
recommended policies were more timely and reflective of diverse information and 
analysis. Some governance actors, such as the Miccosukee Tribe, believed that 
compromise policies developed through open processes were the best way forward, citing 
instances when governance acted without consensus and used forceful policies (such as 
use of eminent domain), thus experiencing poor outcomes ranging from delays, 
worsening conflict, and impressions of incompetence.  
Compromise and multi-purpose policies and projects, however, also had 
unintended negative environmental consequences, such as overcompensating for 
development costs and encouraging greater development (especially in the Shark Slough 
case). Restoration projects also encountered technical challenges during detailed design 
and implementation. With CERP, collaborative processes increased support for the multi-
purpose projects, for which a large component was urban water supply, thus enabling 
“greenwashing.” Environmental groups originally proposed the integration of 
development interests within the C&SF Project Restudy, but they overestimated their 
ability to ensure environmental priorities were maintained. Collaborative process policy 
recommendations were subject to revision during their institution and implementation, 
where such revisions often reduced or delayed environmentally beneficial policy and 
project features, especially those that had stemmed from collaborative processes’ 
expansion of problem boundary and solution scope in order to reach agreement and build 
political support. Project components favored by powerful (i.e., economic and 
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governmental) interests had greater chance of implementation, whereas the other 
components were vulnerable to neglect. This trap was compounded by the fact that many 
projects with primarily ecological objectives were dependent upon the construction of 
multi-purpose projects that had great potential to serve economic development (i.e., urban 
and agricultural water supplies). Economic interests would have likely achieved similar 
gains through traditional processes, albeit probably not as swiftly and efficiently as with 
collaborative processes. 
Toward the end of the case study time period there were a few encouraging signs 
of governance expanding the suite of solutions beyond infrastructure development 
towards responsible growth. Most notably, when faced with technical and financial 
limitations, as well as revised (upward) population growth estimates, the District 
announced its intention to institute a regional cap on Everglades water withdrawals and 
more aggressively pursue water conservation projects. The leadership for these initiatives 
came from the District’s Water Resources Advisory Commission, although observers 
have attributed the policies to the WRAC’s chair rather than the collective group. 
Concurrently in the mid 2000s, the state was also diversifying water solutions by 
promoting water conservation (demand reduction) and alternative water supply projects 
(such as water reclamation). 
 
9.3 Capacity Building and Political Restructuring 
Capacity building and political restructuring are two sides to the same coin. 
Capacity building is the term usually used to describe increases in power of actors 
(individuals, organizations, stakeholder groups, or networks) due to strengthened 
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capabilities. Political restructuring is a term developed for this dissertation to refer to the 
undesirable (from an environmental perspective) or ambiguous changes in agency and 
interest groups’ concerns, advocated positions, and strategies for influencing policy. 
Capacity building and political restructuring apply to environmental, governmental, and 
economic interests. The issue of interest in this section is how collaborative processes 
changed the relative power balance between environmental, governmental, and economic 
interests, and how this affected overall governance capacity for protecting ecological 
health. 
 
9.3.1 Advantages to Environmental Interests: Access and Capacity Building 
As discussed in Chapter 7, collaborative processes built intellectual and social 
capitals that were beneficial to environmental interests. Most collaborative processes 
were transparent to the public and educated diverse participants and observers about 
ecosystem conditions, governance activities, and group perspectives. Stakeholder groups 
that were not “insiders,” such as the Miccosukee Tribe, residents of the 8.5 SMA, and 
environmentalists, valued the information presented at collaborative meetings and the 
chance to voice their opinions. The broader public, if so inclined, could easily access 
governance presentations, meeting minutes, and reports. A member of the Task Force, for 
instance, commented that the group’s review of a CERP planning document “allowed the 
plan to be developed in an open and transparent manner.”4 Process transparency and the 
educational aspect of meetings were important for building broad governance capacity; 
however there were few examples of how this directly affected group behaviors and 
policies. 
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The standard of inclusion set by collaborative processes resulted in a higher 
demand for transparent governance, especially by those non-insider stakeholders that 
benefited the most. The evidence for this included numerous statements at collaborative 
meetings, either complaining about lack of transparency or encouraging the use of 
collaboration to improve transparency. Criticism of process transparency and stakeholder 
inclusion, for instance, was leveled at decision making concerning the 8.5 SMA, the Cape 
Sable seaside sparrow, CERP implementation, and the District’s Long term Plan. 
Expectations or requirements of transparency and inclusion also provided legal and 
rhetorical means for groups to challenge collaborative outputs (as occurred for the 8.5 
SMA, sparrow, and CERP implementation), or the outputs of processes claiming to be 
collaborative (e.g., the Long Term Plan). 
Indeed, collaboration promoted a worldview in favor of diverse groups working 
together to find common ground and coordinate solutions to produce more technically 
sound and socially acceptable policies. The privileging of this worldview affected the 
types of decision making occurring (collaborative and ecosystem level), the groups 
favored for decision making (moderates), the kinds of preferred policies (compromise 
and multi-purpose), and the level of solidarity (little dissention). The impacts of the 
collaborative system in each of these areas were moderate, primarily because of 
collaboration’s less dominant position within the governance system. The main 
contribution of collaboration to “leveling the playing field” was that it advocated the 
ideals of inclusion and equity. 
Collaborative processes thus fostered working relationships between 
environmental groups and governmental and economic groups. The processes also 
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promoted networks, which may have inspired collaboration among environmental 
groups, such as the Barley Group weekly conference calls. Increased networking 
capabilities among economic interests may have occurred, but it was unclear from the 
research data gathered.  
 
9.3.2 Ecosystem Management Goals 
Most important for the long run, collaborative processes helped establish 
ecological health as a publicly accepted and institutionally committed goal equal to 
economic development, whereas environmental values had previously held second class 
status. The broad support for ecological health expressed through collaborative groups, 
such as the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, and the high 
interconnectedness of restoration projects, contributed stable, identifiable political 
support that kept ecological health on the governance agenda when high level political 
leadership, such as governors and presidents, varied in their commitment. And, the 
federal orientation of the Task Force, provided some resistance, along with the presence 
of federal interests such as Everglades National Park, to complete devolution of authority 
to the regional level. The loose, nonthreatening ecosystem level coordination (such as 
with the Task Force) had the advantage of survival during political regime changes, as 
well as the benefits of allowing governance to remain diverse and competitive, which is a 
necessary counterbalance to the dominant agencies’ (District and Corps) and their 
tendencies towards greater ecosystem control. 
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9.3.3 Advantages to Governmental and Economic Interests 
To the detraction of ecological protection, collaborative processes also provided 
powerful governmental and economic interests with advantages beyond what would have 
been possible using traditional processes alone. As mentioned in Section 9.2, 
collaborative processes enabled multi-purpose agendas that were ultimately biased 
towards existing and future development in the watershed, and towards greater 
bureaucratic and physical control of water. With the C&SF Project Restudy, collaborative 
processes gave the impression of greater inclusion of interests than existed at the level of 
plan formulation, which distracted from criticism of the economic biases introduced by 
the merger with the Lower East Coast Regional Water Supply Plan planning initiative 
and the fact that the development-oriented Corps was the lead agency. The Governor’s 
Commission for a Sustainable South Florida acknowledged the planning bias and 
expressed concern for bias during implementation, but these warnings were largely 
ignored. More egregiously, the District inaccurately claimed in planning documents that 
development of the Long term Plan was conducted collaboratively. The District later 
admitted that it failed the public’s expectation to be included in major policy initiatives. 
Collaborative processes also benefited agencies by providing them with an 
additional forum for influencing the policy agenda and public perceptions, increasing 
agency legitimacy, and reducing lengthy procedural requirements. In particular, 
collaborative processes promoted the belief that technical solutions, provided by the 
dominant agencies, were possible. Government also used collaboration to avoid taking 
full responsibility for decisions. 
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Strategic advantages motivated the District and Corps to use collaboration in 
some circumstances. When these strategic advantages were lacking the agencies tended 
to avoid the processes, in spite of stakeholder expectations to the contrary. As such, the 
agencies developed some major Everglades policies, such as the Long term 
Plan/Amendment to the Everglades Forever Act, in secrecy. 
Collaborative processes specifically benefited economic interests by encouraging 
multi-purpose projects and assurances that environmental policies would not infringe 
upon economic interests (or in the case of the sugar industry, that their existence would 
be protected). Economic interests enjoyed better public image (especially the sugar 
industry) and public-private partnerships, thus reducing environmental interests’ ability to 
cast economic interests as villains and partnerships as unethical. Collaborative processes 
also gave economic interests greater access to policy discussions initiated by the 
environmental community and the educational benefits of meetings. With such benefits 
the economic interests found no contradiction between participation in collaborative 
processes and pursing their interests through a variety of forums. As a U.S. Sugar 
Corporation promotional brochure in 2004 stated, “The [restoration] partnership is 
working.”5  
Agricultural and residential development interests in the East Everglades were 
less powerful than the sugar and urban interests, yet they still commanded substantial 
attention due to their economic significance and resources (primarily agriculture), threats 
of lawsuits, and public campaigns (as with appeals to property and human rights). These 
interests were highly determined and persistent and thus did not waiver in their concerns 
or tactics, instead incorporating collaboration into an assortment of strategies. 
 221
 
9.3.4 Disadvantages to Environmental Interests 
Collaborative processes in South Florida slightly affected environmental groups’ 
agendas and strategies, although it is difficult to separate the impacts from the larger 
national movement towards moderation, cooperation, and the ecosystem approach.6 
Traditionally, since the 1970s, environmental groups across the United States have 
claimed their greatest victories through hard-fought legal and public campaigns focused 
on narrow issues. Environmental groups have been diverse, representing different levels 
of organization, issues, and tactics, and they have worked independently and in alliances. 
Since the early 1990s, the principles of collaboration and ecosystem management have 
become best practices for environmental governance, and many environmental groups in 
the United States have formed or shifted activities to reflect the new approaches. 
In terms of changes in environmentalists’ agenda, collaborative processes and the 
associated ecosystem management approach moderately distracted environmental groups 
with ecosystem level restoration efforts and long term capacity building activities that 
had uncertain payoffs. Development of CERP’s Programmatic Regulations, for instance, 
was resource and time intensive. Ecosystem level planning (i.e., the Restudy/CERP) also 
gave all groups, environmental or otherwise, unrealistic expectations of future gains and 
thus delayed action on alternative solutions. It then became a question of how rapidly 
each type of interest could adapt to the realization that alternative solutions were needed. 
On the whole, each type of interest was adaptive. Everglades National Park, for example, 
maintained a narrow focus on restoration of Shark Slough and sought to achieve the most 
ecological benefit from the Modified Water Deliveries Project (authorized prior to 
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CERP). And the District and state, within only four years after CERP was approved, 
began proposing alternative water supply solutions, including Acceler8 and purchase of 
U.S. Sugar Corp. (for additional aboveground storage). 
Environmental interests were somewhat disadvantaged to adaptation, because the 
multi-purpose solutions advocated through collaboration linked environmental gains to 
economic gains and assurances, thus creating disincentives to criticizing economic 
benefits. Bob Graham said as late as seven years after CERP’s passage, “It’s so important 
to avoid doing anything to send the signal that there’s less than full commitment in the 
state where the Everglades is located.”7 The enhanced political feasibility of 
environmental projects through bundling with other values (such as water supply and 
flood control) and political solidarity was a powerful argument to most environmental 
groups, and tensions between this perspective and the traditional hard-line approach were 
felt within the Everglades Coalition.8 More broadly, collaborative processes, such as the 
South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Working Group, additionally 
inhibited criticism by discouraging extreme positions and adversarial, competitive 
strategies, including the use of litigation, dissention, and public criticism. And, 
governance rewarded moderate environmental organizations, such as the National 
Audubon Society and World Wildlife Fund, with invitations to participate in 
collaborative processes. 
Collaborative processes did not, however, directly foreclose options for actors to 
advocate their needs through traditional processes. In fact, collaboration explicitly sought 
to maintain participating groups’ options for alternative decision making processes, since 
it was in the interest of powerful groups to not let collaborative processes dominate. The 
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CSOP Advisory Team charter, for instance, stated, “Participation on the Team does not 
constitute participation in the Corps’ formal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
public comment process and does not preclude Team members from fully participating in 
the NEPA public comment process. Neither does participation on the Team modify the 
independent decision-making authorities and responsibilities of any agencies 
participating on the Team.”9 Many participating groups thus were able to remain active in 
other forums. 
 
9.3.5 Resistance to Cooptation 
Cooptation of environmental interests was a serious concern expressed in the 
literature cited in Chapter 2; however this dissertation observed resistance to cooptation. 
The potential for cooptation during collaborative processes due to power differences 
between participants was tempered by the political dynamics outside of the processes to 
which the collaborative participants had to answer. Collaborative participants, 
representing environmental and economic development interests alike, had a healthy 
skepticism for the internal communications and potential influences of collaborative 
processes and remained active in other decision making arenas.  
The selection of collaboration participants represented privileged decision making 
access and had the potential to affect participants’ public images. Collaboration favored 
the involvement and alliances of moderate environmental groups, but this did not 
significantly affect the difference in power between the moderate and hard-line groups, 
since collaboration represented a small component of governance, stakeholders retained 
their skepticism, and the more hard-lined environmental groups continued to operate. 
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Some groups advocating environmental protection frequently used adversarial 
strategies due to strong personalities and convictions, federal mandates for ecological 
stewardship, extra-regional influences on groups (such as national environmental group 
agendas and approaches), and agencies’ reluctance to set precedents for less individual 
group autonomy. The hard-line environmental groups, such as Mary Barley’s Everglades 
Trust and Everglades Foundation, continued to function, perhaps maintaining their 
identity by not participating in multi-stakeholder collaboration. A 2008 article about 
Mary Barley included the statement by the policy director for Audubon Florida that, 
“[Barley] has single-handedly shifted the balance of power in Tallahassee more in favor 
of the Everglades.”10 Barley continued to operate the traditional political way, through 
informal advocacy among her network of wealthy and well-connected acquaintances (her 
deceased husband George Barley was a millionaire land developer). A member of the 
board of directors of the Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida concurred, “About 
the best thing I could probably say about [Barley] is she’s a worthy foe.” Mary Barley, 
like other governance actors, leveraged the power of networks and influenced others by 
organizing weekly conference calls among the leading Everglades environmental groups 
and using the Everglades Foundation to fund other groups such as the Sierra Club and 
World Wildlife Fund (thus indirectly contributing to the moderate voice).11 Perhaps less 
strident in 2008 than in the days of George Barley’s penny-a-pound sugar tax ballot 
campaign of the mid-1990s, the Everglades Trust and Foundation continue to use high 
pressure tactics such as publicly criticizing Mike Collins (District Governing Board 
member and chair of the Water Resources Advisory Commission) in a billboard erected 
near his home in the Florida Keys.12 
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Dexter Lehtinen also resisted the call to compromise. As attorney for the U.S. 
Department of Justice, Lehtinen filed suit against the agency and state for failing to 
uphold the state’s water quality standards. Following Lehtinen’s resignation from the 
DOJ, the insular and determined Miccosukee Tribe hired Lehtinen as tribe counsel, and 
the tribe filed many lawsuits in support of the central Everglades until the end of the case 
study time period (including the 2008-09 lawsuits against the Tamiami Trail bridge and 
purchase of U.S. Sugar Corp.). Friends of the Everglades, the advocacy group formed by 
Marjory Stoneman Douglas, joined the Miccosukee in their litigation as well as filing 
separate legal claims (not directly related to the two case studies). 
The Miccosukee Tribe, through Lehtinen, set an example for other groups to 
simultaneously collaborate and litigate. However, Friends of the Everglades, a group that 
did not participate in collaborative processes, was the only other group to file phosphorus 
water quality lawsuits. Affecting the Shark Slough case, there was only one instance of 
groups other than the Miccosukee filing lawsuits on behalf of environmental protection. 
Following publication of the draft CERP and ENP’s charge that it was “not restoration,” 
the Environmental Defense and National Resources Defense Council threatened to sue, 
thus leading to federal promises of more water for the park. Other environmental groups 
continued to sue over issues not addressed by the Miccosukee Tribe, such as rock mining, 
large-scale urban developments, and endangered species critical habitat.  
 
This chapter concludes the presentation of the detailed findings of the impacts of 
collaborative processes on the three tenets of ecosystem management. The next and final 
chapter, Chapter 10: Conclusions and Recommendations, steps back from the details to 
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answer the basic question of how collaborative processes affected governance’s ability to 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In late 2008 a National Research Council committee issued its second biennial 
review of Everglades restoration and called the Modified Water Deliveries Project to 
restore flow to Northeast Shark Slough, “one of the most discouraging stories.”1 The 
committee cited several reasons for the project’s twenty-year delay in implementation, 
including “parochial interests, debilitating litigation,…and lack of coordinated leadership 
from responsible agencies.”2 When describing implementation of the Comprehensive 
Everglades Restoration Plan, the committee reported, “There is considerable frustration 
about the administrative process among managers, decision makers, and researchers in 
South Florida. To many of them, it appears that planning rather than doing, reporting 
rather than constructing, and administering rather than restoring are consuming their 
talents and time.”3 Most recently in mid 2009, an Associate Press journalist wrote, 
“Attempts to fix the Everglades by constructing water treatment marshes and reservoirs, 
among other things, have been dogged by politics, funding shortfalls, and contentious, 
litigation-filled disagreements over the best solutions. And while land has been purchased 
and some projects completed, key restoration components are undone.”4 A representative 
of the Miccosukee Tribe added, “Meeting upon meeting, and the Everglades continues to 
die.” 
These comments indict governance performance for all three tenets of ecosystem 
management, citing lack of integration, adaptation, and protection of ecological health. 
The stories are more subtle, however, especially when focusing on the protective tenet. 
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Much of the delay in the Modified Water Deliveries Project occurred because the initially 
authorized project was ecologically inadequate. Everglades National Park’s campaign for 
a stronger plan generated conflict, and therefore gridlock, and required substantially more 
technical planning, negotiation, and political capacity building. The Miccosukee Tribe’s 
numerous lawsuits, while considered debilitating by some groups, such as the South 
Florida Water Management District, have rightfully pushed agencies to satisfy the 
protective requirements of phosphorus legislation beyond comfortable technical, 
financial, and political limits. And, one would expect implementation of a comprehensive 
restoration plan consisting of scores of interrelated projects to require extensive planning, 
reporting, and administering, and it is not surprising that, with limited governance 
abilities and resources, such an effort would be exhausting. Nor is it entirely unexpected 
that the plan would go the way of other large-scale “multi-purpose” revisions of the 
Central and Southern Florida Project and favor economic interests, but to a lesser degree 
than in the past. 
The Everglades situation illustrates the challenges of achieving ecosystem 
management. What was to blame for the inadequate ecosystem management? Lawsuits? 
Overzealous bureaucracy? Or even, “meeting upon meeting,” i.e., collaborative 
processes? Or, were the results the best governance could do with the decision making 
and institutional tools, knowledge, and political will at its disposal? If that was the case, 
what were the successful decision making processes, and how should they be continued 




10.1 Review of Dissertation Question and Approach 
This dissertation considered whether and how collaborative decision making and 
implementation processes advanced the ecosystem management approach for the 
Everglades. Many theorists consider collaborative processes to be exceptionally suited to 
support each of the three tenets of ecosystem management, and indeed many regional 
environmental initiatives include such processes. Everglades governance, for instance, 
used scores of collaborative processes at various scales over three decades. Yet other 
theorists are concerned about the potential for reinforcing domination by powerful 
economic and governmental groups. Clearly, much reflection and research should be 
done to chart a course for continuous improvement of ecosystem management, and to 
evolve collaborative planning and ecosystem management theories. 
The dissertation research took a holistic view of collaborative processes impacts, 
examining for the Everglades cases the full range of impacts predicted in the literature 
and considering how the processes interacted with traditional processes as issues moved 
through the policy cycle. The literature review identified potential impacts in the areas of 
problem solving, capacity building, and political restructuring. The types of impacts 
reflected the major themes in the realm of planning theory, especially how governance 
should make “rational” and efficient decisions, and attend to diverse and disadvantaged 
interests, in the context of pluralist politics and institutional constraints. Beyond these 
major planning theory themes, collaborative planning theory added attention to 
governance needs for conflict resolution and building political, social, intellectual, and 
organizational capital. The additional, normative concept of ecosystem management 
provided an evaluation framework for collaboration when concerned with environmental 
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impacts, especially on ecological health. Chapter 2 presented the theories of collaborative 
processes as they related to the three tenets of ecosystem management (integrative, 
adaptive, and protective governance), noting gaps in understanding.  
This Everglades study confirmed most of the claims in the collaboration literature, 
even those that were seemingly at odds. A major difference was that the impacts, positive 
and negative, in the Everglades were not as pronounced as described in the literature. The 
reasons for the relatively modest impacts were that collaborative processes represented a 
small portion of governance decision making and multiple kinds of impacts led to 
complex interactions that tempered outcomes. The second major difference from the 
literature was that the dissertation’s perspective resulted from a holistic research 
approach that noted impact magnitudes and net effects. The dissertation observed that 
collaborative processes served an intentionally strong conflict resolution role, with the 
problem solving role in a subordinate, but still important, position, contrary to the 
emphasis in the pro-collaboration literature. The next section provides a synthesis of the 




10.2.1 Collaboration as a Political and Bureaucratic Hybrid 
Understanding the role of collaborative processes in advancing (or limiting) 
ecosystem management is the ultimate objective of this dissertation. The term “role” is 
meant to suggest relationships between collaborative processes and their governance 
context, i.e., traditional decision making processes. Identifying how collaborative 
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processes compare to and interact with traditional processes provides the key to 
understanding impacts on ecosystem management. 
The empirical evidence suggested that collaborative processes were a hybrid of 
political and bureaucratic processes. On a continuum from interactive political bargaining 
to administrative instrumental rationality as shown in Figure 5, communicative rationality 
bridges these two extremes. To elaborate, political bargaining is built upon claims to 
subjective valuation and assessment by political actors in competition, while 
administrative rationality is built upon claims to value neutrality, objective analysis, and a 
unitary public interest. Communicative rationality incorporates both subjectivity and 
analysis of interest group discourse, which provides opportunities for agreement. Figure 5 
indicates the different types of decision making processes approximating these 
philosophies, including the placement of traditional public participation processes, i.e., 
consultation. Within the sphere of collaborative processes, individual collaborative 




Figure 5 Process and Philosophical Continuum 
 
In a similar fashion, Innes and Gruber identified four planning styles in a case 
study of regional transportation planning in the San Francisco Bay area: 
technical/bureaucratic, political influence, social movement, and collaborative planning.5 
The technical/bureaucratic style was the rational comprehensive model of planning. The 
political influence and social movement styles of planning were political processes. 
Political influence planning involved government doling out resources to various 
interests, thus resulting in a “remarkable degree of unanimity among the transportation 
providers in the region for many years as all supported agreements that contained 
something for almost everyone. This united front was clearly helpful in maximizing 
funding and getting legislation passed.”6 Social movement planning occurred outside 
formal government and involved strategic actions by interest groups, especially those that 




















judicial processes). The authors placed the planning styles along two continuums, degree 
of diversity representation and recognition of interdependencies (and therefore benefits of 
cooperation). They identified collaborative planning as high on both counts. 
While Innes emphasized the distinctions of the collaborative planning style, 
which are especially relevant to the integrative tenet, this dissertation’s conclusions also 
stress the similarities with the political and bureaucratic processes as illustrated by the 
continuum in Figure 5. In the Everglades cases, the shared characteristics and interactions 
between process types were significant. Innes and Gruber found “conflicts” among 
planning styles, whereas this dissertation also observed synergies (both positive and 
negative for ecosystem management), such as in regards to why governance leaders 
convened and participated in collaborative processes. As discussed by Innes and Gruber, 
collaborative processes are most distinct by virtue of diverse representation and 
consensus building. In practice, many Everglades collaborative processes met these 
requirements to some extent but fell short of the ideal. Innes and Gruber identified few 
processes in the regional transportation planning case that they would classify as 
collaborative planning, whereas this dissertation’s definition of collaboration was more 
lenient. 
 
10.2.2 Hybrid Model Implications for Ecosystem Management 
This dissertation found that collaborative processes improved each of the three 
tenets of ecosystem management compared to what would have likely been achieved 
through traditional processes alone. Governance performance needed substantial 
improvement, however, since even modest ecological gains were taking decades to 
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achieve. Meanwhile ecosystem threats, such as urban population growth, continued to 
intensify. 
Collaborative processes improved the three ecosystem management tenets in the 
Everglades, because the processes were flexible and simultaneously attended to values 
and analysis, either directly or through linkages with other political, bureaucratic, and 
judicial processes. Collaborative processes were most importantly an extension of 
bureaucratic institutions, such as the District and Corps, and other administrative 
leadership, such as the Florida governors. The analytic tendency of the bureaucracy led to 
efforts to rationalize decision making according to ecosystem characteristics and 
sustainability (including ecological health) in order to improve agency competence. The 
South Florida watershed was rapidly changing, and there were conflicting uses of the 
natural environment and highly interconnected interests, and these interests depended 
upon the dominant agencies that controlled the extensive water management 
infrastructure. Systemic rationalization required the tenets of integration and adaptation, 
for which bureaucratic processes and institutions are not known to excel.  
The fact that the South Florida Water Management District’s boundaries 
corresponded to the South Florida watershed was already a big step towards merging 
values with analysis. Collaborative processes allowed this merger to go further. A strong, 
yet open minded and moderately transparent, centralized water management agency was 
a tremendous source of power for environmental interests compared to the fragmented 
authority typically found in other watersheds (outside Florida). Collaborative processes, 
operating within a governance system of diverse and strong interest groups, provided a 
means of encouraging this style of centralized management. Fortunately, environmental 
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groups maintained much of their tenacity and focus despite the cooperative influence of 
collaborative processes. 
Perhaps more essential, in order for the bureaucracy to function, collaborative 
processes enabled conflict resolution and policy support. The political aspects of 
collaborative processes often resulted in recommendations of compromise solutions and 
multi-purpose projects, and therefore enhanced political support, similar to what is 
achieved through the political influence style of planning described by Innes and Gruber. 
Collaborative processes’ combination of values representation and analysis furthermore 
gave the processes high legitimacy among governance actors and the public. 
Collaborative processes’ institutional flexibility permitted their rapid and tailor-made 
construction to specific issues, while their ability to reach consensus on many points 
allowed speedier policy making and implementation. 
In a tethered race, environmental, governmental, and economic interests made 
faster, incremental progress toward their goals in the short run and negotiated a range of 
terms that each group found satisfactory based upon their hopes to have the upper hand in 
the future. Given that governance has historically sacrificed environmental values when 
in direct competition with economic, governmental, and other development values, it 
would appear that environmental interests are less likely to gain the upper hand. The 
saving grace for environmental interests, however, is that at a broad scale they are truly 
interdependent with economic and other social values. Collaborative processes’ capacity 
building to acknowledge, codify, and proactively plan for this fact, and sustain the 




10.2.3 Collaboration Traps and Areas Needing Improvement 
While collaborative processes accomplished much and avoided some of the most 
serious potential negative impacts (such as pacification of environmental groups), 
collaborative processes in the Everglades fell short of theoretical ideals, thus leading to 
less stellar results for ecosystem management. In theory, collaborative processes are 
extremely relevant to achieving the three tenets of ecosystem management. In practice, 
however, there are real-world distortions and challenges. Shortfalls occurred because of a 
combination of reasons: insufficient use of collaborative best practices, contextual 
barriers, and collaborative process traps. Insufficient use of best practices and contextual 
barriers, while not directly reflective of collaboration’s potential, suggest real-world 
limitations and considerations, especially those created by group power dynamics and 
institutional legacies. The collaborative process traps pertain to the ultimate 
appropriateness and tendencies of collaboration.  
Insufficient use of collaborative best practices mainly involved the degrees of 
stakeholder representation and deliberation. For a variety of reasons related to group 
power, incentives, resources, and institutional requirements, full engagement in 
collaborative processes occurred primarily among a few groups for any particular issue. 
Similarly, deliberation varied, thus resulting in some groups thoroughly exploring the 
issues, while others quickly deflected them away from consideration. In some instances, 
collaboration was transformative; in others it was mildly informative or frustrating. This 
variation reflected the fact that collaborative processes emerged when powerful actors 
deemed them useful. Attention to best practices was necessary in order to maintain 
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process legitimacy and some effectiveness, yet there were strong pragmatic (i.e., 
political) forces at work. The findings, however, represented a best-case scenario, 
because Everglades governance leaders were aware of collaborative best practices, and 
collaboration experts were available (e.g., the Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium 
and renowned facilitators). 
The main contextual barrier limiting the success of collaborative processes was 
the challenge of implementation. Following collaborative planning, governance largely 
reverted to traditional processes during periods of implementation. Since collaborative 
processes did not significantly change power relations, collaborative outputs and the 
political capital upon which they depended were largely transient. Collaboration 
produced a delicate balancing act of aligned interests in keeping with the rhetoric of win-
win and sustainability. Collaborative recommendations appeared highly integrated, yet 
under the surface there were strategic motivations and shallow commitments. The 
agreements began to unravel when system dynamics or technical shortcomings changed 
the conditions upon which the agreements depended. Combine this with the long-range 
dominance of economic interests, and the result was poorer implementation performance 
for environmental plan features. 
Last, collaborative process traps are defined as shortcomings that result from 
seemingly proper functioning of the processes. The traps are irrational and limiting 
sacrifices in order to achieve the benefits of collaborative processes, such as keeping 
collaborative processes moving forward and reaching agreement. The interrelated traps 
observed in the Everglades cases included incrementalism and avoidance, overly 
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optimistic expectations for recommendations, and naïve assumptions about collaborative 
processes.  
The first trap, incrementalism and avoidance, refers to the fact that collaborative 
processes were less about communicative rationality and more about resolving conflict, 
achieving political support, and delaying the resolution of seemingly intractable issues 
whenever possible. As a result, collaborative knowledge contained gaps, and 
recommendations were not especially creative or oriented towards long-term ecological 
sustainability. Ecosystem level collaborative processes often failed their missions of 
providing leadership for ecological health. Incrementalism and avoidance, while often 
considered the only way forward, is insufficient adaptation given rapid ecological decline 
and rising threats. 
The second trap was collaborative processes’ overly optimistic expectations for 
recommendations. Collaborative process recommendations put much faith in governance 
ability to find technical solutions to meet multiple objectives, and to effectively 
implement them, thus requiring a host of long-term capacities such as funding, 
institutional stability, and commitment to original goals. These somewhat irrational 
beliefs, however, allowed agreement and therefore incremental progress. The beliefs in 
technical and administrative prowess were desirable from the perspective of the water 
management agencies (District and Corps), because they reinforced their missions and 
control. The beliefs thus maintained the philosophy of technocratic planning by a few 
dominant agencies. The beliefs also resulted in collaborative recommendations that were 
vulnerable to capture by economic interests. Collaborative processes recommendations at 
times recognized the potential for policy institution and project implementation to fall 
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short of meeting objectives, and the result was inclusion of adaptive governance during 
implementation. The adaptive approach, however, was underdeveloped and therefore 
often ignored. 
The third trap, naïve assumptions about collaborative processes and their 
outcomes, addresses contextual phenomena. As this dissertation showed, collaborative 
processes were subject to biases and distortions due to strategic behaviors of groups and 
therefore fell short of their communicative rationality ideals. Contrary to common belief, 
consensus was not directly based on restoration of ecological health. Instead, consensus 
relied on delicately balanced social-political relationships and interconnected projects. 
The unified political front was thus more fragile than many governance leaders thought. 
And, collaborative processes gave an air of inclusion and transparency, while many 
important decisions were made behind closed doors. The high legitimacy, rhetoric, and 
novelty of collaborative processes, however, masked these biases and limitations. Added 
to the veneer were the philosophies of ecosystem management and adaptive management 
that suggested holistic and responsive governance. These naïve assumptions led to 
inaccurate assumptions about the capabilities and accomplishments of collaborative 
processes, thus leading to surprises and reducing critical examination of governance by 
external groups. 
 
10.2.4 Towards an Ecology of Governance 
This chapter’s introductory passage suggested governance failure to protect the 
ecological health of the Everglades. With the perception of failure came blame pointing 
to the lack of consensus on solutions, extensive litigation, excessive bureaucracy, the 
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reliance on collaborative meetings, scientific uncertainty, factors beyond local control 
(such as loss of federal funding), and many other potential reasons. What really was to 
blame for inadequate ecosystem management? The enormity of the task. 
In all of governance and society, the task of protecting ecological health has been 
drastically underestimated. Ecological health will require substantial curbing of 
development and investment in restoration to undo past decisions. These changes 
necessitate making ecological protection a high priority, and the will to change must 
come from within society and under conditions of uncertainty. Towards these ends, each 
type of decision making process and institution has an important role to play within an 
integrated framework, or ecology of governance. Political processes allow the struggle of 
values in order to overcome the status quo. Bureaucratic processes provide the capacity 
for policy institution and system monitoring. Judicial processes hold society accountable 
to past decisions and core values. Collaborative processes bridge the political, 
bureaucratic, and judicial processes, facilitating governance integration and adaptation to 
mitigate the traps of the traditional processes, such as gridlock and dysfunctional 
relationships, but they do not eliminate group identities and power dynamics. 
Communicative rationality and collaborative best practices are guides for achieving 
successful processes. To expect collaborative processes to do more than they are 
designed and capable of doing is fallacy. The goal for ecosystem management theorists 
and practitioners is to design a more effective governance ecology given understandings 
of the strengths and weaknesses of each type of process, how they interact with each 
other, and the constraints of a particular social-ecological setting. 
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10.3 Recommendations for Practice 
Theory and empirical evidence are ultimately intended to inform practice in order 
to meet societal goals. This dissertation normatively evaluated the use of collaborative 
processes for ecosystem management, and therefore the recommendations presented here 
have that objective as well. Specifically, the recommendations are designed to improve 
governance performance of the three tenets: integration, adaptation, and ecological 
protection. And, since the dissertation found that collaborative processes were beneficial 
but limited, the recommendation focus on improving the role of collaboration through 
changes in collaborative process usage and execution, as well as contextual conditions to 
enable success. The Innes and Gruber paper, for example, focused on reducing barriers to 
collaboration. This dissertation’s recommendations take advantage of collaborative 
processes strengths for furthering integrative, adaptive, and protective governance, while 
reducing the traps and areas needing improvement. The recommendations below are 
directed at the governance of the Everglades, however they offer insights for other 
environmental initiatives as well. Each recommendation elaborates the barriers involved 
and possible steps to overcome the barriers. The evolution of collaboration and 
ecosystem management should be an ongoing process achieved through deliberation, 
experimentation, and reflection. These recommendations are thus one small, initial step. 
! Continue to use high-quality ad hoc collaboration for complex, high-stakes 
problems. High-quality ad hoc collaborative processes had many benefits, thus 
existing processes should be improved and new processes applied more liberally 
to complex, high-stakes problems. High quality processes generally means those 
with broad stakeholder representation and a focus on problem solving and 
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consensus building. Barriers to this recommendation are lack of leadership to 
create new processes and strengthen existing ones, and procedural conflicts with 
litigation and standard bureaucratic processes. The achievement of high-quality 
processes is dependent upon performance of the larger governance system, as 
discussed below under “support diverse, networked, and resourceful civic 
engagement.”7  
! Continue ecosystem level coordination groups. The ecosystem level 
coordination groups were an important source of stable ecosystem identity and 
institutional infrastructure, but their operation was weak and needs improvement. 
Improvements could come from ecosystem level groups responding to the 
recommendation for more and better ad hoc collaborative processes, and through 
higher standards for coordination. Several ecosystem level groups made this 
recommendation during self-evaluation exercises, but to limited success, therefore 
constant attention to this issue will be required. Barriers to this recommendation 
include coordination groups’ reliance on external political support and internal 
deference to the most powerful members. A means of overcoming these barriers 
would be through greater ecosystem restoration and governance oversight as 
described below. 
! Re-integrate technical, interagency, and stakeholder collaborative processes. 
The concepts of ecosystem management and adaptive governance recommend the 
integration of environmental, social, economic, and institutional aspects of 
problems. Yet collaborative processes in the Everglades were increasingly divided 
along these lines. Greater integration could occur through more comprehensive 
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processes or better coordination between processes. Barriers to this 
recommendation are a lack of political will for integration, methods to accomplish 
integration, and the vulnerability of scientists and staff to political backlash. 
! Directly support diverse, networked, and resourceful civic engagement. The 
first line of support for high quality collaborative processes is strong civic 
engagement that is diverse, networked, and resourceful. Such a society would 
provide greater equality among the various interests and actors. Towards this end, 
governance leaders should support decision making transparency and the ability 
of groups to meaningfully access traditional processes. Likewise, collaboration 
should temper its rhetoric for cooperation with the merits of adversarial 
approaches. Barriers to this recommendation include a lack of understanding 
about how to balance cooperation with competition. This recommendation is 
suggestive of Flyvbjerg’s observation, “The normative emphasis on rationality 
leaves the modern project ignorant of how power works and therefore open to 
being dominated by power,” and “that forms of participation that are practical, 
committed, and ready for conflict provide a superior paradigm of democratic 
virtue than forms of participation that are discursive, detached, and consensus-
dependent, that is, rational.”8 
! Continue independent oversight of collaborative processes, governance, and 
restoration. Oversight provided by the National Academy of Science was 
intended to focus on the CERP progress; however the panel has fortunately 
provided opinions about other South Florida restoration efforts, including those of 
interest in this dissertation. Holistic and comprehensive evaluation of the 
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ecosystem should continue. Beyond an ecosystem report card, oversight should 
include evaluation of governance, including collaborative processes. This has 
occurred to some extent with the NAS panel and Congressional oversight of the 
Task Force, and this effort needs to be doubled. Oversight of governance would 
improve awareness of the types and quality of decision making processes, and the 
limitations and pitfalls of collaboration and ecosystem management/restoration. In 
particular, oversight should temper the belief in collaboration’s ability to reach 
consensus and the Corps’ ability to design solutions to meet consensus 
requirements. Barriers to this recommendation are the political leadership and 
resources needed to sustain high-quality oversight and follow-through. 
! Encourage double- and triple-loop learning for protection of ecological 
health. The paradigm of adaptive governance is fundamentally different from 
“adaptive management” and “incremental adaptive restoration.”9 The latter 
approaches strive to facilitate adaptive governance, yet they are only add-ons to 
the scientific approach. As such, governance should first explore what adaptive 
governance is, imagine what it might look like for South Florida, and examine 
opportunities and barriers to adopting this paradigm. Double- and triple-loop 
learning for protection of ecological health should be the emphasis. This effort 
would integrate with the recommendations above and include changes to the 
relationship between the traditional and collaborative processes. The new 
relationship would untether collaboration from its incorrect assumptions regarding 
consensus and engineering responsiveness, and allow it to be more creative, take 
more chances, and provide societal resilience when actions are not successful. 
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Barriers to this recommendation are unwillingness to let go of the technocratic 
approach and the degree of change needed to adopt the new paradigm. 
 
10.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
This dissertation, like any research study, is a link in the knowledge chain, 
building on past understanding and suggesting new areas for investigation. The 
dissertation’s most significant contributions to the literature are that it presented a method 
to holistically evaluate collaboration within a governance context and over sufficient time 
to observe environmental outcomes, and thereby integrated and reconciled multiple and 
seemingly contradictory understandings of collaboration. The dissertation provided a 
“magnitude of order” interpretation of the impacts of collaboration, thus tempering many 
of the theoretical claims (positive and negative). The dissertation judged that the 
environmental outcomes of collaboration were beneficial on balance. The findings 
combined with the fact that this dissertation was one of only a few to attempt this holistic 
approach, and the only one to fully do so, suggest fruitful next research steps. 
First, the fact that the research examined a single governance context (South 
Florida) limits the ability to generalize the findings. Future research should holistically 
evaluate collaborative governance in other settings in a comparative fashion. Study 
replication in other settings can test this dissertation’s theoretical contribution, and 
comparison between cases can lead to other questions of interest such as why there are 
differences. The concern with governance paradigms can provide additional guidance on 
case selection. Gunderson and Light cite management of the Grand Canyon river system 
in northern Arizona, a section of the Colorado River, as an example of adaptive 
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governance in a context having similar “resource demands and uses, institutional 
complexity, and asymmetries of power among stakeholders.”10 A study could ask, What 
role did collaborative processes play in making the Everglades and Grand Canyon 
governance systems different? A recent case study of governance of the Colorado River, 
however, was critical of its adaptive performance and recommended the formation of 
watershed/ecosystem level coordination.11 Expounding on the Everglades case would 
illuminate the potential and limitations of this approach. 
Second, since this dissertation’s holistic evaluation painted with a broad brush, 
future research could hone in on several of the most interesting findings in this 
dissertation in order to understanding them more fully. The most initially productive 
research would focus on more specific testing of this chapter’s recommendations. Such 
research could, for example, offer a better understanding of (1) the reliance of 
collaboration on the incorrect assumptions (of consensus and technical capabilities), (2) 
the barriers to frequent, high quality collaboration and its influence, (3) the relationships 
between process design and outcomes, and (4) the interactions between the formal 
governance systems (including collaboration) and the informal governance networks. 
Last, the dissertation evaluated the ability of collaborative governance to reduce 
two threats of interest, the Everglades Agricultural Area phosphorus and Shark Slough 
flow regime threats. An even more holistic evaluation of collaborative governance would 
look at all of its environmental gains across an ecosystem and not just a few of the 
threats. Everglades collaboration achieved many other successes and posed additional 
challenges, and an analysis of these other successes and challenges, including what they 
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had in common and how collaboration filled a unique role in addressing these issues, 
would ensure that recommendations for collaboration retain these advantages as well.  
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APPENDIX A 
PHOSPHORUS CASE COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES 
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A.1 Special Project to Prevent the Eutrophication of Lake Okeechobee (1973-76) 
The Florida Legislature created, and the Division of State Planning sponsored, the 
Special Project to conduct and integrate research concerning the ecological impacts of 
nutrients on the Lake Okeechobee. Participants were an interdisciplinary team of federal, 
state, and local agencies, universities, and consulting firms. The Special Project’s Interim 
Report was not published because it was critical of past drainage policies. The Special 
Project issued a final report that identified the main source of nutrients to the north of the 
lake and recommended discontinuing backpumping to the lake from the Everglades 
Agricultural Area to the south. 
 
A.2 First Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Council (LOTAC I) (1985-86) 
Governor Bob Graham directed the Florida Department of Environmental 
Regulation (DER) to study Lake Okeechobee eutrophication. DER formed the first Lake 
Okeechobee Technical Advisory Council (LOTAC I) composed of scientists and 
representatives of agriculture, environmental groups, and local, state, and federal 
agencies. LOTAC I recommended diverting nutrient-laden water from the lake, with 
possible use of the Holey Land to store and treat the diverted water. 
 
A.3 District Response to Algae Bloom and LOTAC I (1986-88) 
At the time the first Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Council (LOTAC I) 
report was released, Lake Okeechobee experienced a large algae bloom, and public 
criticism was directed at the District and LOTAC I. The South Florida Water 
Management District created cross-departmental teams to develop integrated solutions to 
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the lake’s problems. The District held three workshops with environmental groups, 
agricultural interests, and other agencies. In addition, the District created the Lake 
Okeechobee Stakeholders Advisory Committee to assist development of the Protection 
Options Summary that was forwarded to the Florida Legislature. The District, with input 
from the advisory committee and the second Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory 
Council (see A.4), finalized its Action Plan to Protect Lake Okeechobee and the 
Everglades. 
 
A.4 Second Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Council (LOTAC II) (1987-90) 
The Florida Surface Water Improvement and Management (SWIM) Act created 
the second Lake Okeechobee Technical Advisory Council (LOTAC II) to investigate and 
make recommendations concerning the ecological effects of the first Lake Okeechobee 
Technical Advisory Council’s proposed flow diversions and the previous action to 
eliminate backpumping from the Everglades Agricultural Area (under the District’s 
Interim Action Plan). Members were scientists, including representatives of 
environmental groups and the Florida phosphate council (phosphate miners and fertilizer 
manufacturers). LOTAC II’s interim report warned that nutrient impacts could spread 
across the Everglades and that they may be constrained by law. LOTAC II recommended 
constructing wetlands to reduce phosphorus entering the Everglades (i.e., Stormwater 
Treatment Areas), agricultural best management practices, and comprehensive water 
quality planning (presumably a SWIM plan). The recommendations led to the state’s 
authorization of the Everglades Nutrient Removal Project, a pilot project Stormwater 
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Treatment Area. LOTAC II also provided technical review of the first draft of the 
Everglades SWIM Plan. 
 
A.5 Advisory Committee to Prioritize SWIM Planning (1987-88) 
The South Florida Water Management District formed a committee composed of 
state agencies and local governments to prioritize water bodies to receive SWIM plans 
(under the Surface Water Improvement and Management Act). The committee selected 
the Everglades as a priority body, even though the SWIM Act did not require it. The 
District then began collecting and analyzing agency data for the Everglades SWIM Plan. 
 
A.6 Everglades SWIM Plan Advisory Committee (1989) 
The South Florida Water Management District created the committee with 
members from state agencies and agricultural interests (including the sugar industry) for 
the purpose of identifying issues and management options. The committee considered 
Stormwater Treatment Areas, agricultural best management practices, and permit 
programs. The committee also discussed issues of Everglades hydroperiod, as a result of 
the sugar industry calling attention to the ecological impacts of flow disruption and 
possible reduction of flow due to the STAs. The committee, along with the second Lake 
Okeechobee Technical Advisory Council (see A.4), provided input to the first draft of the 
Everglades SWIM Plan that recommended Stormwater Treatment Areas and a final 




A.7 Negotiations for Joint Federal Comments on Everglades SWIM Plan (1990) 
During the federal lawsuit, the Department of Justice led negotiations to unify the 
federal agencies’ response to the first draft Everglades SWIM Plan. Additionally, an 
interagency team of federal scientists drafted joint comments and commissioned 
scientific studies. 
 
A.8 Martinez Meeting to Settle Federal Phosphorus Lawsuit (1990) 
Governor Bob Martinez held a multi-stakeholder meeting to advance a 
preliminary proposal to settle the federal phosphorus lawsuit. Several governance leaders 
representing the sugar industry, environmental interests, and the South Florida Water 
Management District had endorsed the proposal, but it did not gain traction because 
several key parties had not been involved in its development.  
 
A.9 Powers Negotiations to Produce Settlement Agreement (1991) 
Governor Lawton Chiles brought state and South Florida Water Management 
District officials, environmental groups, and the sugar industry together to reach 
agreement, but the initial meeting ended abruptly. Nor could scientists reach agreement 
on size of the Stormwater Treatment Areas (STAs). The District then brought in Timer 
Powers, a former member of the District’s Governing Board who had facilitated other 
District mediations. Timer Powers asked the Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium to 
help facilitate interagency technical agreement and design a process for political 
settlement. The negotiations produced the Settlement Agreement that settled the federal 
lawsuit. The Settlement Agreement included requirements for STAs, agricultural best 
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management practices, and phosphorus standards (with deadlines). The federal court 
maintained oversight. The agreement did not specify funding sources. 
 
A.10 Technical Oversight Committee (TOC) (1991-present) 
The Settlement Agreement (see A.9) established the Technical Oversight 
Committee (TOC) to coordinate research, monitoring, and compliance, and to make 
recommendations to the settlement principals. Members were technical representatives of 
the federal agencies (Everglades National Park, Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge, 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineering) and state/regional agencies (Florida 
Department of Environmental Regulation and the South Florida Water Management 
District). The Everglades Forever Act continued operation of the TOC. The TOC met 
quarterly, or more often as needed, with meetings routinely attended by other interests. 
The Settlement Agreement also directed the TOC to reach consensus, but on 
controversial issues, members voted, with federal and state representatives often 
disagreeing. The Settlement Agreement envisioned the TOC playing a larger role in 
overseeing research for the state’s numeric phosphorus criterion than it ultimately did.  
 
A.11 Stormwater Treatment Area Design Working Group (1991-92) 
The District convened a diverse group of technical experts representing 
state/regional and federal agencies, agricultural interests, and other stakeholders to assist 
development of a conceptual design for the Stormwater Treatment Areas. 
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A.12 Scientific Advisory Group for the Everglades (SAGE) (1992-93) 
Similar to the Stormwater Treatment Area Design Working Group (see A.11) a 
year prior, the Everglades SWIM Plan established the Scientific Advisory Group for the 
Everglades (SAGE) for the purpose of assisting the South Florida Water Management 
District’s Governing Board in selecting phosphorus reduction technologies, of which 
Stormwater Treatment Areas (STAs) was one. SAGE consisted of state and federal 
agencies and a broad base of stakeholders, including sugar and vegetable growers, urban 
communities, tribes, and environmental organizations. Due to advocacy by the sugar 
industry, SAGE spent considerable time assessing the alternatives in relation to STAs. 
SAGE ultimately determined that STAs was the most viable technology and 
recommended pilot testing of chemical treatment. SAGE stopped meeting when the 
Cormick mediation (see A.13) became the main avenue for technical negotiation. 
 
A.13 Cormick Mediation to Produce the Technical Plan (1992-94) 
In response to the many lawsuits filed by the sugar industry against the Settlement 
Agreement and Everglades SWIM Plan, the South Florida Water Management District, 
state, and Department of Justice proposed negotiations and recruited nationally renowned 
mediator Gerald Cormick. Cormick organized a broad-based policy mediation group and 
a Technical Mediation Group of scientists chosen by the policy group. The Technical 
Plan was completed and became an attachment to the Statement of Principles (see A.14) 
and eventually the Everglades Forever Act. As a result of the sugar industry’s advocacy, 
the Technical Plan expanded the phosphorus reduction efforts to other (not the 
Everglades Agricultural Area) inflows to the Everglades and included features to restore 
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flow regime along the northern border of the Water Conservation Areas. Issues of 
funding and land acquisition remained unanswered. 
 
A.14 Babbitt Negotiations to Produce the Statement of Principles (1993) 
The U.S. Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, wanted to resolve the 
phosphorus conflict in order to clear the way for the Central and Southern Florida Project 
Restudy. With the state’s blessing, Secretary Babbitt negotiated with sugar industry 
representatives concerning restoration funding. The negotiation resulted in the Statement 
of Principles signed by the federal and state/regional agencies, and the sugar industry. 
With the Statement of Principles, the sugar industry would pay about a third of 
phosphorus reduction costs over twenty years. The Cormick mediation (see A.13) 
continued but reached an impasse. The sugar industry convinced Secretary Babbitt to 
allow the issues to be settled through state legislative action. The result was the 
Everglades Forever Act. 
 
A.15 Workshops for the State’s Phosphorus Criterion (2001) 
The Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) held a series of 
multi-stakeholder workshops moderated by the Consensus Building Institute. The 
purpose of the workshops was to “take a fresh look at the science” during the agency’s 
development of the numerical phosphorus standard and procedures for monitoring 
compliance. The workshops included agricultural, environmental, tribal, and other 
interests. Following the workshops, DEP recommended a phosphorus criterion of 10 ppb, 
whereas two years earlier DEP scientists had advocated 8.5 ppb. DEP also kept the option 
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open for a phosphorus rule based on use of phosphorus-reduction technology (rather than 
a numeric standard). 
 
A.16 WRAC Issue Workshops for Long term Plan Revisions (2003-04) 
The Water Resources Advisory Commission (WRAC) held several “issue 
workshops” to provide input on revisions to the South Florida Water Management 
District’s Long term Plan for Water Quality. The plan revisions were not substantial or 











B.1 Interagency Planning of the Survey-Review Plan (1965-68) 
Everglades National Park (ENP) asked the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to 
prepare a Survey-Review Report to improve water deliveries to the park. The Corps 
agreed and communicated with ENP and the South Florida Water Management District 
during the planning process. The Corps agreed to an interim water delivery plan for ENP 
until structural improvements (such as more canals, levees, and pumps in the Water 
Conservation Areas and park) would be in place to meet a minimum delivery schedule. 
As part of the process, the Corps recommended changes to the Central and Southern 
Florida Project to meet future water needs of the growing urban population. This resulted 
in increased water storage in Lake Okeechobee and the WCAs, and authorization of the 
ENP-South Dade Conveyance System. ENP requested that water drained by the South 
Dade system be redirected to Taylor Slough, but this was not done. 
 
B.2 East Everglades Resources Planning Project (1978-80) 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of the 
Interior established a program to fund planning in sensitive areas adjacent to national 
parks. Under this program, Dade County formed the East Everglades Resources Planning 
Project to examine resource management issues in the area and make recommendations. 
An interagency steering committee guided the project with emphasis on technical 
analysis, and two citizens advisory committees represented East Everglades property 
owners and farmers, and environmental groups. The effort was most concerned with the 
East Everglades for its aquifer recharge value, and the report recommended seasonal 
agriculture and no further residential development (except ancillary to agriculture), with 
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public acquisition a last resort. Dade County adopted the plan and passed ordinances for 
its implementation. 
 
B.3 Committee to Study Jetport in WCA 3B (1982-83) 
When concerns were raised regarding citing an airport (or jetport) in Water 
Conservation Area 3B, Governor Bob Graham formed a committee to analyze South 
Florida’s future aviation needs. Environmental groups were not strongly opposed to the 
site, since they believed it would be less detrimental than other sites considered. The 
committee was composed of representatives from state agencies and private industry, and 
a university expert. The committee found that the existing airport could meet the region’s 
demands through 2000 and that further consideration of the site in WCA 3B was 
unwarranted. The governor opposed the jetport plan and did not renew the state’s 
participation in the Everglades Jetport Pact. 
 
B.4 Interagency Agreements for the Experimental Program (1983-99) 
Everglades National Park advocated its Seven-Point Proposal for improving the 
park’s water flow regimes. The South Florida Water Management District, U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, and ENP developed the proposal into the Experimental Program of 
Water Deliveries. The Experimental Program was operational changes designed to 
increase flows to Northeast Shark Slough and provide information for additional 
structural and operational changes through the Modified Water Deliveries Project. When 
the U.S. Congress approved the Experimental Program, it required the National Park 
Service, Corps, and District to agree on the terms of the experiments. 
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B.5 East Everglades Mediation (1983-85) 
East Everglades farmers and homeowners sued the South Florida Water 
Management District and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to stop the Experimental 
Program, and the dispute was mediated. The negotiated agreement allowed the program 
to go forward provided there were operational measures (such as pumping in canals) to 
mitigate the risk of flooding in developed areas due to the program. Studies later found 
that these operational measures caused significant seepage losses from Northeast Shark 
Slough and left some wetlands drier than before the program. The agreement also 
promised seasonal groundwater lowering to aid farming. 
 
B.6 ENP/EE Resource Planning and Management Committee (RPMC) (1984-85) 
Governor Bob Graham established the Everglades National Park/East Everglades 
Resource Planning and Management Committee (RPMC) under the Areas of Critical 
State Concern program. The RPMC was a response to the threat of local land use policy 
change in the East Everglades. The RPMC represented multiple interests with the 
purpose of developing a plan for the area. The South Florida Water Management 
District’s internal East Everglades Task Force (formed in late 1983) assisted the 
committee with data analysis and policy development, and the state’s Department of 
Community Affairs drafted the plan. Governor Graham and the Florida Cabinet adopted 
the RPMC’s Implementation Plan that recommended state land acquisition of 
undeveloped areas (not federal acquisition because of lack of support by the Ronald 
Reagan Administration) and flood protection and density limits for the 8½ Square Mile 
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Area. The RPMC led to the formation of the Southern Everglades Technical Committee 
(see B.7). The RPMC also provided input to the Experimental Program. 
 
 
B.7 Southern Everglades Technical Committee (SETC) (1985-88) 
The Everglades National Park/East Everglades Resource Planning and 
Management Committee’s Implementation Plan (see B.6) created the Southern 
Everglades Technical Committee for the purpose of addressing technical uncertainties 
and resolving conflicts. Members of the SETC were technical representatives of many of 
the groups that had participated in the RPMC. Following disbandment of the SETC 
several years later, there was not strict adherence to the Implementation Plan. 
 
B.8 Interagency Committee to Review the C-111 Interim Plan (1988) 
The South Florida Water Management District asked the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers to address impacts of the Experimental Program on the C-111 basin. A year 
later, public attention grew after flood releases caused damage to the southern estuaries in 
the basin. Since the typical Corps planning process was lengthy, the District proposed the 
C-111 Interim Plan. An interagency committee of federal, state, and local agencies 
reviewed and approved the plan. 
 
B.9 East Everglades Land Acquisition Task Force (1988) 
Governor Bob Martinez formed the East Everglades Land Acquisition Task Force 
to focus on acquisition of East Everglades land as originally set forth by the Everglades 
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National Park/East Everglades Resource Planning and Management Committee’s 
Implementation Plan (RPMC) (see B.6). The land acquisition had faltered because of 
farmer and landowner resistance, and lack of attention by the state. Governor Martinez 
specifically asked the Task Force to consider whether the state should be in favor of the 
expansion of Everglades National Park into the East Everglades. The East Everglades 
Land Acquisition Task Force included many of the agencies that had participated in the 
RPMC, as well as environmental groups and private landowners. The East Everglades 
Land Acquisition Task Force recommended expansion of Everglades National Park and 
the provision of flood protection for the 8½ Square Mile Area (to which ENP agreed). 
 
B.10 DOI and Corps Partnership to Implement MWD Project (1989-present) 
The Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act and subsequent plan 
for the Modified Water Deliveries Project created an unusual arrangement whereby the 
U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) provided funding and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers designed and constructed the project. This led to Corps frustration as the DOI 
changed project requirements and withheld funding. A DOI Inspector General report as 
late as 2006 noted ongoing problems with lack of DOI oversight and poor 
communication between the two agencies. For example, it was not until 2004 that the 
DOI required the Corps to report project status and costs. 
 
B.11 Mediation for MWD Project Impact on Snail Kites (1990) 
Monitoring of the impacts of the Experimental Program led the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service to conclude that the program would jeopardize the snail kite and degrade 
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its critical habitat under drought conditions. The National Audubon Society arranged an 
interagency mediation and research of alternatives. This resulted in a revised water 
delivery plan that maintained a kite drought refuge. The revised plan was the 
recommended alternative for the Modified Water Deliveries Project. 
 
B.12 Development of the C-111 Project (1990-94) 
While the C-111 Interim Plan was in place, the Everglades National Park 
Protection and Expansion Act authorized reevaluation of the C-111 system to address the 
need for restoring flow to Taylor Slough and the Everglades National Park panhandle 
(south of the C-111 canals; see Figure 4). An interdisciplinary team of federal and 
state/regional agencies and agricultural interests developed project alternatives. 
 
B.13 East Everglades 8.5 SMA Study Committee (1994-95) 
Amendment of the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act 
suggested acquisition of the 8½ Square Mile Area (8.5 SMA) and conflict resulted. 
Governor Lawton Chiles established the East Everglades 8.5 SMA Study Committee to 
analyze the relationship between the 8.5 SMA and restoration of flow to Northeast Shark 
Slough and the impacts of alternative plans. The East Everglades 8.5 SMA Study 
Committee membership was the main federal and state/regional agencies, and 
representatives of environmental and 8.5 SMA interests. The Committee recommended 
the acquisition of the western half of the 8.5 SMA to serve as a buffer, and the provision 
of flood protection for the other half. Even though the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had 
participated (expressing restrictions, however), the agency refused to sign an agreement 
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for the recommendation. The Committee’s recommendation eventually formed the basis 
of the South Florida Water Management District’s Locally Preferred Option for the 8.5 
SMA. 
 
B.14 Southern Everglades Restoration Alliance (SERA) (1996-98) 
Five agencies (the National Park Service, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, South 
Florida Water Management District, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection) formed the Southern Everglades Restoration 
Alliance (SERA) to coordinate the restoration projects in the area (the Experimental 
Program, Modified Water Deliveries Project, C-111 Project, and L-28 Project (between 
ENP and Big Cypress Swamp)). SERA’s meetings were generally open to the public and 
other agencies and stakeholder groups attended. The Miccosukee Tribe, however, filed a 
lawsuit alleging violation of open process requirements, and SERA disbanded. The 
Miccosukee asserted that SERA influenced decisions regarding the 8½ Square Mile Area 
and the Cape Sable seaside sparrow. 
 
B.15 Interagency Sparrow Mediations, including for ISOP and IOP (1998-2001) 
In late 1997 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) found that operations 
under the Experimental Program jeopardized the Cape Sable seaside sparrow and 
recommended immediate changes. The Corps responded that the FWS position risked 
catastrophic failure of the water management system. The agencies brought in conflict 
resolution experts, and the Corps coordinated with the U.S. Council on Environmental 
Quality to speed the planning process for the emergency actions. The agencies reached 
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agreement for an initial emergency deviation from the Experimental Program, however 
conflict remained. Numerous interagency meetings occurred, the American 
Ornithological Union provided mediation, and the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration 
Working Group (see Appendix C, C.5) assembled a technical panel with members 
nominated by the Union. The technical panel supported the need for operational changes 
to protect the sparrow. The Council on Environmental Quality facilitated high-level 
interagency negotiations to develop the 2000 Interim Structural and Operational Plan 
(ISOP), with environmental groups presenting at one of the meetings. Interagency 
meetings continued to make adjustments to ISOP and developed alternatives for the next 
plan, the Interim Operational Plan (IOP). 
In early 2001 the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution mediated 
interagency development of the IOP. Public criticism of the draft plan, and South Florida 
Water Management District concerns about the plan’s impact on water supply, led to 
another round of mediation. The result of the mediation was a new alternative that met 
the District’s concerns. Several groups then expressed concern over flood risk to 
development, and the District withdrew its support for the alternative. The agencies 
resumed mediation, which resulted in a revised alternative that also addressed flooding. 
 
B.16 Decomp Project Planning (2000-present) 
The WCA 3 Decompartmentalization and Sheet Flow Enhancement (Decomp) 
Project was one of the initially authorized projects under the Comprehensive Everglades 
Restoration Plan. In 2002, after professionally facilitated development of the project’s 
Project Management Plan, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers suspended project planning 
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because the Modified Water Deliveries Project had not been completed. Corps’ planning 
of the Decomp Project resumed in 2005, and RECOVER (see Appendix C, C.9) 
developed the Decomp Adaptive Management Plan (DAMP) using professional 
facilitation for collaboration with the agencies, tribes, and stakeholder groups (including 
environmental and recreational fishing interests). The purpose of DAMP was to address 
scientific uncertainty through data analysis and large-scale experiments/modeling. 
Following development of DAMP and amendments to the Project Management Plan, the 
federal and regional/local interagency Decomp Project Delivery Team was reconvened, 
and the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force formed an ad hoc subcommittee 
to provide input to the planning team. The initial focus of Decomp Project planning was 
on the removal of the Miami Canal and replacement (or enhancement) of water supply 
capacity. 
 
B.17 CSOP Project Delivery Team and Advisory Team (2001-07) 
The Combined Structural and Operational Plan (CSOP) was an integrated plan for 
several features of the Modified Water Deliveries and C-111 projects. In 2001 the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers convened an interagency CSOP Project Delivery Team aided 
by a professional facilitator. Because of the ongoing controversies over these projects and 
early criticism of the CSOP planning process, the Corps sought stakeholder involvement 
beyond that which could be achieved through the Water Resources Advisory 
Commission (see Appendix C, C.10). In response, the South Florida Ecosystem 
Restoration Task Force convened the multi-stakeholder (residential, agricultural, 
environmental, and recreational interests) CSOP Advisory Team to provide consensus 
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recommendations. The CSOP Advisory Team issued guidance concerning project 
objectives and provided input on project alternatives. The CSOP Advisory Team was 
unable to reach consensus regarding seepage management and recommended continued 






ECOSYSTEM LEVEL COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES 
 
 271
C.1 Governor’s Conference on Water Management in South Florida (1971) 
In response to an extreme drought and impacts on water supply, Governor Reubin 
Askew convened the Governor’s Conference on Water Management in South Florida. 
Held over several days, the Conference assembled 150 technical and planning/policy 
experts with diverse knowledge and affiliations, including agricultural, environmental, 
and governmental interests. The conference was co-chaired by ecologist Art Marshall and 
growth management expert John DeGrove. The Conference’s recommendations led to the 
passage of several state laws in 1972, including the Water Resources Act (which 
established the water management districts), the Environmental Land and Water 
Management Act (which created the Areas of Critical State Concern program), the State 
Planning Act (which formed the Division of State Planning), and the Land Conservation 
Act (to publicly acquire environmentally sensitive lands). 
 
C.2 Save Our Everglades Program and Coordinating Committee (1983-90) 
Under public criticism for environmental problems, especially in the Kissimmee 
River Basin and Everglades National Park, Governor Bob Graham met with 
environmental advocates (including Art Marshall) and held a summit of the main state 
environmental agencies and the South Florida Water Management District. The result 
was the Save Our Everglades Program and state-based interagency Kissimmee-
Okeechobee-Everglades Coordinating Committee to implement the program. The goal of 
the program was to significantly restore the ecological health of the South Florida 
watershed, primarily through a holistic perspective and project coordination. Save Our 
Everglades initially focused on six preexisting restoration projects (such as the 
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Experimental Program), and gradually added projects as they were created. Save Our 
Everglades did not address the phosphorus threat. The Committee issued annual progress 
reports through the Governor’s Office.  
 
C.3 Lower East Coast (LEC) Water Supply Plan Advisory Committee (1990-98) 
In 1989 state legislation required each water management district to prepare water 
supply plans to forecast water needs and identify sources for the next twenty years. The 
District began preparation of the Lower East Coast Regional Water Supply Plan (LEC 
Plan) and in 1992 created a LEC Plan Advisory Committee with urban, agricultural, and 
environmental representatives. In 1995 the LEC Plan planning process merged with the 
Central and Southern Florida Project Restudy to reduce duplication of effort. The draft 
LEC Plan did not meet new legislative requirements for environmental protection, so the 
District issued the LEC Interim Plan. The Interim Plan established “minimum flows and 
levels” for protection of natural areas (as required by state law), but it also continued to 
rely on the Everglades for water supply and maintained the existing farming practices in 
the Everglades Agricultural Area. The final LEC Plan authorized in 2000 relied on the 
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan to meet the projected water demand. 
 
C.4 Central and Southern Florida Project Restudy (1992-99) 
After the U.S. Congress authorized the “Reconnaissance Phase” of the Central 
and Southern Florida Project Restudy in 1992, and at the urging of the U.S. Department 
of the Interior, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers solicited planning input from 
Everglades National Park and Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge. The South Florida 
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Water Management District, feeling excluded, formed its own team to communicate with 
the Corps. A year later, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt established the South 
Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Working Group (see C.5) to unify the 
federal agencies in support of the Restudy. In 1994 Governor Lawton Chiles convened 
the state/regional/locally-oriented Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South 
Florida (see C.6). In early 1995 the District’s Lower East Coast Water Supply Plan 
planning process (see C.3) combined with the Restudy. Toward the end of the 
Reconnaissance Phase in mid 1995, the Corps invited stakeholders to develop a process 
plan for the “Feasibility Phase.” The Corps then formed the Restudy Team consisting of 
over 100 interagency (and tribal) technical and planning experts. In 1998, as the 
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan was being finalized, the Corps formed an 
interagency Implementation Team to formulate the CERP implementation plan. 
 
C.5 South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Subgroups (1993-present) 
U.S. Department of the Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt initiated the South 
Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force and Working Group to enable federal support 
and guidance for the Central and Southern Florida Project Restudy. The original Task 
Force consisted of the heads of five federal Departments and the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, with the Assistant Interior Secretary serving as chair. The original 
Working Group membership was Florida-based senior officials of ten federal agencies. 
The function of the Working Group was to evaluate restoration efforts, identify 
interagency conflicts, and recommend actions to the Task Force. The Working Group 
created several subgroups, including the Science Coordination Team. The 1996 Water 
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Resources Development Act expanded Task Force membership to include state, regional, 
local, and tribal governments. The Task Force had an administrative staff including an 
executive director. 
Most notably, the Working Group immediately produced a controversial Federal 
Objectives Report that advocated dramatic measures to restore Everglades ecological 
health. Later, the Working Group mainly assembled technical experts to weigh in on 
controversial science and provided information for annual activity reports. The Science 
Coordination Team prepared a plan for coordinating science and established a set of 
ecological indicators to evaluate restoration progress (largely drawn from Comprehensive 
Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) evaluation indicators). For oversight of CERP, the 
Task Force contracted with two successive National Academy of Sciences independent 
review panels. Most recently, the Task Force was drafting an Integrated Schedule to 
improve coordination between CERP and non-CERP projects (such as the Modified 
Water Deliveries Project). 
 
C.6 Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable South Florida (GCSSF) (1994-99) 
Governor Lawton Chiles created the Governor’s Commission for a Sustainable 
South Florida (GCSSF) to provide a state response to U.S. Department of the Interior 
Secretary Bruce Babbitt’s call for collaborative ecosystem management during the 
Central and Southern Florida Project Restudy. The Florida Conflict Resolution 
Consortium designed and facilitated the process, and Richard Pettigrew, a former Florida 
Speaker of the House, was chair. GCSSF membership included a wide range of public 
and private stakeholders. The GCSSF issued a series of consensus-based reports to 
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Governor Chiles. The first report declared the current path of South Florida to be 
“unsustainable” and made over a hundred recommendations. The 1996 Water Resources 
Development Act directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to incorporate GCSSF 
input (especially the GCSSF’s Conceptual Plan) into the Restudy and suggested that the 
South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (see C.5) designate the GCSSF as an 
advisory body (which it did). Last, the GCSSF commented on the draft Comprehensive 
Everglades Restoration Plan implementation plan. 
 
C.7 Governor’s Commission for the Everglades (GCE) (1999-2001) 
Newly elected Governor Jeb Bush replaced the Governor’s Commission for a 
Sustainable South Florida (see C.6) with the Governor’s Commission for the Everglades. 
Membership included the sugar industry, an environmental group (the Florida Audubon), 
urban development interests, and local officials. The stated purposes of the GCE were to 
enable public participation and improve decision making, especially for implementation 
of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), and to act as an advisory 
body to the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (see C.5). The GCE met six 
times, focusing on early CERP implementation issues. The GCE used majority voting 
rather than consensus building to make recommendations, for which there were few. 
When the executive order creating the Governor’s Commission for the Everglades 
expired, the GCE recommended that the South Florida Water Management District create 
a forum for stakeholder involvement. The District’s Governing Board thus established the 
Water Resources Advisory Commission (see C.10). 
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C.8 South Florida Water Quality Protection Program (1999-2003) 
The Florida Department of Environmental Protection, with funding from the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), created the Water Quality Protection Program 
to coordinate the state’s Total Maximum Daily Load program (especially regarding 
pollution from urban development) and water quality restoration activities under the 
Everglades Forever Act and the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan. The 
program established an Interagency Management Committee consisting of various state, 
regional, local, and tribal governments, and the EPA. The Miccosukee Tribe declined to 
participate. The program got off to a slow start due to inadequate staffing, and the 
program was suspended. 
 
C.9 Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) (2000-present) 
Implementation of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) 
began in 2000 when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and South Florida Water 
Management District signed a Design Agreement for selected projects. The agreement 
created the Design Coordination Team composed of the District, Corps, and Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection. The Water Resources Development Act of 
2000 specified institutional measures to guide federal and state/regional coordination for 
CERP implementation, including the interagency development of Programmatic 
Regulations. In 2003 the Programmatic Regulations established the multi-agency 
RECOVER (Restoration Coordination and Verification) group out of individuals who 
had been involved in the Restudy Team (and had continued to meet informally since 
CERP’s approval). In 2005 the Corps and District formed the CERP Quarterly Review 
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Board to discuss issues and project status among a small group of leaders. The QRB 
focused on streamlining CERP implementation and resolving issues between agencies. 
 
C.10 Water Resources Advisory Commission (WRAC) (2001-present) 
At the request of the Governor’s Commission for the Everglades (see C.7) (which 
was disbanding), the South Florida Water Management District’s Governing Board 
established the Water Resources Advisory Commission (WRAC) to provide consensus 
recommendations to the board on all aspects of water resource protection. The WRAC’s 
almost fifty members represented business, agricultural, environmental, community, 
governmental, and tribal interests. The WRAC met frequently (monthly), held many 
focused “issue workshops,” and formed special issue sub-committees (such as concerning 
Lake Okeechobee). The WRAC initially used facilitation provided by the South Florida 
Regional Planning Commission, but soon switched to direction by the WRAC chair (a 
member of the District’s Governing Board, who was Mike Collins until 2009). In 2002 
the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (see C.5) designated the WRAC as 
an advisory body, and the two groups met together once a year. The main issues 
addressed by the WRAC were the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (and the 
state’s related Acceler8 initiative), water assurances, regional water supply, Lake 
Okeechobee management, land acquisition, recreation (which affected the Decomp 
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Hello or Dear _________: 
 
My name is Kathryn Frank. I am a doctoral candidate in the City & Regional 
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processes. 
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completely voluntary. The interview would be open-ended and take about 45 
minutes, and I will record your responses with hand-written notes. I would like to 
meet you and conduct the interview in person if possible. I will be in your area on 
X days. If an in-person interview is not possible, I could call you at your 
convenience. 
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Investigators: Kathryn Frank (doctoral candidate) and Michael Elliott 
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Research Consent Form 
 
You are being asked to be a volunteer in a research study.  
 
Purpose:  
! The purpose of this study is to see if use of teamwork 
improves governance’s ability to incorporate environmental 
and long-range perspectives, coordinate the activities of 
diverse stakeholder groups, and attend to emerging and 
pressing environmental problems. The research will examine 
how teamwork achieves these results directly through 
collaborative process outcomes and indirectly through 
increasing the capacity of political and bureaucratic 
governance. Approximately 100 government officials and 
civic leaders will be interviewed for this research.  You were 
selected for interview because of your involvement in or 
observation of collaborative decision-making processes for 
restoration of the south Florida ecosystem. 
 
Procedures: 
If you decide to be in this study, your part will involve:  
! An open-ended interview with Kathryn Frank that will take 
approximately 45 minutes. The interview may occur in 
person at a location of your choosing (typically an office or a 
public place, but not a private residence) if Kathryn Frank is 
in the area or over the telephone. 
! If you prefer, Kathryn Frank will e-mail you the interview 
questions in advance with enough time for your review. 
! Kathryn Frank will record your responses by taking notes 




The following risks/discomforts may occur as a result of your 
participation in this study: 
! The risks involved are no greater than those involved in daily 
activities such as your involvement in public affairs as a 




The following benefits to you are possible as a result of being in 
this study: 
! There are no direct benefits, however you may benefit from 
being in this study as a government official or civic leader 
because the lessons learned in the dissertation will directly 
pertain to your involvement in public decision-making in 
south Florida. The lessons learned will not be available until 
the dissertation is finalized in about May 2006. 
 
Compensation to You 




! You have the option of maintaining confidentiality or being 
cited by name when your interview responses are used in the 
dissertation. No direct quotes will be used. You will have the 
opportunity to review the text in which your identity appears, 
to ensure proper attribution. 
! The Georgia Institute of Technology IRB has the right to 
review study records to ensure that the research is being 
carried out in the proper way. The Office of Human Research 
Protections may also look at study records.   
 
Costs to You 
! There are no costs to you other than your time to participate 




! Your participation in this study is voluntary. You do not 
have to be in this study if you don't want to be. 
! You have the right to change your mind and leave the 
study at any time without giving any reason, and without 
penalty. 
! Any new information that may make you change your 
mind about being in this study will be given to you. 
! You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
! You do not waive any of your legal rights by agreeing to 
participate in this study.  
 
Questions about the Study or Your Rights as a Research Subject 
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! If you have any questions about the study, you may 
contact Dr. Michael Elliott, at telephone (404) 894-9841, 
or Kathryn Frank, at telephone (541) 683-1514. 
! If you have any questions about your rights as a 
research subject, you may contact Ms. Melanie Clark, 
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